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ABSTRACT 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is most well known as a matematician, or a logician, and then famed as 
the initiator of a phenomenological movement. He has been accused of promoting transcendental 
indealism to the point of solipsism. His focus on pure consciousness has been received as a method 
which operates above its historical context and straight to the 'seeing essences.' This is partly because of 
his problematic wording in his earlier writings.  
 However, his last published (yet unfinished) work, The Crisis of European Sciences (Belgrade, 
1936), is certainly a very different introduction to his phenomenology. In this publication he struggles 
with the issue of Life-wo 
rld, the world we live in, before it gets to be described abstractly, in a scientific way. One aspect of our 
experience in this Life-world is our consciousness of internal time (not the clock-time, not even a 
simple measuring of duration). This investigation into the consciousness of internal time, impinges his 
definition of pure consciousness. Consciousness is embedded in internal-time-consciousness. 
Consciousness cannot operate "outside" time. In this line of thinking  Husserl almost "by accident" 
came to formulate his philosophy of history, for which is so far much less known.  
 Husserl's 'Philosophy of History' is his last contribution as a philosopher who had failed to 
systematize his teaching, as in his Erste Philosophie mss. of 1923-'24., and again in Cartesianische 
Meditationen, mss. 1929. which he has kept revising and ultimately dropping. Just as well in the latter 
case, since tempora mutantur and nos mutamus in illis, and so, as I will contend, his new concerns with 
history emerged. 
 This is my thesis presented here, and it is my own original research, that Husserl's philosophy of 
history is not only worthy of reconstruction but a very significant aspect of his mature phenomenology.   
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Husserl's Later Thinking Converging into a Philosophy of History, or 
The Theme of Historical Consciousness in Husserl's Later Writings Especially in the Crisis of 
European Sciences 
 
Introduction 
Chapter One.   Profiling Edmund Husserl, the Man and the Thinker  
1   Husserl's Basic Biography 
2   Husserl's Achivements and the Reason of his Fame. 
 2. 1   Husserl came only later in his writings to appreciate History and he  was  against  
Historicism, more particularly that of W. Dilthey.  
 2. 2   Husserl was famous on  
 (1) Transcendental Logic, (2) Intentionality, (3) and the Theory of   Reduction, before the Crisis 
texts.  
3   The problem of approaching Husserl as a Philosopher of History 
4   The Complexity of Husserl's diverse streams of thinking focussed on  
      (1) Pure Consciousness, (2) Consciousness of Internal Time, and  both   converging into his 
discovery of (3) History  
 
Chapter Two.   Pure Consciousness 
 The object of 'phenomenological science' is described as the activity of  the consciousness 
explored in a pure phenomenological reflection,  focussing on  the essential structure of that 
activity. 
1   1913. Ideen 1 Buch, published by Husserl in the 'Jahrbuch für Philosophie und    
      phänomenologische Forschung'  Bd. I.  
     1950. Ideen 1 Buch, published in the series Husserliana (abbrev. Hua) III.   
     1976. (a new edition) Ideen I, published in Hua III-1 and III-2.  
2   1950. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, in Hua I. 
 
Chapter Three.   Consciousness of Internal Time 
 Every Now of a mental process has its necessary horizon of an After. The  stream of mental 
processes is an infinite unity and the stream-form,  which  necessarily comprises all mental processes, 
is pertaining to the pure ego. 
1.  1928. Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins   
      published by Heidegger in the Jahrbuch Bd. IX.    
2.  1966. with the Supplementary texts, in Hua X 
 
Chapter Four.   A Totally New Introduction to Phenomenology.  
 Husserl came to be dissatisfied with his introduction to Phenomenology  as he had done in 
The Ideas I, the Cartesian Meditations and even in the  Formal and Transcendental Logic. After 
his successful lectures in Vienna   and Prague, and in the midst of his personal crises in Germany 
itself,  he introduced a new way into Phenomenology, which was first  published in Belgrade.    
   
1   History-bound Consciousness 
2  1933-37. The situation of German Academics    
3  1935. Vienna and Prague Lectures     
4  1936. 'Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften un die transzendentale  
    Phänomenologie,' part I and II, published in 'Philosophia' vol. I., in Belgrade.  
5   1954 'Krisis,' (part I, II, and III) in Hua VI,  (henceforth "Krisis I") 
     1993 'Krisis' (Nachlass) in Hua XXIX. (henceforth "Krisis II") 
 
Chapter Five.   Toward a Philosophy of History  
 Husserl's "conversion" toward history. 
 The meditation on history, is now seen as one way of doing  phenomenology. In this 
chapter the meditations on the Pure  Consciousness and the meditations on the Internal-Time 
 Consciousness can be seen to converge.  
 He speaks further about the two levels of historicity. 
1    A short overall view 
2   1956. Erste Philosophie erster Teil  (mss 1923-24). Hua VII 
3   1959. Erste Philosophie zweiter Teil  (mss 1923-24). Hua VIII,  
4   From Intersubjectivity's perspective  
5   Inner history from the 'Crisis'  
 
Chapter Six.   The Phenomenological Philosophy of History 
 The History of European people is a constant human effort to focus on a  telos. And in 
Husserl's interpretation of history, this telos is what he sees  as a constantly bursting out of human 
thinking, on the surface of  chronological time. Thus we have philosophers and even philosophies. 
1   Beyond Husserl's texts 
2   How to read history philosophically 
3   Doing History as doing Phenomenology 
 
Chapter Seven.   Meditation on History 
 Husserl's Philosophy of History, is best to be approached from a different  or distinct 
perspective: it is not to be categorized as a substantive or  speculative philosophy of history or as a 
critical or analytic philosophy of  history. Two categories usually used in this case.  
 Husserl's approach to History has emerged from his Life-world  meditations, and his 
meditations on Pure Consciousness and  Consciousness of internal Time.   
 
 
   
 HUSSERL'S  LATER  THINKING  CONVERGING INTO  A  PHILOSOPHY OF  HISTORY, OR  
THE  THEME  OF  HISTORICAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  IN  HUSSERL'S  LATER  WRITINGS  
ESPECIALLY  IN  THE  CRISIS  OF  EUROPEAN  SCIENCES  
 
 
 
 "Uns gilt es, die T e l e o l o g i e in dem geschichtlichen Werden der  Philosophie, 
insonderheit der neuzeitlichen, verståndlich zu machen, und  in eins damit, uns über selbst 
Klarheit zu verschaffen, als ihre Träger, in  unserer persönlichen Willentlichkeit ihre Mitvollzieher"  ( 
Husserl, 1936 ).   
 
 (Our task is to make comprehensible the teleology in the historical  becoming of philosophy, 
especially modern philosophy, and at the same  time to achieve clarity about ourselves, who are the 
bearers of this  teleology, who take part in carrying it out through our personal intention).1
In Husserl's perception, the Western culture was progressively losing its capacity to propose a meaning 
  
 
Introduction 
 
What had motivated Husserl's thinking around the Vienna and Prague lectures and eventually the 
publication of the Krisis text in 1936 in a great haste? What motivated him afterwards to constantly 
revise its third part, which was published posthumously in 1954? I can say in one word, the crisis itself. 
Husserl experienced this urgency of the crisis in threefold paths,  
 Crisis in foundation of mathematics and logic, 
 Crisis in the understanding of 'reason' , 
 Crisis in meaning,  
Certainly he also experienced crisis in his own life, just around that time.  
 This study will concentrate on the third perceived understanding of crisis, which means that it 
will inevitably involve the second yet only tangently be concerned with the first. In the spirit of 
Husserl, meanwhile the crisis in his own life will provide its context.  
                                                 
1  Edmund Husserl. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenscaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1976 (2)) 71. 
 The Crisis  of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Trans. David Carr. (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1981(5) ) 70.  
 All translations are taken from the published translations (see Bibliography), unless indicated otherwise,.or  where there 
is no translation available to me, then the translations are mine.   
for our striving, a meaning for our life. Culture, as the preservation and development of meaning, which 
had given power to act, was losing precisely this power. 
 Meaning however, is not "something absolute and solid" it has always been fluctuating, and all 
the more so with the post Renaissance developments in Western philosophical circles, there is no 
philosophia perennis anymore, there is only a philosophia perenniter valida (i.e., a tradition that the 
West are the bearers of true thinking). Husserl's solution in the quest for Truth in the early twentieth-
century context was phenomenology. 
 Husserl's Ideas, book I (1913), and Cartesian Meditations (in French 1931), are both subtitled 
"an introduction to phenomenology," and the Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929) has been 
referred by Husserl himself also as an "Emporleitung zur transzendentalen Phänomenologie,"2
 As a philosopher Husserl participated intensely in his world. As he saw fit, his world was in a 
crisis. He attributed this crisis to a deeper crisis of the European Mensch, since the European method of 
thinking had become fragmented. The thinker and the object thought had become separated, and this 
separation was paradoxically hailed as good as, "objective, scientific." Husserl raised his voice, 
declaring that the origin of human thinking is one's personal engagement with one's world while being 
fully aware both of this world and one's process of thinking. By taking this orientation Husserl (as if) 
discovers the historical dimension of our thinking process. One is always a beginner in thinking, 
 as 
reported by Fink in his lecture at Freiburg University on July 3, 1959. 
 Now The Crisis is also subtitled An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, an 
introduction with a difference.  
 In the earlier stages of his writings Husserl did not give history a prominent part and worthy 
attention, but in his last unfinished work, The Crisis, history has become one way of introducing and 
doing Phenomenology. History is treated in the context of his treatment of the Lebenswelt. I will 
capitalize on this new "turn" of Husserl and I will develop a Philosophy of History based on Husserl 
texts. While not totally leaving his Ideas I, and Cartesian Meditations, altogether, this will be 
substantially based on Husserl's Crisis, the published texts of 1936 and the later editions/ publications 
of Walter Biemel (1954) and Reinhold N. Smid (1993) 
                                                 
2  Edmund Husserl 1859-1959 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959) 105 
operating in a world of issues, processing, often altering. Husserl can be said to have developed a 
history and his own notion of the philosophy of history. This indeed will be the convergence of this 
thesis.  
 How does this Husserlian thinking (esp. the Crisis) have consequences for the history of ideas 
in Husserl's own time and ours? How is it approached after Husserl's time? In answer, I intend to go on 
to explicate Husserl's special contribution, to the Philosophy of History, against the background of  the 
Phenomenological  movement and its further development.   
 Husserl voices the call of the philosopher to demand that consciousness, thinking in the broad 
sense, is humanizing whatever we are conscious of. To always be aware of the origin of human 
awareness, however, is not the same as to analyse the brain-matrix. In our common parlance today, 
many still believe that human thinking is only a case of  grey-matter. I will have to deal with this issue. 
 This thesis is deliberately short, tautly tied around a specific problem-package of Husserlian 
thought that has never been satisfactorily unpacked or picked through in the way I do here. I proceed on 
the assumption that many other aspects of Husserl's thought have been more adequately interpreted and 
need no complete accounts in this thesis here. In terms of disciplines applied in this thesis the 
exegetical approach involves first and foremost the history of ideas, but in the end the auther of this 
thesis allows Husserl to start teaching him how to philosophize about history. The main task has been 
to make clear and represent accurately Husserl's difficult thinking, often explicating highly dense 
German philosophical discourse in which terminology is often fluid3
                                                 
3  E. Husserl. Ideen Buch I, Hua III / 1 § 66 and §84 
.  
 In the concluding part of the thesis I will use especially Husserl's later writings to argue how, 
first in his new, a philosophy of consciousness in its historical context could unfold. In other words, 
that a Philosophy of History is ultimately a philosophy of history of human consciousnesss in its most 
active engagement with(in) the world. Hereby the definition of Consciousness has also been added one 
more dimension, that of history, which in Husserl's earlier writings had been overlooked. I will then go 
on to ask, in this light, how can we ourselves now truly become philosophers by studying Husserl's 
writings?  
 
 
Chapter One.   Profiling Edmund Husserl, the Man and the Thinker  
1   Husserl's Basic Biography 
2   Husserl's Achivements and the Reason of his Fame. 
 2. 1   Husserl came only later in his writings to appreciate History and he  was  against  
Historicism, more particularly that of W. Dilthey.  
 2. 2   Husserl was famous on  
 (1) Transcendental Logic, (2) Intentionality, (3) and the Theory of   Reduction, before the Crisis 
texts.  
3   The problem of approaching Husserl as a Philosopher of History 
4   The Complexity of Husserl's diverse streams of thinking focussed on  
      (1) Pure Consciousness, (2) Consciousness of Internal Time, and  both   converging into his 
discovery of (3) History  
-------------------------------------- 
1   Husserl's basic biography 
Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl, was born on April 8, 1859 in Prostejov/ Prossnitz,  Moravia/ 
Mähren, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was an area later to become part of the Czech 
Republic. Thus Husserl was an Austrian by birth. His family had been there for generations. He was 
son to Adolf Abraham Husserl (1827-1884) and his wife Julie Selinger (1834-1917), Edmund was the 
second son, his elder brother Heindrich was born in 1857 and after him Helen, born 1863, and Emil, 
1869.  
 The family religion was Judaism but with a very liberal outlook, even to indifference. Edmund' 
s chilhood was uneventful, and he was average at school.                                                                                                                                                     
 Husserl started his university study in Leipzig, in 1876, with the intention of becoming an 
astronomer. He subsequently attended the Friedrich Wilhelm University of Berlin, in 1878, where he 
met Leopold Kronecker, Ernst Kummer and Karl Weierstrass, who all introduced him to a rigorous and 
disciplined way of thinking, through the study of mathematics. Lectures from Friedrich Paulsen  also 
influenced him greatly. In 1881 Husserl transferred to the University of Vienna, and where he took up 
his doctoral studies under the supervision of the Mathematician, Dr. Leo Königsberger. He was 
promoted doctor with the dissertation  entitled Beiträge zur Theorie der Variationsrechnung 
(Contributions to the Theory of the Calculus of Variations)  in 1883.   
 Weierstrass then called him back to Berlin, to work as his assistant., but because Weierstrass 
fell ill and was not able to lecture, Husserl decided to return to Vienna. For the next two years he 
attended the lectures of Franz Brentano. It was Brentano who introduced him to the notion of 
'intentionality,' which in Husserl's later altered reaplication would receive a central place in his own 
phenomenology. Through Brentano Husserl studied Bernhard Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre and the 
logic of Rudolf Hermann Lotze. It was Brentano who suggested Husserl to become assistant to Carl 
Stumpf, at the University of Halle, and thus to obtain a thorough training in psychology. In 1886 
Husserl completed his Habilitationsschrift entitled Über den Begriff der Zahl: Psychologischen 
Analysen (On the Concept of Number: Psychological Analyses). And on Oct 24 1887 he presented his 
inaugural lecture entitled Die Ziele und Aufgaben der Metaphysik (The Aims and Tasks of 
Metaphysics). He taught beside Stumpf, at Halle starting as a Privatdozent, and he stayed in there  until 
1901.  
 During the year he received his Habilitation Husserl was baptized into the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church (Aug. 1, 1886) and a week later he married Malvina Charlotte Steinschneider, the daughter of 
Sigismund Steinschneider and Antoine Simon.  They had two sons, Wolfgang and Gerhart. 
 When we consider Husserl's university career as a Philosophy Professor, it is sensible to divide 
it into three periods : 
 1887-1901 Halle as Privatdozent 
 1901- 1916 Göttingen as Extraordinarius Professor 
 1916-1928 Freiburg as Ordinarius Professor 
In his Halle period 1887-1901, Husserl gave lectures in theory of knowledge, metaphysics, logic, 
ethics, philosphy of mathematics and psychology.   
The first publications by which he established himself as a philosopher among his peer, come from this 
period :  
  Philosophie der Arithmetik  (1891),  
  Logische Untersuchungen ( I Teil 1900) 
  Logische Untersuchungen (II Teil 1901) 
 In his Göttingen period 1901-1916, he was first installed as Extraordinarius Professor, "on the 
ground that he lacks 'scientific distinction',"4
                                                 
4  As quoted by J. J. Kockelmans. Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology. (West Lafayette, Indiana:Purdue University Press, 
1994) 3. 
 but by 1906 he was made an Ordinarius, since the 
Prussian Minister of Education overruled the decision of the Faculty. Husserl gave extra lectures and 
commented critically on the philosophies of Locke, Hume, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Bolzano and Ernst 
Mach. He wrote extensively in this period and his important step was that it was in Göttingen where 
Husserl first lectured on 'phenomenology'.  
His publication of  Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft' (Philosophy as Rigorous Science') appeared 
in 1911. The following year he founded a Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische 
Forschung and published his Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenlogie und phänomenologische 
Philosophie (1 Buch) in  this Jahrbuch in 1913.    
By January 1916, on the recommendation by Heinrich Rickert, upon the latter's retirement, Husserl was 
appointed to succeed him in Freiburg am Breisgau as full professor (from April 1916). 
 In the twelve years of his Freiburg period (1916-28) Husserl was academically very productive 
yet at the same time suffering personally. Sad times came with the death of his son Wolfgang in 1916 
near Verdun, and the wounding of his other son, Gerhart in 1917 at Speyer. During July 1917, 
moreover, Husserl's mother Julie Husserl-Selinger passed away.  
 Husserl's inaugural lecture in Freiburg (delivered in May 1917) was entitled Die reine 
Phänomenologie, ihr Foschungsgebiet und ihre Methode (The Pure Phenomenology Its Research Area 
and Its Method). From then on he was exposed to a wider public audience. In November 1917 for 
instance, he gave public lectures on Fichte's Ideal of Humanity for war-participants which were then 
repeated for the Academic Staff of the Philosophy Faculty. 
After World War I, he delivered public lectures abroad at the University College in London titled  
Phänomenologische Methode und phänomenologische Philosophie (Phenomenlogical Method and 
Phenomenological philosophy) (June 1922). 
 Between1919-23 Martin Heidegger was working  as Husserl's assistant, an important time that 
ended in a deep disappointment for both men. When  Heidegger presented Husserl his copy of 'Sein und 
Zeit' in 1926, Husserl invited him to co-operate in his article on Phenomenology for the Encyclopedia 
Britannica  but the co-operation stalled and failed in the end.   
Before Husserl's entrance into Emeritus professorship in 1928, his lectures, Vorlesungen zur 
Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness 
of Internal Time) were published by Heidegger in  the 'Jahrbuch'. Although officially retired, Husserl's 
philosophical acitivities continued with a series of lectures in Amsterdam, on  'Phänomenologie und 
Psychologie: Transzendentale Phänomenologie' (Phenomenology and Psychology: Transcendental 
Phenomenology) (1928), and Husserl's own publication of  Formale und transzendentale Logik 
(Formal and Transcendental Logic) (1929), It was in the latter year that he gave phenomenology 
lectures in Paris, at the 300th anniversary of Descartes' Meditations on the First Philosophy.  This is 
what later would become the famous Cartesian Meditations. It was soon translated and published in 
French in 1931 by E. Levinas and G. Peiffer, and long before it eventually would be taken up in the 
first of the Husserliana series in German, which would be published posthumously by S. Strasser, in 
1950.  By the time the Meditations were out in French, Husserl had already published a Postscript to 
his Ideas I, of 1913 on the occasion of the English translation of his work by W. R. Boyce Gibson in 
1931. Then the situation became more and more difficult for him as a Jew by birth. Out of anxiety 
during the mid thirties there were plans to transfer all his manuscripts to Prague, but these plans never 
materialized. In 1935 Husserl gave two very important lecture series: one in Vienna in May on  
Philosophy in the Crisis of European Humanity; and the other in Prague in November on The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Psychology.  
 It was at the end of this year that his teaching licence was withdrawn. Nonetheless, using his 
two last lectures, he put together his work  The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, and he was still able to send two parts of the manuscript off to Prague to be published 
in the first issue of 'Philosophia,' a new journal edited by Arthur Liebert in Belgrade. 
 Deprived from all academic contacts, and left alone by virtually all his student-disciples, 
Edmund Husserl died on April 27, 1938 at the age of 79. ` 
After his death he left a massive amount of writings, which were smuggled out of Germany to avoid the 
Nazi-censorship. Cooperating in this were Rev. Herman Van Breda OFM., who was at that time 
preparing his Ph.D. in the Phenomenology of Husserl and with Mrs. Malvina Husserl, the great man's 
widow. The collections took many detours until they eventually came to be housed in the Institute of 
Philosophy of the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. By (the northern) Autumn 1938 one can 
speak of the founding of the Husserl Archives.5
                                                 
5   Van Breda, H. L.., 'Le sauvetage de l'héritage husserlien et la fondation des Archives-Husserl,' in Husserl et la pensée 
modrene, Phenomenologica 2. Ed. H. L. Van Breda et J. Taminiaux (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959) 1-42   
  
2      Husserl's Achievements and the Reason of his Fame 
 2. 1  Husserl was not famous in his appreciation of history and he was against historicism. 
After 1900-01 the publication of his Logical Investigations, theorist of history Wilhelm Dilthey, held a 
seminar in 1904 on this newly published works, and the following year Dilthey praised Husserl's works 
as 'epochal', in his own presentation to the the Berlin Academy. But Husserl himself had a rather 
reserved appreciation of Dilthey's history-based philosophy, and in 1911 when publishing his attack on 
'historicism' in Philosophy as Rigorous Science he obviously doubted whether such scholars as Dilthey 
(he did not mention Dilthey explicitly, though) could refute historical scepticism after abandoning 
metaphysics, in view of the conflict of historical systems. Dilthey's fondness of historical flux and of 
flexibility principles built into an historical outlook, was simply not compatible in Husserl's term (at 
least at this stage) with a rigorous logic and the best scientific principles.  
  2. 2   Husserl was famous for his work on three elements of philosophical analysis: 
transcendental logic, intentionality and reduction theory out of which his  method of phenomenological 
investigations results. I will make very short notes of each one of them, while the longer notes will be 
saved to the later convergence of Husserl's streams of thinking into his philllsophy of history.        
 (1)Transcendental Logic.6  The achievement of such a logic was the aim of the early writings of 
Husserl, his labours culminating in the publication of Formale und transzendentale Logik in 1929. For 
Husserl at that stage, the 'evidence' of logical and mathematical truths is stronger and more compelling 
than that of the fallible evidences of empirical sciences.  The laws of Logic are formal laws and 
principles in the technical sense: in which temporal causal existence is neither co-given nor 
presupposed. There must be logically no interdependence between the objectivity of the known fact and 
the subjectivity of the knowing subject. With his Formale und transzendentale Logik, Husserl  wants to 
give an intentional explication of the proper sense of formal logic.7  This conviction stays with Husserl 
for a long time, at least until in 1935, when suddenly in one of his Forchungsmanuskript, we find a 
statement, declaring that "Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous 
science: the dream is over."8 This turn around, this self-correction, and the implications of it for his later 
writings, is for me the most exciting in Husserlian thinking. Upon reading of the Die Krisis der 
europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (1936) (Crisis of European 
Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology), which is also subtitled An Introduction to 
Phenomenological Philosophy, we are confronted with an introduction to Phenomenology of a totally 
different kind than in all his previous writings. While the publications of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy first book, (1913) and Cartesian Meditations 
(1931/ 1950) both have also subtitles of "General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology" and "An 
Introduction to Phenomenology" respectively, still the Crisis gives Phenomenology a new "key". In it 
we find the emerging theme of 'Lebenswelt' (lifeworld), which has never been thematised before, 
presents itself9
 (2)Intentionality. From Brentano (and ultimately from Suarez
. What was indeed new was the inclusion of 'tradition' and 'history' in the foundation of 
Phenomenology itself. We will get back to this later, in the chapter on the 'History-bound 
consciousness' in the Crisis, in chapter 4 of this thesis.    
10) Husserl inherits the concept of 
'intentionality'. This means, according to Husserl in one of his more mature formulations, that "each 
cogito, each conscious process, we may  say 'means' something or other and bears in itself, in this 
manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum".11
                                                 
6   For the sake of its completeness, Husserl's works in Logic, with exceptions of reports and articles, comprise:  
 Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891),  
 Logische Untersuchungen (1900, reworked into 3 volumes in the 2nd edition 1913, the 3rd and 4th editions unaltered, in 
1922 and 1928).   
7   See E. Husserl. Formal and Transcendental Logic. Trans. Dorion Cairns. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978): 316 ad b. 
8  All Husserl's own writings will be quoted from Husserliana, Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke series, which has 
started in 1950. For this quotation also, see Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentalen 
Phänomenologie. (Henceforth Krisis I) Hrsg. W. Biemel, Hua VI, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976). Beilage xxviii. (mss. 
1935 according to Biemel's note). The Crisis  of European  Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy  (Henceforth 
Crisis) Trans. D. Carr, (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970) App.ix Quotations in English translations whenever  
available. Although I do not suspect that this turn around happened suddenly. See Chapter Four of this Thesis.   
9  The life-world (Lebenswelt) plays a major role in Husserl's analysis of pre-predicative experience as the Umwelt  
(surrounding-world) in Ideas II, a manuscript of 1912, that Husserl has kept revising and finally dropped in 1928 and he 
did not publish it.        
10  F. Suarez, De Entibus Rationis: "Disputatio Metaphysicae LIV".  Trans. J. P. Doyle. (Milwaukee: Marquette U. P., 
1995) 
11  Cartesianische Meditationen . HUA. I,  Hrsg.  S. Strasser, (Den Haag: Nijhoff,1950) §14: 30-35 . Cartesian 
Meditations Trans. D. Cairns . (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977) §14: 31-33  
 At that time the thought of history has not as 
yet adjudged important for the investigation of this concept of intentionality. Yet then again Husserl 
comes to shift his position, and in his mss of 1935 Husserl criticizes his own prior opinion by 
contending that, concerning intentionality, "we should be engrossed in historical considerations if we 
are to be able to understand ourselves as philosophers and understand what philosophy is to become 
through us"12
3   The problem of approaching Husserl as a Philosopher of History.                    It is very interesting 
to see that Husserl eventually incoporated history in his phenomenology. If as late as in 1925, in his 
Erste Philosophie, he was still explicitly renouncing 'tradition', "the emergence of history at a later 
stage might strike one as strange indeed."
. We can spot here a similar turn to the one pertaining to transcendental logic. In other 
words, we find here another self correction peculiarly Husserlian.                                                       
  
 (3) Epoché and Theory of Reduction  
Epoché is a method of making the transition from natural attitude, our more normal way of considering 
consciousness and the world, to the properly phenomenological way of considering them. Epoché 
(suspension) refers to the institution of the goal of phenomenological research as operative in the 
consciousness of the researcher, who must 'bracket' her or his preconceptions and prejudices and grasp 
phenomena as what is presented to the perceiver, 'such as they are' (als solches) in an eidetic vision. 
This entails a natural reduction, as the focus of attention on what is basic or essential to grasp. When 
Husserl's shift of position occurred in the mid 1930s the epoché and reduction principles remained 
important for his approach to history, but apparently at the beginning it only applied to acts of 
philosophical perception independent of any specific historical contexts.     
These two principles combined to bring the world-constituting dimension of consciousness into the 
purview of reflective intuition so that the manner of consciousness' functioning can be elucidated 
through constitutive analysis. 
 
13 We have to understand, however, that the 'history-element' 
in the later Husserl writings emerged in the context-horizon of his own awareness of 'the crisis' of 
European culture, which he had to admit had been brought about by modern science and philosophy. 
But the shift also came about by Husserl's own latecoming dialogue with history. This dialogue was 
somehow forced upon him when he had 'to make sense' (Besinnung) of being required to leave 
Freiburg University as a prominent thinker and in his emeritus status through the actions of the new 
rector, his former assistant Martin Heidegger, as well as of the Nazi State. These circumstances bring 
out a remarkable change in Husserl's interpretation of the sense of philosophy. It is no longer solely 
matter of intellectual life being a 'pure living' out of a theoretical interest, but philosophical work had to 
become a life-shaping and a world changing praxis as well. Once philosophy enters into praxis then the 
dimension and intuited direction of history is never neutral anymore. In this light, I would argue, 
Husserl can be regarded as a Philosopher of History since in the collection of Crisis-texts, dated 
between 1934 and 1937, he is struggling to make sense of himself being a philosopher in that particular 
historical period. He is also struggling to make sense of that period of history itself, and of his 
generation as bearers of that concrete historical transition. This will be fleshed out in the following 
chapters,  to lay bare the historical side to Husserl's thought.14
                                                 
12    Crisis, App. ix 
13  Cf. E. Ströker. Husserl Transcendental Philosophy. Trans. L. Hardy. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993)  176. 
14   Especially in the next chapters 4 and 5  
     
4.    The complexity of Husserl's diverse streams of thinking  
It is well known that Husserl thought while he wrote. An example is when he wrote Ideas I, he said that 
he did it "in six weeks, without outline or source material, as if in trance"15 Hence we have now, a 
massive amount of writings he has bequeathed to us, most of which, significantly are Forschung 
Manuskripte (research manuscripts). In tracking his sense of history, I will follow his diverse streams 
of thinking by putting together a variety of texts, some are less well known, which all eventually 
converge into his philosophy of history.  It is important to be reminded that Husserl did not start his 
study as a historian or even a philosopher. From his early interest in Astronomy he changed direction 
into Mathematics, and his famous Logic is a result of his rigorous mathematical mind. He had also a 
deep interest in the Psychology16 of Brentano, from whom he got his entrée into the investigation of 
thinking processes. As indicated above, he actually reworked Brentano's notion of Intentionality. Early 
in his career, as early as 1893,17 we find that Husserl had a manuscript investigating the notion of the 
Consciousness of Internal Time. In 1928 Heidegger published some of Husserl's lectures on the subject 
(the main text only).18
I think, at that stage Husserl was also influenced heavily by Kant's 'pure reason,'
 Now we have already admitted that Husserl has come rather late to take up 
history as his theme in philosophy, addressing  history in the context of his theme on the life-world. But 
we need to trace back his many highlights of investigations that has finally led to this. I will approach 
this merging of Husserl's diverse streams of thinking, through the stages of his own investigations into 
Pure Consciousness, into Consciousness of Internal-time and finally into Life-world and the sub-theme 
of History. Here in short is an overview,  followed up subsequent  chapters with details.                                    
4.1. Pure Consciousness  
Husserl has once called his "transcendental phenomenology" a new Cartesianism. What Husserl deeply 
appreciate in Descartes' method  is, that with Descartes the subject cogitans is given a prominent place, 
indeed an original place, his subjectivity. He did not have a too high regard for Descartes' (method of) 
doubt, though. We will see that Husserl does not doubt the existence of 'the world', not even 
methodically. It is this cogitans which is seen to be the origo, the source, of cogito-cogitatum. While 
Husserl wants to continue Descartes line of subjectivity-tradition  he also wants to distance himself 
from Descartes by introducing "a new member"  since each cogito bears in itself its particular 
cogitatum. This was Husserl in 1929. It is interesting, though, that from the publication of Ideas I in 
1913 to Cartesian Meditations lectures in 1929 Husserl did not investigate the cogito-cogitatum against 
the background of time consciousness. 
19
                                                 
15  Letter to Arnold Metzger, Sept. 4, 1919. Briefwechsel  IV Ed. Karl Schuhmann, 1994. p. 413. 
16  When I use the word "psychology" I do not mean empirical psychology after Wundt, nor do I mean psychology as a 
behavioural science after Watson. In Brentano's writings and Husserl's , it is  the psychologia rationalis, more in the line 
of Aristotle's De Anima / Peri psyche.  
17  See Ch. 3 ftn. 1 for a complete list. 
18  Edmund Husserl. 'Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins'. Hrsg. Martin Heidegger. Jahrbuch 
für Philosophy und phänomenologische Forschung IX (1928): 367-498.  Reprinted, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1980. 
(unveränd. Nachdr. d. 1 Aufl. 1928)  
19   I. Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. (unified ed. with all the variants from the 1781 and 1787 editions). Trans. Werner 
Pluhar. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1996)  
 so that he did this 
investigation in its 'pure state,' apart from all historical conditions. Intriguingly, we find in his 
manuscripts from 1893 that Husserl  had already an interest in investigating time-consciousness. But 
these two streams of investigation seemed to go in a parallel lines without intersecting one another in 
the earlier stages of his thought.                               
 
 
4.2.Consciousness of Internal Time    
One year before Husserl's Cartesian Meditations lectures in the Sorbonne, Heidegger published his 
master's 1905 lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness20
 Commenting on his own work, Husserl says, "It has become a major work, and I am not yet 
quite finished. . . I almost think it is the most important writing of my life, one that reaches the greatest 
depth."
 in which Husserl lined 
himself up in the tradition of Augustinian way of philosophizing. This work is less "pure reason" (in 
the Kantian sense) and more concretely based in the reality that a cogitatum is always in the cogitans 
who lives in time although he/she may not always be conscious of it. What interests me is the fact that 
the drafts for these lectures existed at the same time and even earlier than the Cartesian Meditations 
and Ideas I manuscripts, and yet in dealing with the 'pure consciousness' in Ideas I and Cartesian 
Meditations Husserl has completely abstracted and set aside the 'time dimension'  from his 
consciousness investigations, and in quite a successful way. I am deducing, then Husserl's lines of 
thinking run as two distinct streams and it is only later when he picked up history as his theme that 
these two streams start  merging into a new way of introducing phenomenology. This seems almost as 
if by "accident." The Crisis publication in 1936 has also the subtitle of 'An Introduction to 
Phenomnenological Philosophy, as if Husserl wants to introduce phenomenology in quite a new way.  
21
When Husserl at last published Crisis with the subtitle of "an introduction to phenomenology", he had 
already published Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations  (published in French by E. Levinas) and even 
Formal and Transcendental Logic, and all of them are subtitled "an introduction to phenomenology". 
This repetition, we may claim, simply reflects  Husserl's history of attempts to introduce his program 
over and over again. And one could say with caution that Husserl came to see the last way of 
introducing phenomenology was through history. Speaking of history, in 1923-24 Husserl actually 
lectured on history of philosophy, he called the work Erste Philosophie. Beginning with Plato to 
Descartes, Husserl saw that Philosophy had been trying to formulate an "echte Idee einer universalen 
Wissenschafts-Lehre (a genuine idea of a universal doctrine of Science)", which consisted in "die 
gesamte Theorie eines Vernunftlebens (the overall theory of a life of reason)", and he further explained 
that overall theory as "eine universale Theorie der erkennenden, wertenden und praktischen Vernunft (a 
universal theory of cognition, judging and practical reason)"
 
 
 
 
4.3. History 
22
                                                 
20   see above ftn. 12 
21   Letter to Gerhart, Febr. 20, 1936. Briefwechsel. IX, Ed. Karl Schuhmann. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994):250 
22   Erste Philosophy  1Teil , HUA VII, Hrsg.  R. Boehm. ( The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956). 1Kap., 6.  
 (Cf. Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Schriften. Ed. E. Ströker. Hamburg: Felix Meiner,1992)   
. Here I see that Husserl is at the same 
time appreciating Kant's pure theory and yet also distancing himself from Kant by bringing together 
both the theoretical and practical reason.  
 We cannot take these earlier lectures, however, as a full formulation of his ideas about the 
philosophy of history. For start, Husserl called these lectures "Erste Philosophy (First Philosophy)", 
because of "nur die wortwörtliche Bedeutung (solely for the word for word meaning)" and not for the 
manyfold historical sediments. Although Husserl seemed to quote many philosophers before him, 
especially Descartes and Kant and attempting to radicalize them both, it was not until the Crisis 
manuscripts, written between 1934 and 1936, that he started to thematize 'History' as also a means to 
introduce Phenomenological Philosophy. 
 From his study of pure Consciousness, from his investigations of Time-consciousness, Husserl 
moved into a new awareness of history. Although this turn to the lifeworld and the inclusion of history 
has given phenomenology a fundamentally a new orientation, I tend to agree with Ströker, "that Husserl 
eventually took up the lifeworld as a theme was thus not something that occurred abruptly,"23 because 
the life world is basically a maturer way of understanding the subject and subjectivity in Husserl, since 
a philosopher or a knower/ perceiver cannot come to grips with whether he or she is doing in the mind 
without considering the built up of presumptions from one's life situations. The inclusion of tradition 
and history on the other hand "was something actually new and might strike one as strange indeed."24
                                                 
23  cf., Ströker , op. cit.., 175  
24  ibid. 
    
 Before we come to Husserl's treament of history in deph, I will first follow more closely his 
probing into Consciousness and Consciousness of Internal Time, then his treatment of History in 
Crisis. The next two chapters will be dedicated to these two areas of investigations. We will see that in 
the next two chapters, the issue of history, has not taken a role at all, due to Husserl's own background 
in science. Hence his biography and his intention to ground sciences with a 'scientific' philosophy, 
which had been thought of as being 'above' all historical changes, is indeed an important part of 
Husserl's pre Crisis struggles.  
 
 
 
Chapter two   Pure Consciousness 
 The object of 'phenomenological science' is described as the activity of  the consciousness 
explored in a pure phenomenological reflection,  focussing on  the essential structure of that  
activity. 
1   1913. Ideen 1 Buch, published by Husserl in the 'Jahrbuch für Philosophie und    
      phänomenologische Forschung'  Bd. I.  
     1950. Ideen 1 Buch, published in the series Husserliana (abbrev. Hua) III.   
     1976. (a new edition) Ideen I, published in Hua III-1 and III-2.25
2   1950. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, in Hua I.
  
26
1) noematic intentionality in general. 2) the stream of subjective process as having the characteristic of 
 
 
 
------------------------------ 
Praenotanda 1 
Bewußtsein, usually translated as 'consciousness', hence, 
1) intentional act or state referring to objects 
2) the stream of acts and states made up of such acts.  
While the English 'conscience: con-scire: (Lat) scire, to know, an accompanying prefix, 'con', indicates 
a connotative 'with'. From this, conscientia (a reification), then  we get two derivatives (1) 
consciousness and (2) conscience.                                                                                    
In Husserl's writings, consciousness is:  
                                                 
25   E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erste Buch.  in 'Jahrbuch für 
Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung,' Edited by E. Husserl, e.a. # I (1913), 1-323. then reprinted with 
Sachregister  by G. Walther in 1922. and with a new Sachregister by L. Landgrebe in 1928. A new edition by W. 
Biemel ("neu, auf  Grund der handschriftlichen Zusätz des Verfassers erweitere Auflage") Husserliana III. (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1950).   
 Later, Neu Hrsg. Karl Schuhmann. Husserliana (Hua) III-1 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976). Henceforth Ideen I.  
26 Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Trans. F. Kersten. (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1983.) I am using the Kluwer publ. reprint 1998.     
 Henceforth Ideas I.  
    E. Husserl. Méditations cartésiennes. Trad. G. Peiffer et E. Levinas. (Paris: Armand Collin, 1931) was the first 
publication after Husserl's lectures in 1929. The German version came much later, due to Husserl's own disatisfaction 
with the text. In the meantime Crisis text was written.    
 E. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträage. Hrsg. S. Strasser. Hua I. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950. 2 
Aufl. 1963). Henceforth, C. Med . 
 Cartesian Meditations. Trans. D. Cairns. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977). See ftn. 12. Henceforth  
 CM.. 
noematic intentionality. 3) the stream of "actual" subjective process, the 'ego cogito'. 
While the term 'conscience' originally has no ethical bearings, in modern usage it has become a term for 
the mind functioning to distinguish between right and wrong, an independent source of moral insight.  
 
Praenotanda 2  
Gegenstand, what stands opposite me, before I am doing anything. The German word here is very 
graphic. To me, it almost loses its 'picture' when translated as 'object,' since objectum comes from 
obiicere (Lat), throwing in front of me, (from ob+iacere), hence it is now facing me, after I did "the 
throwing" of it. But in our usage Gegenstand, is just 'object'. The German word Objekt is also used for 
concrete real-world objects.  
 
Praenotanda 3 
Geist, spirit with all its manifold meanings. No distinction between Mind and Spirit in German, hence 
Geist is (also) Mind.  
Wissenschaft, usually knowledge, science, 
'Wissen',  to know, hence Wissenschaft, the skill developed because of  knowing. 
In German the division is between Geisteswissenschaft and Naturwissenschaft, while in English the 
usual division is between Arts and Science. 'Arts' in the English tradition, however, was originally a 
translation of artes liberales.27
Geisteswissenschaft, humanistic science and Naturwissenschaft, as natural science (David Carr
 
 
28). 
While Dorion Cairns29
                                                 
27   Artes Liberales is difficult to translate in English. Originally it consisted of a quadruvium: arithmetic, geometry, 
astronomy and music and  a trivium : grammer, rhetoric, dialectic. It was called liberales, since historically intended for 
free-men (not for slaves, and there were no women involved).  
28   David Carr. The Crisis of European Sciences. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970) right through the 
whole book.   
29   Dorion Cairns. Guide for Translating Husserl. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973) 
 translates Geistes-wissenschaft,  socio-cultural science, or cultural science, even 
moral science. Following G. Wahrig, my preference is: cultural science for Geisteswissenschaft, and 
natural science for Naturwissenschaft. Yet in this thesis, since I am using Carr's articles and books 
more than that of Cairns', I have decided to follow Carr's translation.  
 
 (Geisteswissenschaft,  jede Wissenschaft die sich mit einem Gebiet der  Kultur befaßt.  
 Naturwissenschaft, Wissenschaft von der Natur, ihren Vorgängen und  Erscheinungen und 
deren gesetzmäßigen Zusammenhängen.  
 Wahrig. Deutsches Wörterbuch30
 A little more than ten years since writing Logical Investigations
. 
 Translated, 
 "Geisteswissenschaft, is every knowledge which involved itself with the  area of culture. 
  
 Naturwissenschaft, knowledge of nature, its occurance, its appearance  and its natural-laws). 
Another difficulty is the English word 'science' as 
 (1) the intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic  study of the structure 
and behaviour of the physical and natural world  through observation and experiment, [and] (2) a 
systematically organized  body of knowledge on any subject, [and] (3) (archaic) knowledge. 
 Soanes/ Stevenson. Concise Oxford Dictionary).   
For this study, certainly the first meaning listed just above, is too narrow to represent the German 
'Wissenschaft,' I will have to apply the second and  third meaning.  
 
1   Ideas . First book. 
Since this thesis is about Husserl's thinking-streams which eventually converge into his discovery of the 
importance of History while writing the Crisis texts, (and not about 'Consciousness as such in Ideas I, 
or Cartesian Meditations), the treatment of Ideas I (and any other Husserl's texts) will be selective and 
only when pertaining to the thesis.  
31
                                                 
30   Gerhard Wahrig. Deutsche Wörterbuch. (Gütersloh: Bertelmann Lexicon Verlag, 1997) 
31      C. Soanes, A. Stevenson (Eds). Concise Oxford Dictionary. (Oxford University Press, 2004) 
  1900, 1901. which launched his career as a logician.  
, Husserl published his Ideas, 
in his newly founded Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, in 1913.    
At this stage of Husserl's streams of thinking, the object of 'phenomenological science' is described as 
the activity of consciousness explored in pure phenomenological reflection, focussing on the essential 
structure of that activity. Ideas I is going to explicate just this. It has not been too long ago that Husserl 
had published a paper 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science,' in Logos vol. I / 1910. His idea that 
Philosophy is and should be a rigorous Science is very strong in him in this contribution. Introducing 
his new publication of Ideas in 1913, Husserl stated that,  
 
 pure phenomenology . . . we shall characterise and show to be the  science fundamental to 
philosophy (Grundwissenschaft der Philosophie),  is an essentially new science which in consequence 
of its most radical  essential peculiarity, is remote from natural thinking and therefore only in  our 
days presses toward development. It is called a science of  phenomena.32
It is important to note Husserl's translators use of the word "Science" (read: "Knowledge") or 
"Wissenschaft" for Phenomenology, and that this 'new science' is fundamental to Philosophy. Husserl 
wanted to give philosophy a scientific rigor and he sought to give Science a philosophically  based 
validity. Contextually what he means by "scientific rigor" is a precision , or what Husserl states, "that 
an idea has validity, would mean that it is a factual construction of spirit which is held as valid and 
which in its contingent validity determines thought",
 
 
33
 In the first part of Ideas I, Husserl introduced the concepts of Essence and Eidetic Cognition, on 
which the whole book is focussed. Husserl maintains that essences, can be known, can be grasped and 
cognised. His definition of "essence" as "the what of an individuum". And he further explanied that 
"any such 'what' can also be 'put into an idea'." This eidetic view is diametrically opposed to Kant's 
view concerning the issue, hence Kant's usage of the words "phenomenon" (and "noumenon") is totally 
different from Husserl's. In fact the usage 'phenomena' is only introduced in Ideas I, and beyond the 
introduction chapter the word phenomenon is rarely used, instead 'noema' and 'noesis' have taken its 
place. The  terminology Husserl used to explicate the core of eidetic cognition is also interesting: his 
Anschauung is rightly translated as 'intuition', by Dorion Cairns, Fred Kersten, Joseph Kockelmans and 
Emmanuel Levinas,
 that was his manifesto, two years before Ideas 
Book I.    
34
                                                 
32  Ideas Book  1,  introduction.  [ Note: throughout the Thesis  English translations will ususally be used when available, 
unless the German original has a special nuanced meaning. Or where several translators (e.g., ftn. 7) could not agree 
upon the English rendering.] 
33   E. Husserl. Philosphy as Rigorous Science. (first publ. 1911) Trans. Quentin Lauer. (New York: Harper, 1965), 125. 
34   D. Cairns, Guide for Translating Husserl . (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973). 
 F. Kersten,  Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book.  (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1982. reprint  Kluwer, 1998)  
 J. J. Kockelmans. Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology. (Perdue Univ. Press, 1994). (Discussing Husserl's 
Phenomenology, using the text for Encyclopedia Britannica as Haupttext. Text Trans.  R. E. Palmer 1981). 
 E. Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl Phenomenology. Trans. Andre Orianne. (Northwestern Univ. Press, 
1995). (Originally published in 1963, it is still the best commentary on Ideas I ). [Note: although I am not in total 
agreement with the translation of 'intuition', in this thesis I am using it for lack of a better word].  
 from the Latin 'intueor', meaning, I gaze and seeing all at once. For the essence 
being 'seen', Husserl used the word eidos, (almost) in the Platonic sense.  Husserl says  
 
 "seeing an essence (Wesenserschauung) is therefore intuition  (Anschauung): and if it is 
seeing in the pregnant sense and not a mere and  vague making present, the seeing is originarily 
 presentive intuition, seizing  upon the essence in its personal selfhood."35
 In § 34 of the same part of Ideas I, Husserl discusses 'the essence of consciousness as theme.' 
Taking the Cartesian "cogito", as a starting point, he explains that the Cartesian cogito means "I 
perceive, I remember, I phantasize, I judge, I feel, I desire, I will, and thus all egoical mental processes 
which are at all similar to them, with their countless flowing particular formations."
 
 
In other words, intuition is the theoretical act of consciousness that makes objects 
present to us. This very condensed description of 'seeing essence', has to be explicated as to  how it 
happens, so that it can be claimed as a method and it can be shown as uniquely Husserl's.    
 In the second part, in § 32 we find the 'phenomenological epoche', by which Husserl explained 
his method, when he says "épochè in our sharply determinate and novel sense of the term, takes the 
place of the Cartesian attempt to doubt universally".  
 What we know so far from the texts is that, Husserl does recognize Descartes' dubium 
methodicum, but by using this new terminology Husserl also wants to distance himself from Descartes, 
hence he says that his "phenomenological epoche" in his own sharply determinate and novel sense, will 
take the place of Cartesian universal doubting. According to Husserl, Descartes was on the right track, 
using dubium as the only way to achieve indubitable truth. But for Descartes, the next step after the first 
one is that his own act of doubting is accepted as indubitable, while for Husserl the world that is there 
for us will always remain there according to consciousness as an actuality, as a "horizon," even if we 
choose to parenthesize it, and with that  we shut ourselves off from any judgment of it, even the 
judgment of (accepted) sciences, or traditional opinions for that matter. Being a mathematician by first 
profession, it is hardly surprising that his first modelling of mind was also mathematically rigorous, 
upon hindsight, after the Crisis, published in 1936, we can say, that it explained why historical 
consideration in thinking was not entering into his scope of attention.     
36
                                                 
35   Ideas I, 10 
36   Ideas I, 68. 
 (Hence, the 
common translation of "cogito" as "I think" needs to be broadened, since the classical Latin has no one 
word for "I-think" in the narrow English sense).  
Further, in § 56 the phenomenological reduction (phänomenologischen Reduktion), is explained. 
Husserl begins by arguing that "the exclusion (Ausschaltung) of Nature was for us the methodic means 
for initially making possible the turning of regard (Blickwendung) to transcendentally pure 
consciousness."37
 their explicitly stated "parenthesizings" (Einklammerungen) have the  methodic function of 
continually reminding us that the spheres of being and  cognition in question essentially lie outside 
the one which, as the  transcendental phenomenological sphere, is to be explored, and that any 
 intruding of premises belonging to those parenthesized spheres is an  indication of 
countersensical confusion, a genuine metabasis.
 By 'exclusion',  he means that,  
 
 the physical and psychophysical world, all individual objectivities which  become constituted 
by axiological and practical functionings of  consciousness are excluded [ . . . ] Consequently, all 
natural sciences   and cultural sciences (Natur und Geisteswissenschaften) with their total  stock 
of cognition, undergo exclusion precisely as sciences which  require the natural attitude 
(natürliche Einstellung).     
Through this 'exclusion', the cogitans, has moved away from 'natural attitude' or naturalistic attitude 
and enters into the phenomenological "purity" of cogitare. What does Husserl mean by that? Husserl 
says that,  
 
38
 From Ideas I, in the third part, I have to underline § 84 here because it  discusses 'Intentionality', 
which is introduced as "Principal Theme of Phenomenology". As indicated in Chapter 1 of this thesis, 
Husserl has taken as well as changed Brentano's notion of intentionality. For Husserl, by intentionality 
"we understand the own peculiarity of mental processes 'to be consciousness of something'", or 
verbatim, "die Eigenheit von Erlebnissen 'Bewußtsein von etwas zusein'." A bit further in the same 
    
 
It is worth noting that Husserl did not use the (Cartesian) word "doubting" in this  
case, his "exclusion" or "parenthesis" is a positive act, while not doubting at all those "things" being 
excluded or parenthesized do exist. They are just put "outside" the  transcendental phenomenological 
sphere that is to be explored and in this way we are enabled to seize upon essences.     
                                                 
37   Ideas I, opening sentence of §56. p 131 
38   Ideas I, § 61. p 139  
number, Husserl calls it a "comprehensive name for all-inclusive phenomenological structures". As he 
explicates , 
  
 In every actional cogito a radiating "regard"(ausstrahlender Blick) is  directed from the 
pure ego to the "object" (Gegenstand) of the  consciousness-correlate (Bewußtseinkorrelats) in question, 
to the physical  thing, to the affair complex, etc., and effects the very different kinds of 
 consciousness of it. 39
One year into his emeritus, on Febr. 23. 1929, Husserl gave lectures at the Sorbonne, invited by the 
l'Institut d'Etude Germaniques and la Société Française de Philosophie. The lectures' exact location 
was in the l'amphithéâtre Descartes.
  
Intentionality, then, is built into consciousness as our living acts of thinking.    
 
2  Cartesian Meditations 
40 The four lectures were given in German, with an introduction 
and a summary in French. The French translation of these lectures came very soon after41
                                                 
39   Ideas I, § 84. p 200. 
40   K. Schuhmann. Husserl-Chronik. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), 341. 
41   Méditations Cartésiennes. Trad. G. Peiffer et E. Levinas. (Paris: Armand Collin, 1931). See ftn. 2 above. There is 
another French translation by M. de Launey, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991) translated from Strasser German edition. 
 but the 
German publication was delayed by Husserl himself, until very much later due to Husserl's 
dissatisfaction and repeated revisions of the text (working together with his assistant Dr. Eugen Fink). 
The German text was eventually published as the first of the Husserliana series in 1950 under the 
auspices of the Husserl-Archiv Leuven, directed by Rev. Dr. H. L. van Breda OFM.  The event was a 
very important milestone in Husserl-research.  
 The Cartesian Meditations was meant as an 'introduction to phenomenology', Husserl wanted to 
introduce phenomenology again, originally with the French audience in mind then in the revised edition 
also adjusted to his  German audience. When we compare it with Ideas I, the Meditations, has some 
deepening investigative meditations. I wil start highlighting these points. 
In the first Meditation § 8 Husserl says,   
 
 At this point, following Descartes, we make the great reversal that, if  made in the right 
manner, leads to transcendental subjectivity: the turn to  the ego cogito as the ultimate and 
apodictically certain basis for  judgments, the basis on which any radical philosophy must be 
grounded. 
To this statement Husserl also has a marginal note which says, 
 
 It is necessary to say that the reduction has apodictic significance, since its  shows 
apodictically that the being of the transcendental Ego is antecedent  to the being of the world.42
 I note in passing, that the much shorter way to transcendental epoché in  my Ideas toward a 
Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological  Philosophy
 
In the second Medtation § 14 Husserl says concerning stream of consciousness,  
  
 To his conscious life -for example, his sensuously perceiving and  imagining life, or his 
asserting, valuing, or willing life- the ego can at any  time direct his reflective regard (seinene 
reflektierenden Blick); he can  comptemplate it and, in respect of its contents, explicate and 
describe it.  
 
 In spite of the important focus on consciousness that we have read in Ideas I, and C-
Meditations, the qualification that Husserl himself put on these two works also needs to be taken into 
account. This qualification takes a very important step in Husserl's self-critique, concerning his 
previously published work, Ideas I (1913, 1922, 1928), and the first work Cartesian Meditations (1931) 
in French; there being no German publication, of it by this time. Showing his work to be in constant 
revision we find this critique is in the Crisis text:  
 
43, which I call the "Cartesian way" 
(since it is thought of as  being  attained merely by reflectively engrossing oneself in the Cartesian 
 epoché of the Meditations while critically purifying it of Descartes'  prejudices and 
confusians), has a great shortcoming: While it leads to  the transcendental ego in one leap, as it 
were, it brings this ego into view  as apparently empty of content, since there can be no preparatory 
 explication; so one is at loss at first to know what has been gained  by it,  much less how 
starting with this, a completely new sort of fundamental  science, decisive for philosophy, has been 
attained."44
                                                 
42   In Cartesian  Meditations, (henceforth, C-Med). p. 18, ftn. 3 
43   this translated title by D. Carr, is different than F. Kersten's title.   
44   E. Husserl. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänemonologie. Hrsg. Walter 
Biemel. Husserliana VI. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 2nd. ed. 1976),158. Henceforth Krisis I, to distinguish from Die Krisis, 
Hrsg. Reinhold N. Smid. Husserliana XXIX, as Krisis II, so far there is no English translation as yet. I am following 
Anthony Steinbock's reference system, in his article "The New "Crisis" Contribution". (Review of Metaphysics, 47 
(March 1994), 557-584.   
 E. Husserl. The Crisis of  European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Trans. David Carr. (Northwestern 
University Press, 1970) p. 155. Henceforth Crisis.  
    
 
Intriguingly, indeed significantly David Carr, also added his own footnote to this statement, asserting 
that,  
 
 It is to be remembered that the German version of Cartesian Meditations  had never been 
released for publication by Husserl. These remarks  support the theory (italics, mine) that Husserl had 
given up the project of a  final version of the Meditations altogether in favor of the Crisis as the 
 definitive introduction to phenomenology. 45
 the revision of the Cartesian Meditations came to yield to Husserl's  alternative idea of 
composing an entirely new 'systematic work' and that at  the end, both projects (Husserl's [revised] 
Cartesian Meditations and  Fink's [additional] VI Cartesian Meditation) were displaced, (italics 
mine) by  his turning to the Crisis -writings.
 
       
Ronald Bruzina, in his study of the textual genesis of Husserl-Fink collaboration  has also commented 
that,  
 
46
                                                 
45   Crisis, 155. ftn. 1  
46   Ronald Bruzina. Edmund Husserl & Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenlogy, 1928-1938. (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2004), 485 
 
 
Husserl is now poised to put to fill the 'empty content' with the knowing subjects temporal awareness 
and historical rootedness. Already his consideration of Lebenswelt`(see Ch. 1) has prepared him for the 
shift 
But before concentrating on the Crisis writings, textually and contextually, I will first "direct my 
reflective regard" (to quote Cartesian Meditations), to other collections of Lectures and Forschung 
mss. concerning the 'Consciousness of Internal Time'.  
 What seems to be a "guided tour" round some of the highlight of Husserl's works is necessary to 
explicate the streams and gradually the shift in Husserl's thought which is not linearly logical at all 
time.    
Chapter Three.   Consciousness of Internal Time 
 Every Now of a mental process has its necessary horizon of an After. The  stream of mental 
processes is an infinite unity and the stream-form,  which  necessarily comprises all mental processes, 
is pertaining to the pure ego. 
1.  1928. Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins   
      published by Heidegger in the Jahrbuch Bd. IX.47
Entgegenwärtigung
    
2.  1966. with the Supplementary texts, in Hua X 
----------------------------------- 
Praenotanda 1  
Gegenwärtig, (adj) present, actual, current. (adv) at present, now, nowadays 
48
                                                 
47   (a) E. Husserl. Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins. Hrsg. M. Heidegger. Jahrbuch für 
Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. Bd. IX, 1928.  
 (2Aufl. Tübingen: Niemeyer,1980).   
 (b) E. Husserl. Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins (1893-1917) Hrsg. Rudolf Boehm. Husserliana X.  
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1966, 2 verb.Aufflage.1969) (Teil A Vorlesungen 1905. Ausg. 1928. Teil B. Forschung Mss.) 
 (c) E. Husserl. Texte zur Phänomenologie des inneren  Zeitbewußtseins. Hrsg. Rudolf Bernet.. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 
1985. (his texts grouping differs from that of Boehm). 
 (d) E. Husserl. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917) Trans. John Barnett Brough. 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991): Translator Introduction p. xvii ftn. 5 indicates a new research, resulting in a new texts-
grouping, superseding Boehm's texts-grouping. 
48   Ronald Bruzina.  Edmund Husserl & Eugen Fink. Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology 1928-1938. (New Haven: 
Yale U. P., 2004). (Henceforth Bruzina 2004).  Fink's creative variations of  'Gegenwärtigung'  and Bruzina's 
translation.  
, de-presenting 
Gegenwärtigung, presenting, presencing, acts that intend as present what actually present in its own 
appearing. Be-presence. 
Vergegenwärtigung, presentification, acts that intend as present what is not  actually present. 
Representing. 
 
Praenotanda 2 
Protention, Retention,  protention, retention 
Protention,  the immediate forward reach of consciousness toward the future (not active expectation). 
Retention, the immediate backward reach of consciousness toward the past (not active recollection). 
 
-------------------- 
Consciousness of Internal Time 
In the previous chapter, I have explicated Husserl's investigations and meditations concerning 
'Consciousness' in general, as an introduction to Phenomenology. I have also concentrated only on the 
two books Ideas Book I, and Cartesian Meditations.  
 Though Husserl did not elaborate the problem of Time-Consciousness in these two books, yet 
we find that in Ideas Book I, §81 and 82 and Cartesian Meditations §37, he has hinted at the problem 
of 'Consciousness of internal time.'   I will use these sections as links between the previous chapter and 
the current one.  
 First, in Ideas I, §81, concerning the matter of temporality Husserl says "Fortunately we can 
leave out of account the enigma of consciousness of time in our preliminary analyses without 
endangering their rigor". His own footnote here is also important, for he points out that,  "the effort of 
the author concerning this enigma, and which were made in vain for a long time, were brought to 
conclusion in 1905 with respect to what is essential; the results were communicated in lectures at the 
University of Göttingen."49
Husserl mentions the necessary connection of now-after, with the 'now' possessing an horizon of the 
'after'. Even the metaphore he uses of a 'stream of mental processes' is important to contemplate, for it 
    We are now not only in possession of manusripts of his lectures in 1905, 
but many other Forschungmanuskripte, which have been made available to us, and included in the 
Husserliana series mentioned earlier. 
 From the above details I will draw a couple of points: first, that Husserl calls the Time-
consciousness "an enigma," and then that the 1905 lectures  just mentioned are called "a conclusion." to 
it. But in fact the Forschung mss. (show that the sorting out of this matters, and this will have to be 
taken into account in future exegeses of Husserl's opera), continued until 1918. 
In §82, Husserl explains what he now clearly recognizes a 'before' and 'after' experience in thought, and 
maintains, "every Now of mental process has its necessary horizon of After, [. . . ] The stream of mental 
processes is an infinite unity and the stream-form which necessarily comprises all mental processes 
pertaining to a pure ego." (italics and capitals Kerston's translation).      
                                                 
49   Ideas I, p 193-94 and ftn 26. 
could be concluded that, time consciousness experience as described here is not as a contiguous 
sequence of each point-of-now, but a necessary continuous flow. 
 In the same section Husserl says "we reserve for future expositions, already announced, of the 
more  precise elaboration of these insights and the pointing out of their great metaphysical 
consequences". I assume that Husserl must have intended in this passage to refer to his constant 
revision of the 1905 Göttingen lectures before the event of their publication in 1928, after being 
textually edited by Edith Stein, and nominally edited by Martin Heidegger. By the time of the 
publication of Ideas Book I, in 1913, that revision was going on, which can be proven from the 
collection of Bernauer mss. dated 1917-18.50
 constitutive performances with a multiplicity of particular motivations and  motivational 
system, which, according to universal laws of genesis,  produce a unity of universal genesis of the 
ego. The ego constitutes  himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of history.
  
 I will turn now to Cartesian Meditations, fourth meditation, §37, where concerning time-
consciousness Husserl says,     
 
 this most universal form, which belongs to all particular forms of concrete  subjecttive processes 
[. . . ] is the form of a motivation, connecting all and  governing within each single process in 
particular. We can call it a formal  regularity pertaining to a universal genesis, which is such that 
past,  present, and future become unitarily constituted over and over again in a  certain noetic-
noematic formal structure of flowing modes of givenness.  
 
Husserl continues, 
 
 within this form, life goes on as a motivated course of particular   
51
                                                 
50   E. Husserl. Die Bernauer Manuskrpte über das Zeitbewußtsein 1917-1918. Hrsg. Rudolf Bernet , Dieter Lohmar. Hua 
XXXIII, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004). 
51   C. Meditations  p 75. 
      
 
'Time' is here described as "formal structure of flowing modes of givenness, in which past-present-
future become unitarily constituted over and over again",  
this in turn "producing a unity of universal genesis of the ego." Husserl puts 'motivation' central in 
connecting past-present-future, and when this happens in an ego then, in his understanding, history is 
happening. Or as Husserl had said, a bit earlier,  
  
 whatever occurs in my ego,52 and eidetically in an ego as such [. . . ] has its  temporality 
and, in this respect, participates in the forms that belongs to  the all-inclusive temporality with 
which every imaginable ego, every  possibility-variant of my ego constitutes himself for himself.53
The Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time.'
   
 
'Time' is described here as an overall blanketing, overwhelming presence under which, or in which, 
'whatever occurs' is time-filled, all-inclusive. So it is impossible to investigate 'time' as if we are 
investigating a Gegenstand, what stands opposite me, or an object. In this light one shall continue by 
consideration of   
54
 Time is fixed and yet time flows. In the flow of time, in the continuous  sinking down into 
the past, a non-flowing, absolutely fixed, identical,  objective time becomes constituted. This is the 
problem. 
 
Husserl defines the problem as, 
  
55
As it turns out, he has quite a modest aim what to do about the perennial conundrum. "I do not intend to 
offer this analysis as a final one," he writes, "it cannot be our task here to solve the most difficult of all 
phenomenological problem, the problem of analysis of time".
    
 
56
 lift the veil a little, from this world of time-consciousness, so rich in  mystery, that up 
until now has been hidden from us. And I will to  emphasize particularly the new sense of unity as 
opposed to multiplicity.
 Instead, he set up the situation so as to  
 
57
Beside describing the time-consciousness "so rich in mystery" [in our sense of time] and elsewhere a 
"wonder"
    
 
58
                                                 
52   Ibid., §36 almost at the end,  Husserl's ftn. 5 : "occurs as related to me"  
53   Ibid., p 74-75 
54   However, since this thesis is about Husserl's thinking-streams which eventually converge into his discovery of the 
importance of History while writing the Krisis texts, (and not about 'Consciousness as such in Ideas I, or Cartesian 
Meditations, or Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time), the treatment of any of Husserl's texts will be 
selective and only of these pieces pertaining the thesis. Cf., the beginning of Ch. 2. 
 9  E. Husserl. On the Phenomenology of the  Consciousnee of  Internal Time. Trans. John Barnett Brough. (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 1991)(Henceforth PCITime), 67. 
55 10 Ibid., p. 286. 
56 11 Ibid., p. 286 
57 12 Ibid., p. 290 
58 13 Ibid., p. 346 
 Husserl also thinks that it is "perhaps the most important [issue] in the whole [of his] 
phenomenology."59 For Husserl "time-consciousness exemplifies what Husserl took to be the universal 
structure of conscious life, i.e., intentionality."60
                                                 
59 14 J. Brough, Trans. Introd. to PCI. Time, Ibid., p.xviii. 
60 
   
 I have tried here to refrain from giving a full-blown discussion on the issue of Time-
consciousness as also the case concerning Pure Consciousness (Ch. 2). I have kept in mind that my 
thesis is to be on the convergence of the meditations on (the ego) Counsciousness and (the all-
enveloping) Time in the (concretely-experienced) World. It is not an exhaustive treatise concerning 
either of these  separatedly.   
 These background explorations now allows us to proceed to Husserl's developing 
phenomenology, as his last attempt in The Crisis, to introduce his phenomenology as an all-inclusive 
method of a philosophy of history.   
Chapter Four.   A Totally New Introduction to Phenomenology.  
 Husserl came to be dissatisfied with his introduction to Phenomenology  as he had done in 
The Ideas I, the Cartesian Meditations and even in the  Formal and Transcendental Logic. After 
his successful lectures in Vienna   and Prague, and in the midst of his personal crises in Germany 
itself,  he introduced a new way into Phenomenology, which was first  published in Belgrade.    
   
1   History-bound Consciousness 
2  1933-37. The situation of German Academics    
3  1935. Vienna and Prague Lectures     
4  1936. 'Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften un die transzendentale  
    Phänomenologie,' part I and II, published in 'Philosophia' vol. I., in Belgrade.  
5   1954 'Krisis,' (part I, II, and III) in Hua VI,  (henceforth "Krisis I") 
     1993 'Krisis' (Nachlass) in Hua XXIX. (henceforth "Krisis II") 
-------------------- 
1   History-bound Consciousness 
We have noticed that in Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations,61
Since Husserl's appreciation of history has not hitherto been great, it is strange indeed that in his last 
opus he includes history in it and places it as one of the in-roads to phenomenology. This Husserlian 
 Husserl's interest in introducing the 
transcendental phenomenology was still bypassing history, as a possible way to fulfil it.     
However, after his 1929 Paris lectures, and the French Cartesian Meditations was published in 1931, 
Husserl kept on revising and delaying to publish its German text. In the meantime several external 
events, needing  our consideration, contributed to the shaping of the Crisis texts. When eventually 
Crisis was published in 1936, his project of publishing the German Cartesian Meditations had been put 
aside. Crisis, as we indicated earlier, was a different kind of introduction to phenomenology. Most 
importantly, it thematizes the Lebens-welt and within it, the meditation on history, their lineanage 
together now being seen as one way of doing phenomenology. At last the meditations on (the all-
enveloping) Time and the meditations on (the ego) Consciousness can be seen to converge.  
                                                 
61  Chapter 2 of this Thesis 
meditation on history, is the heart of the thesis presented here. It will be elaborated further in the 
following chapters, but first I ought to contextualise it by sketching the academic situation in Germany 
around that time which was unfavourable for Husserl, in complete contrast to the success of his  Vienna 
and Prague lectures, and his achievement of the original publication of part I and II of Crisis in 
Belgrade. The other Crisis texts of the later posthumous publications will also be consulted as I 
undertake the contextualization.    
   
2    Academic LIfe in Germany around 1931-33 
Few incidents in Germany, that were depressing for Husserl and his philosophy.  
1933 May, book burning in Berlin Opera Square. 
1935 Sept., 15, Nuremberg Law on Citizenship 
1936 Jan., 15, Husserl's emeritus-professor status was annulled. 
In contrast, few other incidents that were uplifting for Husserl and his philosophy, all happened outside 
Germany, 
May 7 and 10, 1935 the Vienna lectures 
November 14 and 15, 1935 the Prague lectures 
1936 the publication of Crisis in Belgrade 
 
 I will not however, put too much emphasis on the political situation in Germany between 1933-
37 in connection with Husserl's last opus, since in the Crisis texts, one finds only very few indications 
that he was in his philosophy much influenced by the rise of Nazism. In his private letters, on the other 
hand, matters are different. He was personally  influenced by the changed conditions, showing that for 
Husserl the personal life and the professional life, of philosophical thinking, were two very distinct 
"regions" of his experiences. While Nazism is not specifically mentioned in the Crisis, to illustrate 
Husserl privately wrote to Dietrich Mahnke, in his letter May 3, 1933, 
 
 Finally in me old age, I had to experience something I had not deemed  possible: the erection 
of a spiritual ghetto, into which I and my truly worthy  and high-minded children (together with all 
their issue) are to be driven. By  State Law to take effect hereafter and for evermore, we are no 
longer to  have the right to call ourselves Germans, the work  of our intellects 
 (Geisteswerke), is no longer to be included in German cultural history  (Deutsche 
Geistesgeschichte). They are to live now on solely branded as  "Jewish" . . . as a poison that 
German minds are to protect themselves  from, that has to be extirpated. I have had much that was 
difficult to  overcome in my long, perhaps too long life. . . , but here it touches my  philosophical 
development, which for me, in my uncertainty, in my  unclarity, was a struggle over the life and 
death of the mind (um geistiges  Leben und geistigen Tod).62
 On May 10, 1933 night, at the Berlin Opera Square was the notorious night of the book-
burning, when some 20.000 books were torched.
        
 
Eventually, the situation had forced the relocation of Husserl's manuscripta out of Freiburg in Germany 
to Belgium, to the safety of the Catholic University of Leuven, in Autumn 1938. It thereby indicated 
that Germany in that Nazi period was not a favourable place for any Jewish contributions at all, a 
travestry which culminated with the book-burning in 1933. And the whole social transformation was 
indirectly influencing the growth of the Phenomenology movement.  
  Why did such fierce anti-Jewish feelings erupt, simultaneously with the waking up of the 
German nationalistic feelings and the rise of the Nazi political party to power? If we put this upsurge 
against the background of Germany's defeat in World War I, and the creation of the Weimar Republic 
as a weak Government awkwardly imposed upon the German people, we can at least make some sense 
in the over-reactions of many in Germany, in a situation manipulated by the Nazi political protagonists  
to gain more ground.   
63 Books including those by Marx, Freud, Hirschfeld 
and Mann went up in flames. Among those who took part was Alfred Baeumler, who on that same day 
had been inaugurated as Rektor64
                                                 
62   Briefwechsel III. Hrsg. K. Schuhmann. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994) 491-93. See R. Bruzina. Edmund Husserl & E. Fink. 
(Yale University  Press, 2004), 39.   
63  Hans Sluga. Heidegger's Crisis. (Harvard University Press, 1993), 125  
64   Rektors used to be chosen by academics at a university to fulfil the function of  the Head of   
       that university as well as the executive officer, for one year. During the Nazi time a new law 
      has been promulgated that Rektors will be chosen by the State and expected to fulfil the State 
     duty as well as university duty and for an unspecified period. 
 of the University of Berlin. Like many philosophers of that time, he 
was convinced that the political revolution in progress needed to be supported by a spiritual revolution 
in the universities. This in turn necessitated a new thinking in Philosophy, which had to be appropriate 
to the historic moment. So at the end of his inaugural lecture Baeumler announced to his students "You 
are leaving now to burn books in which an alien spirit uses the German words to fight us," 65
Another official was Goebels, the newly appointed Minister for Propaganda, who also came along that 
night, dramatically at midnight, and in his short speech declaring that this symbolic act  was marking  
the end of "an age of exagerated Jewish intellectualism."
 and 
asserted that this burning was only a symbolic act against those opponents who needed engaging in 
ideological battle. With this contention he led them, as if a new form of philosophical leadership, to the 
burning of the books.    
66
 Thirteen days after the book-burning night, Ernst Krieck stood on a podium to be inaugurated 
Rektor of Frankfurt University. As distinct from Baeumler and his pro-Nazi political philosophy, 
Krieck affirmed his rectorship as "a bond between University and the workers." His ideal was that any 
university should be the university of the people, with a folkish political world-view. Such a world-
view also calls for a new kind of philosophy, a philosophy that will be produced by the whole 
community working together. It will be achieved when the new university becomes "the member of the 
state subject to authoritative leadership." So the "liberalist age of dissolution and false freedom will be 
brought to an end,"
 A grand Opera indeed tragically worth a 
place as large as the Berlin Opera Square. 
67
 Two weeks after the book-burning, it was Martin Heidegger's turn to make a public 
commitment as rector of Freiburg University. Like Baeumler and Krieck before him, Heidegger was 
motivated in his address by the thought that university needed radical reform. But it would not be 
sufficient to change old institutions with  new ones. What was needed was the realization the a 
"spiritual world alone guarantees a nation greatness." Thus "the will to the historical mandate of 
German people, as a nation knowing itself in its state", was at the same time a will to science and hence 
to the essence of German university. Heidegger mentioned three bonds in the student's life: labor 
service, military service, and service to knowledge all as of equal ranking. Perhaps we can concede, 
with Hans Sluga that when Heidegger was first "allying himself politically with the victorious Nazi 
 as he put it.    
                                                 
65   H. Sluga, Heidegger's Crisis. (Havard University Press, 1993), 127 
66   Ibid., 125 
67   Ibid., 130-131 
regime, he was trying to bend it to his own will."68 Once he was in office, however, Heidegger 
collaborated vigorously with the Nazis in particular to replace the old system of university self-rule 
with one based on dictatorial leadership. One quotation that stands out in this context is his speech at 
the beginning of the 1933 winter semester, when he averred: "Not doctrines and ideas should be the 
rule of your existence. But the Führer himself and him alone is the present and the future reality and 
laws."69 A dark passage indeed 'worthy' of a philosopher who dared to write that to live means "sein 
zum Tode"! On this occasion Husserl wrote to Ingarden, "The old German University exists no more, 
from now on it has a political meaning."70
 The conservatives in the mean time came together for their annual conference in Magdeburg, in 
October of that year. Nicolai Hartmann, Bruno Bauch, Felix Krueger were the main speakers at this 
meeting, which had as its   theme "Purpose, Meaning and Value." At Magdeburg philosophers as a 
group could offer in all honesty their support for Hitler and his regime, and this group, speaker after 
speaker, warned again and again, that a "unique historical crisis is at hand," announcing of "Germany's 
singular mission in the world."
  
 Hans Sluga has discussed the three above-mentioned philosophers as exponents of positions 
who were reading the signs of the time and who,  trying to move with sharp political change, ended up 
responding each in their own way, yet although they attempted to work together for a time, the 
cooperation did not last for very long. These radicals had nonetheless taken a clear lead in 
philosophical debates in 1933, and their inaugurations and speeches were widely publiciized.   
71
 Thus both the radical and the conservative groups, let it be clear, supported Hitler and his 
movement, the only difference being that the "radical professors" were closer to the students and 
 It was also in this gathering of philosophers that Hitler sent a telegram, 
saying "May the force of true German Philosophy contribute to the foundation and strenthening of the 
German worl view." The telegram was read to the conference by Krueger and followed up by the 
German Anthem and the Nazi "Horst-Wesel."   
                                                 
68  Ibid. p 143. Much later in an interview with Die Zeit', in 1963  Heidegger mentioned his deeper  
      intention at the time as "dem Führer zu führen" (to lead the Leader).  
69  Ibid., 144  
70  Briefwechsel  III. Hrsg. K. Schuhmann. (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1994), 291. See R. Bruzina. Edmund Husserl & E. Fink. 
(Yale U.P., 2004), 39.   
71   Ibid., 154 
supported their demand for restructuring the universities. These "radicals" trusted that the renewal of 
their institutions was tied up with the renewal of philosophy. The "conservatives", on the other hand, 
wanted to maintain the existing university structures and the philosophical ideas on which they were 
founded, hoping for the preservation of the great German tradition and that their own reworking of that 
tradiition would be the basis of the Nazi world view. 
 One particular professor who needs mentioning here,  is Hans Heyse, who was occupied the 
Kant Chair at Koenigsberg and who was about to become  rector at this time. After a long conversation 
with Heidegger (in Spring 1933), he organized a public meeting in Leipzig for November of the same 
year. Many prominent academics attended and expressed their support for Hitler's revolution. The 
declaration issued on that occasion was signed by more than a thousand professors.72  I have to 
mention Heyse because he and Heidegger both spoke in this context of the 'crisis' and German 'mission' 
and the need for 'spiritual leadership' in the nation. Such was the academic atmosphere in 1933.73
On March 13, 1935 Husserl, among all state employees, had to sign an acknowledgment of his having 
been informed, on all occasions, that the form of German greeting had to be the "German hail", "Heil 
Hitler!" said with the right arm held out.
 
 There were few more incidents after all these, pertaining to Husserl personally, and to be 
intensely felt by him.  
74
This was followed on November 14 by a Supplementary Decree on Race, and its article 4(1) stated, "A 
Jew cannot be a citizen of the Reich".
  
 On September 15 of the same year, the Nuremberg Law on Citizenship was decreed. Article 2 
(1) stated  
  
 A citizen of the Reich may be only one who is of German or kindred blood.,  and who, 
through his behaviour, shows that he is both desirous and  personally fit to serve loyally the German 
people and the Reich.  
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72   Ibid., 168-169 
73   Hence I do not think it is fair to single out Heidegger for his mistake in supporting 
      Hitler. The Magdeburg and Leipzig meetings were full of Hitler supporters.     
74   There is a copy of this Personalakten, E. Husserl, University Archives, Freiburg.   
75   Louis L. Snyder Ed., Hitler Third Reich: A Documentary History. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981), 211-212 
 Husserl's break with the Reich was inevitable and final.     
  
As of January 15, 1936 Husserl's right as emeritus professor to teach at the University of Freiburg was 
officially annulled.76
3. Vienna
 Now the break with Freiburg University is also final.  
 
77 and Prague78
On May 7, 1935 Husserl delivered a lecture entitled "Die Philosophie in der Krisis der europäischen 
Menschheit"
 Lectures in 1935 
 The Vienna lecture and its implications 
79 in Vienna, on the invitation of the Wiener Kulturbund. The lecture was to face up to "the 
European crisis," which he took as a topic that has been a "frequently treated theme".80
The text itself
 The lecture was 
then repeated again on May 10. 
81
Husserl begins the lecture with an example, one highlighting the difference between scientific medicine 
and the lore of natural cure. The former, he argues, derives from an application of the theoretical 
science of the human body, especially anatomy and physiology, which in turn are based on the natural 
sciences chemistry and physics. The latter, the love of natural cure, he sees as    coming from traditional 
 is divided into three parts 
Part I:  Husserl's view on the situation of Europe's cultural tendency toward "objectivism", which for 
the sake of systematic reviewing, I will briefly summarize  in several points.  
Part II: To counteract Europe's cultural decline, Husserl speaks about Philosophy's infinite task, and 
this part introduces a clear distinction between philosophy as a fact of history, and philosophy as an 
actual human enterprise.  
Part III: Condensation.  
 
Part I  
A Teleological sense of European humanity 
                                                 
76   A copy of the document Persoalakten E. Husserl, University Archives Freiburg Nr. A. 23. 
77   Husserl's Archives Mss. (1935) M-III  5-IIa Seite 1-34,  
      Krisis I,  Hua VI (1954),  Abhandlungen III. p 314 ff 
78   Husserl's Archives Mss. (1935) K-34 S. Krisis II, Hua XXIX (1993), part II Nr. 10.  p 103 ff 
79   Krisis I,  314-348.. 
80   For example, R. Pannwitz, Die Krisis der europäischen Kultur. (Munchen: Hans Carl, 1921)  
    (Originally 1917) See H. Sluga.   Heidegger's Crisis. Harvard University Press, 1993  
81   I am using the published text , in Krisis I, 314-348. Crisis, 269-299 
native experiences of people. Then he turns to the area of Geisteswissenschaften,82 which are directed to 
humans, exclusively as persons in their personal 'life and accomplishments'. In these humanistic 
sciences, however, the word 'life' does not have a physiological connotation, as in natural sciences. 
'Life' is taken to mean an accomplishment of a spiritual product. While there is clearly a distinction 
between health and sickness in medical areas  (that is to say, in the areas of natural science, which sees 
humans solely from the perspective of anatomy and physiology, with scientific medicine being 
developed to maintain health and counteract sickness), there is in the areas of humanistic sciences no 
such "scientific medicine" being developed for people as persons.  This assertion also implies that with 
the fragmentation of knowledge, humans are viewed as an assemblage of parts. But Husserl's major 
question is "But why do so richly developed humanistic disciplines fail to perform the service here that 
is so admirably performed by the natural sciences in their sphere (Sphäre)?"83
 In Husserl's observations, while mathematically-exact natural sciences encompass the infinities 
in their actualities and real possibilities, resulting in a true technical control of nature, the humanistic 
sciences are different. The humanistic sciences are limited to intuitive finitudes, because these sciences 
are based on the surrounding world, which is not the same as the mathematically-exact world.   In 
Husserl's term, our 'surrounding world' is a 'spiritual structure in us', and is our historical  life. This 
means, that our 'surrounding world' is a world peceived according to our individual sediments of 
experiences, or at least very nuch influenced by them. Hence the term "nature" in the context of our 
'surrounding world' is not the "nature" of the natural sciences. When we think it through, 'natural 
science' is also a spiritual accomplishment, done by humans, and thus irreducible to scientific research 
results only, since behind all scientific researches there is always a human motivation at work. Yet 
because of the positivist-naturalistic tendency, the humanistic science fails to inquire after a theory of 
essence of 'spirit purely as spirit'. This failure has arisen through a partly blind attitude in these  
sciences. Husserl's "diagnosis" is that "European nations are sick. Europe itself, it is said, is in crisis"
.  
84
                                                 
82  Geisteswissenschaft, see beginning of Ch. 2. praenotanda 3.  
83  E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, Trans. David Carr. (Evanston: Noerthwestern Univ. Press), 270 
(henceforth Crisis). 
84   Ibid.,  270. 
. 
There are already many suggestions for reforms, to solve the malady, but according to Husserl none has 
touched the core of the problem. 
  
Spiritual Europe as a problem 
A Husserlian question in this context concerns "how the spiritual shape of Europe" is to be 
characterized?"85 (Die geistige Gestalt Europas" was ist das?) This query   comes with readiness to 
exhibit a teleology86 which is immanent in 'Europe'. Husserl asserts that, upon consistent and internally 
directed observation, there are perceptibly  new peculiar interrelations and differences in Europe. Yet in 
spite of the differences, there is an inner kinship of spirit, which causes a feeling of a homeland, i.e., a 
Europe for Europeans87.  This is what Husserl calls 'an inborn entelechy' in the European civilization. 
Now in his estimation, it is with the ancient Greeks that a new human epoch begins, an epoch with its 
essence being the idea of reason, which the Greeks called 'philosophia'. This spiritual Europe according 
to Husserl has a "birthplace" in the Greek world of seventh and sixth centuries BCE. From this 
"birthplace" there emerges a new sort of attitude of individuals toward their surrounding world.  
Husserl says "In this breakthrough of philosophy . . . I see. . . the primal phenomenon of spiritual 
Europe".88 In other words, the primal phenomenon of a spiritual Europe, is 'philosophy', not mythology. 
It was precisely among the ancient Greeks that the philosophers were rebelling against the solely 
mythological explanation of the surrounding-world, and thereby risking the social reactions of the as 
yet mythologically-oriented people.89
 Husserl contends, that the spiritual 'telos' of European humanity, lies in the infinite, the infinite 
idea toward which the whole spiritual 'becoming' converges (ineinander strömend). Thus for Husserl 
this breakthrough of philosophy is uniquely European, and Europe is essentially a philosophical break-
through of human history. In this way Husserl is doing an 'intentional history' , which means, that he is 
doing history but based on the development of the people's intentionality, and not just a concatenation 
  
                                                 
85   Crisis, 273. Husserl's "Europe" is to denote a spiritual entity and not a geographical or a political entity. In this thesis  
this Husserlian use of the word 'Europe' will be maintained, unless otherwise stated.  
86  Husserl seems to capitalize this notion of 'teleology', which I will be dealing later in chapter  V and VI.. 
87   I  think that Husserl would be delighted to see a new Germany leading the way of the United Europe now, although its 
reason might not be exactly "philosophical". 
88  Crisis, 276. 
89   This thought is somewhat parallel with the thought of  Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes, Bd.I, 1818  
Bd.II, 1922, quoted in R.G. Collingwood. The Idea of History (Oxford University Press, 1961. pbk ), 181-2. 
of facts. After these first conceptions of ideas, humans have gradually become new humans. Their 
spiritual beings enter into the movement of advancing reconstruction. Within such movement a new 
sort of humanity happens, humans are living in finitude but learning toward poles of infinity, and in 
this way a philosophical community has been formed.   
 Such, for Husserl is the history of the emerging spiritual Europe. Europe, because of 
philosophy, has been becoming a new spirit of free critique and of a  norm-giving aimed at infinite 
tasks. It is here we find what in Husserl's terms is called "the human spirit at work as spirit". Within 
European civilization philosophy has to exercise its function constantly as one which is the 'essence' for 
the civilization as a whole. This is obviously a very Eurocentric view of philosophy and thus a 
Eurocentric account of intentional-history; but it was very difficult for a European in the 1930s not to 
be.  
 As if Husserl has forgotten something, he also mentions the concept of God in this Vienna 
Lecture, but only in passing. In his emphasis on 'reason' Husserl has an absolute view on religion and 
God. When the world is thematized as a totality but lived in practical way, then we have a mythico-
religious attitude. In traditions of this sort people's gods (in plural) are objects of the surrounding world, 
having the same reality as animals and humans. 
 In a religion, that conforms to and develops with a philosophic outlook however, the concept of 
God-as-singular is essential for the progress of thought. God's ontic validity and God's value-validity 
are experienced as an absolute inner bond. This absoluteness coalesces with philosophical ideality. In 
other words, Husserl's 'reasoning' of God is that it must be absolute, and thus singular, and only such a 
God is acceptable as philosophical ideal in a Europe that has been becoming what it was meant to be.     
 
Part II  
Philosophy as an infinite task 
According to Husserl, the European crisis has its root in a mis-guided rationalism. The mistakes of the 
"Enlightenment,"  and of its intellectualism, which loses itself in theories alienated from the world (i.e., 
the world as it is, and not a mathematically-constructed world)  amounts to a wrong representation of 
'ratio' in European philosophy.  
 Reason (the Latin ratio90
 The European crisis-situation cannot be remedied as long as objectivism, rising from a 
naturalistic attitude toward the world, is not seen as naïve. To apply a natural science methodology to 
humanistic science is equally naïve. Humanistic discipline should not be placed on an equal footing 
with the natural science discipline. Hence it is imperative that humanistic science discover its own 
), in the original sense is what distinguishes humans from beasts. 
Philosophical reason represents a new stage of human nature and human reasoning. Speaking about 
philosophy, Husserl distinguishes 'philosophy' as a historical fact in a given time, resulting in 
philosophical systems, and he writes of 'philosophy' as the idea of an infinite task. In other words, there 
is a symbiosis mutualistis between philosophies and actual philosophizing.  A philosophy as an idea of 
infinite task, Husserl contends, as an act of continuously reasoning, is necessary to counteract the crisis.  
This means that only through self-consciousness can philosophy fulfil its function of putting itself on 
the road to a realization of knowledge. Only through constant reflexivity is philosophy a universal 
knowledge. But philosophy has gone through its naïvity, it has gone through objectivism, naturalism, 
and thereby a naturalization of spirit. Philosophy is seeing the world within the universe of what is.  
Truth is objective in this sense.  Hence cosmology emerged as a science of the world's bodies. Humans 
and animals are of corporeal nature, and in an orientation toward the surrounding world humans and 
animals come to appear as 'something with bodily existence,' even if they are not merely corporeal and 
even though  psychic occurences (orientations in animals) have certain objectivity as well.   
 It is because of the reign of positivistic objectivism that an individual human gets taken as a 
psychophysical object. Its spiritual interrelation comes to be reduced to psychophysical causality, 
which then lacks a spiritual continuity. "Objectivism" in the psychic world creates "psychologism". 
This objectivistic attitude is similar to that of the ancient materialism and determinism.  Since Socrates' 
days, Plato and Aristotle maintained that humans should be thematized as humans in their specifically 
human quality. Humans belong to the sphere of objective facts surely, but that is not all that there is, as 
persons, humans have goals, norms given by traditions, - in Europe after the ancient Greeks, traditions 
of reasoning- which are norms of truth, indeed eternal norms.   
                                                 
90  It is a bit hair-splitting, but since in English we use the word 'ratio'' also in the sense of 'proportion' , I include this note 
to clarify that.   
methodology. For Husserl, this calls for the emergence of his transcendental phenomenology. 
      
2   The Prague lecture and its implications 
On November 14 and 15, 1935 Husserl delivered a lecture entitled "Die Psychologie in der Krise der 
europåischen Wissenschaft"91
 Aber alle diese Menschheitsfragen bleiben in den positiven  Wissenschaften, auch in denen, die 
vom Menschen in seinem  geschichtlichen Dasein handeln, ausgeslossen. Ausgeslossen vermöge 
 ihrer Einschrankung auf das, was sie "Objektiivität" nennen und was die  ganze Methode ihrer 
Wissenschaftlichkeit bestimmt.
 in Prague, on invitation of the deutschen Philosophischen Fakultåt, and 
the Tschechischen Philosophischen Fakultåt.  
This lecture, along with the Vienna one forms the main motivation for Husserl to write the Krisis and 
publish it afterwards. With still a worse fate, than the Vienna lecture, this Prague lecture, was left in 
obscurity, it  would not be published with the Krisis I text in Hua VI. but only much later in Hua XXIX 
in 1993.  
 In the lecture itself, there is much repeating of the Vienna contentions. His critique of the 
general trend of the sciences and his observation of the European crisis is on every page. Right from the 
beginning of the lecture, Husserl says: "Blosse Tatsachenwissenschaften machen blosse 
Tatsachenmenscehen," (naked/ merely factual knowledge is making naked/ merely factual people). And 
a little further, he recognizes the atmosphere of war, with its posed choice "Sinn oder Sinnlosigkeit 
dieses ganzen menschlichen Daseins" (meaning or meaninglessness this is the whole human Being) 
remains unanswered. He says, 
  
92
After that, though, he qualified the above-quoted assertion, when he said "Das war nicht immer 
so"(That has not always been that way). Then Husserl goes through the history of philosophy, 
   
 
 (But all these humanity's questions are stiil in the realm of positive  sciences, and also those 
questions that are dealing with historical human  being are out of the question. This exclusion 
enables the limitation, which  is called "objectivity". The whole scientific methodology is directed to 
it).  
                                                 
91  Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Ergänzungband Texte aus dem 
Nachlass.  Hrsg. Reinhold Smid. Husserliana XXIX, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), 103-139.  (Henceforth Krisis II)  
92   All the three quotations from the same page, Krisis II, p 104 
beginning from the Greeks up to the "Founders of the New-time," (Begründer der philosophischen 
Neuzeit). who according to Husserl reacted against the Scholastic philosophy, and had to discover a 
really final "philosophia perennis" (eine wirklich endgültige Philosophie, eine philosophia perennis).93
 One very different note in the Prague Lecture, when compared to the Vienna one, interestingly, 
is Husserl's mention of God. He said that "the Greek philosophy and the Jewish-Christian monotheism 
together as "sources of meaning, out of which came the European humanity in the old-time" (den beide 
Sinnesquellen, aus denen das europäische Menschentum im altertum entsprungen: die griechischen 
Philosophie und dem judisch-christlichen Monotheismus).
  
Husserl observes that philosophy and sciences from the early Greek period to the Renaissance were 
giving answers to the general Lebensprobleme des Menschen. But then things changed, the intellectual 
atmosphere became splintered. Sciences developed in their own way and method, and philosophy was 
very much influenced by the split.  The belief in a 'universal philosophy' had been lost. The crisis had 
set in.  
94
 Theoretische Philosophie ist das Erste, eine überlegende  Weltbetrachtung frei von den 
Bindungen des Mythos und Tradition,  universale Welt- und Menschenerkenntnis in absoluter 
Vorurteilslosigkeit,  schließlich in der Welt selbst die ihr innwohnende Teleologie und ihr 
 oberste Prinzip: Gott, erkennend.
 Here it becomes very clear that Husserl's 
search for the origin of his European-ness has been answered much clearer than in any other 
manuscripts. When discussing the philosophy of history as such I will have to come back to this 
philosophical-theological teleology's origin once again in my later chapter. A little bit further on in the 
Prague piece, Husserl still maintains that,   
 
95
 (Theoretical Philosophy is the first, the superior world-contemplation which  is free of 
restictions of myth and tradition. It is a knowledge of the world  and humanity in an absolute 
presuppositionlessness. In the end it is a  knowledge of teleology which is in the world itself and its 
  
 
                                                 
93   The term "philosophia perennis" has been used by the Scholastics to indicate their philosophy. It started with Steuchus 
Eugubinus (1496-1549), in his "De Philosophia"(1540).  Leibniz (1646-1716) used the term to indicate "the philosophy 
which has been passed on from the ancient time and has spread widely." Jaspers (1883-1969) used it to indicate '"the 
great philosophies over the centuries." (see Georgi Schischkoff, Philosophisches Wörterbuch. (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1991) 
In the Vatican II Council (1963-65) when indicating Scholastic Philosophy for the formation of  students in Theological 
Major Seminaries, the text says " innixi patrimonio philosophico perenniter valido". (see  Sacrosanctum Oecumenicum 
Concilium Vaticanum II, Constitutiones, Decreta, Declarationes. (Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1966), 374. In the Prague 
lecture, Husserl might have meant either in the Leibnizian or Jaspers' sense.     
94   Krisis II,  p 109 
95   Ibid., p 109-110 
highest principle  God). 
Husserl speaks about "inwohnende Teleologie" in the above quotation. And also the "oberste Prinzip: 
Gott." Thus the teleology and the highest Principle God are not "things" to be accepted as mythos or 
tradition, but as "inwohnende," immanent teleology.  Therefore, "Im Ideal ist der Antike Mensch der 
sich in freier Vernunft einsichtig formende". This ideal is much "bigger picture" than one presented in 
the post Renaissance rationalism. In this line of thinking Husserl defends Descartes' link with medieval 
Scholasticism. From here Husserl says there developed two streams of thinking: the Leibnizian 
monadology up to Kant's "Vernunftkritik" on the one hand, with the other stream being the Lockean 
"Verstandeskritik". From the text so far we do not know whether Husserl judges these two streams 
should be kept together or not.   
Thus Husserl, while observing the crisis, is still in full hope of offering his trancendental philosophy as 
"remedy", saying  
  
 Auf dem Hintergrund des die ganze Neuzeit durchziehenden Ringens um  das 
Selbstverständnis des Menschen in der Form der  Transzendentalphilosophie und der Psychologie 
hat sich damit die Idee  der Phänomenologie abgezeichnet. [. . . ] Und so mag nun die 
 Phänomenologie das neue, das transzendentale Wissen um dem  Menschen im alten stolzen 
Worte aussprechen: anthropos metron  pantoon, der Mensch ist das Maß aller Dinge.96
 In the Crisis Husserl gradually picked up and thematized the idea of 'Life-world' (Lebenswelt) 
    
 
 (From the background which has been through struggles to reach a  humanity's 
selfunderstanding through transcendental philosophy and  psychology, the whole new age is marked 
with the idea of phenomenlogy,  [. . . ] And now phenomenlogy may be the new transcendental 
knowing, to  speak proudly to humans, that human being is the measure of  everything).      
4   The Crisis Texts of 1936, and the context of their publication  
From the Vienna and Prague lectures texts, and even during his working over of his conference papers, 
Husserl began to work towards a new approach to his phenomenology. A new way of introducing it 
slowly began to emerge for him. The writing of the Crisis texts which were written in a very critical 
year, gave Husserl such a new light that it resulting in a new introduction to phenomenology that  
superseded his Cartesian Meditations project. The German version of his Meditations, whether original 
or developed, were never published during his lifetime and a byproduct of the argument in our thesis is 
to explain why..   
                                                 
96   Ibid., p 138-39 
and within it the theme of history (Geschichte/Historie). Although Life-world had for a long time been 
a base used by Husserl for philosophizing, this is the first time he thematizes it explicitly. Since his 
appreciation for history has not hitherto been great, moreover, it is strange indeed that in his last opus 
he includes history in it and places it  so high as one of the key in-roads to Phenomenology. This is 
clearly a new emphasis.97
 I cannot simply repeat old ideas and just put them together in a higher  level textbook-like 
treatise; . . . I am drafting a substantially deeper train of  historical-philosophical thinking, 
[emphasis, mine] but I don't want to stop  with that . . . I want  to work out a fundamental text on 
the  phenomenological reduction based on my many investigation of it, and  thus prove to myself 
and to the world that I do not belong to the past.
 Up until his Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations Husserl investigated and 
explicated Consciousness as if in vacuo, but now in the Crisis texts he wants to carry out his 
investigations in modo historico. He said about himself in his letter at that time that,  
 
98
Die Krisis der europäische Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, was eventually 
published in Belgrade, in 1936.
   
  
99 It can be regarded as Husserl's great "Unvollendete", an opus which is 
excitingly new but nevertheless unfinished.100 Arthur Liebert published part 1 and part 2 of the Krisis 
text, but part 3 seemed not to have reached the publisher at all in Husserl's lifetime, either because it 
was never sent to the publisher,101 or because it was requested by Husserl to be brought back for 
revision.102
However, since the Biemel edition, the publication of the text in the 'Husserliana' Series in 1954,
  
103 we 
now have all the three parts of Husserl's text together as was intended, and some related texts as well.104
                                                 
97   His very first emphasis, I detect in the Erste Philosophie, texts of 1923-24 in Hua VII (1956) and VIII (1959)  
98   Letter to Albrecht Husserl. April 11, 1935. Briefwechsel IX. Hrsg. K. Schuhmann. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 117. See 
R. Bruzina. E. Husserl & E. Fink. (Yale University Press, 2004), 60. 
99   Philosophia   Ed. Arthur Liebert, Bd. I (1936), 77-176   
100  Hussesrl himself made this simile in his 'Vorwort zur Forsetzung der "Krisis", Krisis, I  Beilage  
      xiii, (mss. 1937), 435.   
101   Krisis I,  xiv. 
102   E. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen. Hrsg. S. Strasser. Husserliana I (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950). Hua. I,  
xxx.  
103   Krisis I p. xvi.  
104   The Crisis of European Sciences. Trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970) 
 
In this new and exciting work Husserl is found consistently promoting transcendental phenomenology 
as a method, to give science a thorough foundation, and to heal the whole European way of narrow 
"scientific positivistic mode of thinking." In other words Husserl sought to re-found philosophy. He 
had admittedly wanted to do this before, in the area of logic, especially in his later work in logic, as 
found in Formale und Transzendentale Logik  (1929). But the case of the Krisis is different.   
 
In the Krisis Husserl provides not only a history of philosophy but a  philosophy of history. 
 The Krisis text, we reiterate, has a subtitle 'An introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy', 
and it is obvious that Husserl meant this as another 'introduction to phenomenological philosophy' after 
Ideen. Buch I (1913) and Méditations cartésiennes (1931), which also both carry the subtitle of 'an 
introduction'. What is new and important about the Krisis' as introduction, however, is that, here for the 
first time the history of our philosophizing, is being investigated phenomenologically. It is not the 
history of philosophy, in the sense of  the history of philosophical systems, beginning from the early 
Greeks to those in Husserl's days, but it is the history of philosophies as a collective attempt to search 
for a "meaning of man" (sinn des Menschen),105 which is here being consciously investigated. and "there 
is an insight that there is something in phenomenology that can be understood best through a critical 
historical reflection."106
 By investigating the history of philosophizing, by penetrating into the collective attempts to 
explicate the "history of modern philosophy as a struggle for the meaning of man" (die Geschichte der 
neuzeitlichen Philosophie als Kampf um den Sinn des Menschen),
  
107
                                                 
105  Krisis I, 12   Crisis, 14. 
106   James Dodd.  Crisis and Reflection.  (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004), 1 
107    the title of Krisis / Crisis  § 6  
 Husserl confronts philosophy itself, 
which needs to go back to its own first assumptions again. Philosophy, indeed, is required to clarify its 
origins. Considering this,  Husserl was also applying phenomenology to the core question of how to 
philosophize. He is re-"introducing" phenomenological philosophy and using history as his point of 
entry.  
 Husserl is doing an 'intentional history' and not just factual history, and in both parts I and II he 
is trying to show the difference between those two. In part I Husserl sketches the history of European 
philosophical "development" leading up to the crisis, and in part II gives a clarification of the origin of 
such a "development". 
 European scientific development for Husserl has been ambivalent right from the start. He writes 
in his preface to the original published version : 
  
 The work that I am beginning with this present essay and shall complete in  a series of 
further articles in Philosophia, makes the attempt, by way of a  teleological-historical reflection 
upon the origins of our critical scientific and  philosophical situation, to establish the 
unavoidable necessity of   transcendental-phenomenological reorientation of philosophy.  
 Accordingly, it becomes, in its own right, an introduction to transcendental 
 phenomenology .108
This part expresses Husserl's main concern. It is entitled "The crisis of sciences as an expression of the 
radical life-crisis of European humanity." (Die Krisis der Wissenschaften als Ausdruck der radikalen 
Lebenskrisis des europäischen Menschentum), Husserl has now equated the crisis of sciences with the 
life-crisis of European humanity.
 
 
Let me explicate especially from the first two parts of this great work. 
Crisis part I 
109 He starts this part with a statement that, in the era of scientific 
development and scientific fad, even philosophy is almost succumbing to scepticism, irrationalism, and 
mysticism; at the same time, science, which is highly praised, has been reduced to mere factual science 
or fact finding activity. In his words, "Merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people 
(Bloße Tatsachenwissenschaften machen bloße Tatsachenmenschen)."110 According to Husserl, this is 
contrary to the ideal Renaissance-Mensch. It is exactly the Renaissance movement that has attempted to 
shape a new freedom, and as a model it has chosen the ideal of the ancient humans, whose essence is 
their philosophical form of existence, an existence shaped by freedom. This is the ideal existence and in 
Husserl's words: "Philosophy as theory frees not only the theorists [or scientists], but any 
philosophically educated person." 111
 This type of philosophy asks questions that surpasses the world of mere facts. Positivism is 
simply too limited and he condemns it. Positivists "all claim a higher dignity than questions of fact, 
[yet] Positivism in a manner of speaking decapitates philosophy."
   
112
                                                 
108   Krisis I, xiv. footnote 3.  Crisis, p. 3 fn 1. 
109   The crisis was also mentioned e.g., by  Rudolf Panwitz. Die Krisis der europaeischen Kultur.1921, Oswald 
Spengler. "Pessimismus." in Preussische Jahrbücher, 1921 and 
 Alfred Rosenberg. Krisis und Neubau Europas. 1934 
110   Crisis, 6. 
111   Ibid., 8. 
112  Ibid., 9. 
 After depicting the failure of the 
new science and declaring scientists as unphilosophical experts (unphilosophischen Fachmännern 
gewordenen Wissenschaftler), Husserl observes that there had already been a louder protest than his 
own from thinkers, or from "theorists who were filled with the philosophical spirit."113 This happened in 
the period from Hume to Kant, the period of a "passionate struggle for a clear, reflective understanding 
of the true reasons of a century-old failure (zu einem klaren Selbstverständnis der wahren Gründe 
dieses Jahrhundertelangen Versagens durchzudrinegn) [in philosophical thought]."114 We are made to 
remember that Hume's scepticism has caused Kant to "wake up from his dogmatic slumber," to publish 
his Kritik der reinen Vernunft in 1781, followed later on by the editio emendata in 1787. This Kantian 
Kritik wants to radicalize the Cartesian starting point "cogito," and now in a comparable spirit Husserl 
wants to suggest that there is a necessity to change the whole way of Western philosophical thinking, 
which has been and is in crisis. He seeks to apply the phenomenological method (at least part of it) to 
history. He says that "the history of modern philosophy is a struggle for the meaning of man (Kampf um 
den Sinn des Menschen)."115  Therefore the crisis of the meaning of the European people can be read 
from the crisis of philosophy, too. Hence the title of part I of the text. In Husserl's words: "The struggle 
(Geisteskämpfe) of European humanity as such takes the form of struggles between philosophies 
(Kämpfe der Philosophien),"116
 For Husserl, "the faith (Glauben) of the possibility of philosophy as a task (Aufgabe), that is, in 
the possibility of universal knowledge (universale Erkenntnis), is something we cannot let go."
 and this basically means for him the struggle between positivism and 
phenomenology.  
117 This 
indeed has been and will be a self-imposed task and mission for Husserl himself, which he calls his 
vocation. He sought to awaken his own and thereby our passion of responsibility as "functionaries of 
mankind," so that we may -indeed- should "inquire back into what was originally and always sought in 
philosophy."118
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Crisis part  II 
In his second part Husserl explains his new 'contextual' and 'genetic' phenomenology by giving a 
"Clarification of the origin of the modern opposition between physicalistic objectivism and 
transcendental subjectivism." To depict this opposition in the later portion of this part, Husserl would 
work through a clarification of origin of the thoughts of Galileo, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley Hume, and 
finally Kant. Although his treatment of those thinkers before him, as mentioned before, was very 
sketchy indeed, the point of his argument is clear over the issues of the objectivity and universality of 
science. According to Husserl, the context of these new emerging ideas is the particular historical 
opposition between physicalistic objectivism and transcendental subjectivism. He has his list of 
philosophical thoughts with the intention to investigate how these thinkers have come to their 
conclusions and to learn from each one of them how not to fall into their unacknowledged prejudices. 
(One would not be too far from the truth to admit that this is the way chosen for later development by 
Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) in his labour of 'deconstructionism'). Hussserl's is indeed a new procedure 
of doing a philosophy of history. From the philosophical and historical point of view, this kind of 
phenomenology is not investigating philosophy as such, or history as such, in the usual sense. With this 
kind of phenomenology what Husserl wants to accomplish is to allow the historicity of the subjectivity 
of those thinkers to become explicit, since he thinks that "every single process of consciousness has its 
own history, i.e., its temporal genesis."119
 . . . insight into the explicit and implicit intentionality wherein the alter ego  becomes 
evinced and verified (bekundet  und bewährt) in the realm of  our transcendental ego; we must 
 He is convinced that his method of genetic analysis will 
expose thinkers' contextual prejudices in their genesis. Nevertheless, for Husserl the exposure and 
awareness of the prejudices, as such, is only one side of the whole knowing process, the other side 
being that Husserl wants his own mind "to go back" to their experiences, by asking the same questions 
they asked all over again, such as "how is this given to my consciousness?"  (whatever the object may 
be). It is the 'how it is given' that is important for his historical retracings. This means that he must seek 
an  
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discover in what intentionalities,  syntheses, motivations the sense [of the] "other ego" becomes 
fashioned  in me (anderes Ego sich in mir gestaltet).120
Of course it is nearly impossible to experience fully and exactly the experiences of another. The closest 
to this experiencing of another's experience is the possibility of  'empathy' ('empatheia' Greek: em, in; 
pathos, suffering).
 
121
 Thus with his genetic phenomenology and his theory of subjectivity, Husserl arrives at the 
kernel of this investigations in the Krisis.  But at this point we need to go deeper into his appropriation 
of the other thinkers' experiences. Since this is the profound part of Husserl's view of 'inner history', it 
deserves a full investigation, which will be treated in the following chapter.
 But for Husserl to experience 'how a given is given' to one's consciousness, even 
given the same context and the same condition as it is given to another's consciousness is indeed 
possible, and is the proper search method to uncover the origin of previous thinkers' experiences of 
questioning and reasoning. For him this was certainly possible.  
122
 Husserl's first analytical reflection in this part of the Crisis is on mathematics. Mathematicians 
in the ancient times knew only a 'finitely closed a priori', yet it is now possible to conceive an infinite 
totality.
 Suffice to say here, this 
"inner history" is not a concatenation of facts. It is also not an ordinary historiography. It is a discerning 
of our European spiritual heritage "from the inside", by regarding its retrieval as a 'self-interpretation' 
which reveals a motivational continuity, and not just a causal series. 
123 With this new possibility comes also the possibility of a mathematized natural science. 
Galileo is taken as a prototype of this trend to mathematize nature.124
 In his view of the world from the perspective of geometry, the perspective  of what appears to 
the senses and mathematizable, Galileo abstracts from  the subjects as persons leading a personal 
life, he abstracts from all that is  in any way spiritual, from all cultural properties which are 
attached to  things in human praxis. The result of this abstraction is [that] the things  move  purely 
as bodies (die puren körperlichen  Dinge), but these are   [nonetheless] taken as concrete real objects 
(wie konkrete  Realitäten
 In Husserl's words:  
  
125).126
In this Galilean-style of mathematically structured science, the world is an enclosed world of bodies, 
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measurable and quantifiable. This science is then regarded as an objective and universal (read: true) 
knowledge. In consequence, knowing the world means knowing it exactly as it is quantifiable, because 
this is regarded as "objective" knowledge, thus true according to the status of the object, and not 
according to the status of mind of the knower. In this way the world as it is experienced, as given to the 
perception before the quantitative abstraction is applied to it, this Lebenswelt, is replaced by a 
quantitative world. The substitution is then passed on to the following generation of scientists, and 
"knowledge" becomes "universal", in the sense of being accepted all over the whole scientific world as 
"true", since it is not a particular view of one particular scientist, but a general possession of truth by a 
community of scientists. From then on when people speak about the world, they mean the 'objective 
universally known' world. For Galileo, this "objective knowledge" of the world remained heuristic as a 
method, yet for  successive scientists this "objective knowledge" of the world became an objective and 
universal truth about the world. For the common people, non-scientists, this "objective knowledge" of 
the world's leaders becomes the only truth possible about the world. As soon as this Galilean science 
moves to success, the ideas of philosophy as 'the science of the universe', in the sense of 'the science of 
all that is,' is transformed into "a science of all there is quantifiably."'127 This transformed knowledge, 
when accepted as 'the truth', is what Husserl calls the "unacknowledged prejudice."  But of course 
scientists could not always be aware that this kind of truth was originally only a methodical truth, in the 
sense of a working hypothesis for all their daily conscious practice of science. This is the first great 
crisis of European thought. Reflecting on Husserl's position, Buckley calls this unawareness "the crisis 
as forgetting".128
 In the context of his criticism of Galileo, and the subsequent unacknowledged prejudice, 
Husserl turns to the world, as Galileo did. But in doing so, Husserl is showing how he presupposes the 
Lebenswelt as the source or meaning-fundament which ultimately makes scientific rationality, in 
Galileo's quantifiable sense, intelligible to us as an abstraction, albeit a valid one. Thus Husserl goes 
back to a world before its scientific description and begins to thematize what he calls the priority of the 
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Lebenswelt. This thematization happens for the first time in the Krisis texts (mss. 1935/1936). One 
must concede that the term "life-world" itself has been used by Husserl since 1917/ 1919 and in print 
since 1924129  and 1925,130
 . . . the developed method, . . .  is as method, an art (Methode, Kunst /  Techne), which is 
handed down, but its true meaning is not necessarily  handed down with it. And precisely for this 
reason it is that a theoretical  task and achievement like that of natural science, - . . .-, can only be 
 and remain meaningful in a true and original sense if the scientist has  developed in himself 
the ability to inquire back into the original meaning  (Ursprungssinn) of all his meaning structures and 
methods, i.e., into the  historical meaning of their primal establishment (Urstiftungssinn), and 
 especially into the meaning of all the inherited meanings taken over  unnoticed in this 
primal establishment, as well as  those taken over later  on.
 but not treated as a philosophical theme. The 'life-world', according to 
Husserl, is a forgotten foundation of natural science. It is forgotten because, as in Galileo's case, Galileo 
did not inquire into the origins of mathematical "self-evidence". For Galileo the "objective knowledge" 
of the world was 'a given', though for him his orientation was still a method.  In Husserl's words,  
 
131
 . . . the mathematician, the natural scientist, at best a brilliant technician of  the method, [. 
. . ] is normally  not at all able to carry out such reflection.  In his actual sphere of inquiry and 
discovery he does not know at all that  everything these reflections must clarify is even in need of 
clarification,  and this for the sake of that interest which is decisive for a philosophy of  science, i.e., 
the interest in a true  knowledge of the world itself, nature  itself.
   
Husserl has discerned to his own satisfaction that, there is a basic confusion among scientists. To get to 
the true knowledge of the world, one becomes content to have a mathematical-knowledge of it, yet 
while this mathematical knowledge is useful as a method to understand the world from one particular 
perspective, and can serve as one method to get one perspectival understanding, the method itself 
needs to be understood as to how it functions as a method in the first place. Otherwise the method that 
functions well as a method is then taken as the aimed-for knowledge itself.     
 Husserl also observes that  
 
132
Thus science cannot, and should not stop at the point of scientific findings only, or else scientists will 
pretend that the truth has been revealed through scientific conclusions. The knowledge of the world 
cannot stop at a mathematical formula of it. True understanding in science not only requires a thorough 
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understanding of the world itself, including nature, but it requires also a thorough understanding of the 
method by which the understanding processes is accomplished. It is thus a process of understanding the 
object of knowing and at the same time understanding the process itself. If this double-edged act cannot 
be performed, then what is thought to be understood is merely  registered data about the world (or more 
accurately, one aspect of it) in a customised formula. Husserl thinks that scientists fall short of 
performing the complete or valid task. This inability and part-ignorance is the most significant  cause of 
the crisis. Husserl states 
 
  and this [true knowledge of the world itself] is precisely what has been lost  through a 
science which is given as a tradition and which has become a  techne, insofar as this interest 
played a determining role at all in its primal  establishment.133
 he abstracts from the subjects as persons leading a personal life, he  abstracts all that is in any 
way spiritual, from all cultural properties which  are attached to things in human praxis. The result 
of this abstraction is that  things will now be understood purely as bodies; but these are taken as 
 concrete real objects, the totality of which makes up a world which  becomes the subject 
matter of  research. One can truly say that the idea  of nature as a really self-enclosed world of bodies 
first emerges with  Galileo.
 
 Husserl then finds it necessary, for essential reasons, to investigate the origins of Galilean 
science. His aim in trying to understand the Galilean science is not so much to correct Galileo, but to 
come to the origin of Galileo's way of thinking, and to go through it once again with Galileo, so to 
speak, but now in full awareness (taking nothing for granted) so that he can rise from the temptation of 
falling back into the accepted science without being aware of its prejudices, be they mathematical, 
scientific or placed on any other uninvestigated ground.  
 Husserl's second analytical reflection in this part of the work is on the issue of dualism. Due to 
Galileo's mathematical attitude, and his method is over-abstractive:  
 
134
 Husserl observes, that "the result of this abstraction is that the things will now be "understood" 
purely as bodies."
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 This shift in turn paved the way to the the mind (spirit)/ body dualism which 
appeared soon after with Descartes. According to Husserl, this dualism is unavoidable, because  
                   
 . . . if scientifically rational nature is a world of bodies in itself, then the  world-in-itself must, 
in a sense unknown before, be a peculiarly split world,  split into nature-in-itself (Natur an sich) 
and a mode of being (Seinart)  which is different from this: that which exists psychically (das 
psychisch  Seiende ).136
" . .which is left over after the animal and the human bodies have been separated off, [and] as belonging 
inside the closed region of nature".
  
             
 Husserl observes, too, that from this dualism, comes the specialization of philosophy (in its 
earlier broad conception) into sciences. This "specialization" has a deeper meaning, exclusively related 
to the modern attitude. In the ancient times, even up to the late Middle Ages, any specialization 
occurring never caused a loss of the common basis of root disciplines of philosophical endeavour. 
Galileo's natural science did not arise through specialization, yet subsequent sciences did arise from his 
reorientation of method. From these later specializations more and more special regions of study 
cropped up, rationally closed to and from one another within the rational totality of the intellectual 
universe. Thus sciences have tended to lose their philosophical common ground and origin.  
 Both this dualism and subsequent splintering of disciplines came to affect all areas of research, 
i.e., the biophysical sciences, physics, etc. An example of resulting problems involved how to explain 
the position of the soul as that  
137
 Even in metaphysics, where physicalistic rationalism could not be carried through, aid was 
sought through the use of variation of concepts. The previous Scholastic concepts are now "watered 
down". As a consequence we have the writings of people like Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). We also find Benedictus de Spinoza's (1632-1677) Ethica 
being created modo geometrico. Indeed we cannot call them Scholastics anymore. However, according 
to Husserl, Spinoza's Ethica (1677) was the first universal self-subsisting ontology. In the spirit of that 
 Here a type of being is ascribed to the soul which is similar in 
principle to that of nature. This naturalization of the psychic comes down through John Locke to the 
modern psychology of Husserl's day. Locke's tabula rasa image (Husserl used the English word 'white 
paper') and is typical in his explanation that psychic data can come and go "here" and "there," that it is 
somehow ordered like the events of bodies in nature.  
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time, these authors thought that the ancient philosophy had wanted to be the comprehensive science, 
but did not attain it. That old ideal, however, was now thought of as a possibility to be attained for the 
first time, and through the newly formed mathematics and natural science(s),  philosophers thought 
they had just done that. No doubt the new ideal of universality and rationality brought advancement in 
mathematics and physics, but it remains a different matter as to  whether these new paradigms should 
be accepted as the basic paradigms of all sciences, let alone of philosophy.  
 When philosophy was done modo geometrico, the difficulty began to be felt in the new 
naturalistic psychology. The area of psychology, which included the rational knowing in general, 
claimed to bear the ultimate truth-meaning of the world.  This brought on -in both Berkeley and Hume, 
for instance- a scepticism, first towards models of rationality then towards its basic concepts.  Hume 
even carried through his scepticism towards the whole ideal of philosophy, and towards the whole 
manner in which new sciences were claimed to be "scientific". Faced with this challenge, philosophy 
became an epistemology, a theory of reason, or an Erkenntnistheorie, to enable us better to meet this 
new scepticism. Thus philosophy was on the way from scientific objectivism into transcendental 
subjectivism. This development took form in a continuous tension between objectivistic and 
transcendental philosophy. Hussserl seeks to show that this tension is at the core of the life of  modern 
philosophy, it is the sense (Sinn) of modern spiritual history, and this spiritual history needs to be 
investigated if we are to embark upon a new horizon of philosophizing through history.  
 In this same part II, in the midst of his historical exposé, Husserl pauses to reflect on his 
'historical manner of investigation,' as he calls it. In this reflection Husserl states that his unusual 
historical investigation is  
 
 . . . to make comprehensible the teleology in the historical becoming of  philosophy, 
especially modern philosophy, and at the same time to achieve  clarity about ourselves, who are the 
bearers of this teleology, who take  part in carrying it out through our personal intentions.138
In the Origin of Geometry, also written in 1936,
  
 
139
 . . . our considerations (of Galileo) will necessary lead to the deepest  problems of 
 Husserl states that,  
  
                                                 
138  Ibid., 70. 
139  This mss. written in 1936. first edited and published and given a title by Fink, in Revue Internationale de 
philosophie, I, 2 (1939), See also  Crisis, 353.  
meaning, problems of science and of history of science in  general, and indeed in the end to problems 
of  universal history in  general; . . . 140
  . . . self-reflections about our own present philosophical situation,  in the  hope that  [in this 
way] we can finally  take possession of the meaning,  method, and beginning of philosophy, . . 
 
 
A bit further on he says, that in this way he is carrying out a  
 
141
In the next six sections Husserl speaks about Descartes - in three sections - then about Locke, Berkeley 
and Hume - each in one section - and then about Kant in three. His aim in doing this is not to provide a 
quick glance over the history of modern philosophy, but "to carry out the clarification of the unifying 
sense of the modern philosophy."
 
 
 Two components of the one whole project are disclosed in these passages: to make the historical 
becoming of philosophy comprehensible through showing its teleology; and at the same time to achieve 
clarity about ourselves. Since this teleology is not to be comprehended in abstracto, but to be 
comprehended as being incarnated in us, the bearers, it makes sense that this pause is injected 
methodologically into the flow of this unusual historical investigation. Rhetoric aside, this reflection is 
not only a methodological one, but is at the same time Husserl's personal creed. This creed actually 
must be imbibed and applied as any investigation is being carried out. Husserl believes that history can 
be read in the intentions of the human bearers, since these intentions reveal who we are and while at the 
same time expressing the distinctive forms of the past. Thus to learn how to read history, is at the same 
time to learn how to be aware of our own inner consciousness in its possible and various attempts to 
express itself. It means that if we read history only from the observable physical concatenation of facts, 
we thereby ignore that human history is human-made, by thinking beings like ourselves.  Therefore, the 
whole human-making of history needs to be addressed; and since humans are not merely physicality, it 
follows that a merely physical description of history will not be a truly human history.  
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 Admittedly he offers an apparently simplistic account of each 
philosopher, since his focus is to highlight their common underlying intentions and struggles to express 
the 'search for the meaning of being-human.' But the exercise confirms his agenda to rethink the same 
issues that have pestered  philosophers for so long and be able to address them better in one's own 
thinking for learning how they have been approached in the past.   
 Husserl's summary view on Descartes, to illustrate, is that  
 
 Like all historical ideas that result in great developments, those in the new  mathematics, the 
new natural science, and the new philosophy live in very  diverse noetic modes in the consciousness 
of the persons who function as  bearers of their development.143
Philosophical knowledge, according to Descartes, is an absolutely grounded knowledge: philosophy 
must  stand upon a foundation of immediate and apodictic knowledge whose self-evidence excludes all 
conceivable doubt.  Husserl agrees with this, asserting that "Once in his life every philosopher must 
proceed in this way; if he has not done it, and even [if he] already has "his [own] philosophy" he must 
still do it."
   
144
 This statement declares how radical Husserl wants to be, but as it turns out, not in a Cartesian 
way. For according to Husserl, Descartes was radically rational in principle, but he was not radical all 
the way through in the execution of his principle. Doing philosophy for Husserl, as for Descartes, is 
going back to the origins of thinking. According to Husserl the "Cartesian epoché" (or dubium 
methodicum, as it is known) has in truth a hitherto unheard-of radicalism, since it encompasses the 
whole sense experience and its correlate: the world itself. The original Cartesian motif was a passion  " 
. . .that of pressing forward through the hell of an unsurpassable, quasi-sceptical epoché toward the 
gates of heaven of an absolute rational philosophy."
  
145
 If I refrain from taking [a] position on the being or non-being of the world, . . .  I the ego, 
carrying the epoché, [as I] am not included in its realm of objects  but rather am excluded in principle . 
. . It is precisely herein that I find just  the apodictic ground I was seeking, . . . Thus during the 
universal epoché,  the absolutely self evident  "I am" is at my disposal.
  
 As far as a rational philosophy is concerned, Husserl fully agrees with Descartes. How is this 
ratio-based philosophy to be accomplished? How does this happen? In Husserl's reading of Descartes, 
he says:  
  
146
 I , the ego performing the epoché, am the only thing that is absolutely  indubitable.
   
147
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In other words, Descartes' radicality, has still an I, as a beginning point of the philosophizing process. I 
might paraphrase, "Even when I doubt, I still have my doubting-I as my base from which to 
philosophize." 
 So far Husserl has only praise for Descartes. But his sharp critique is that Descartes "does not 
actually carry through the original radicalism of ideas."148
  
 . . .in spite of the radicalism of the presuppositionlessness he demands,   [he] has, in advance, 
a goal in relation to which the breakthrough to this  "ego" is supposed to be the means. He does not see 
that, by being  convinced of the possibility of the goal and of his, he has already left this  radicalism 
behind.
 Husserl says that  
149
 Also, in Husserl's reading, "Descartes himself really believes he is able to establish the dualism 
of finite substances by way of inferences to what transcends his own soul, mediated through the first 
inference to the transcendence of God."
  
Descartes' "goal" and "means" are too clear for Husserl as not altogether 'presuppositionless' for they 
reveal hidden presuppositions. According to Husserl, Descartes cannot pretend not to have a goal, 
while saying that he is investigating such a goal with  the I as a starting point of thinking. In any case, 
already his "I-starting-point" means that he is not so totally presuppositionless as he claims.  Descartes 
cannot pretend not to have a means, while saying that he is investigating it, i.e., the means being the 
doubt, since he 'knows' (without doubt) that he is doubting. Thus his principles turn out to be self-
contradictory, at least, in their philosophic execution.   
150
 . . . thinks he is solving the problem of how the rational structures  engendered in my reason 
can claim an objectively "true" metaphysical  validity.. . . Thus, in truth, there begins with 
Descartes a completely  new  manner of philosophizing which seeks its ultimate foundations in 
the  subjective.
 Since, according to Descartes, one substance is measurable, 
and the other substance is non-measurable, the only way out for Descartes to put these two together is 
through the primal inference that God is accepted as infallibly true or that, as far as substances go, "God 
wants it that way".  On the other hand Descartes   
  
151
This is a total break from the mediaeval traditional philosophy where the ultimate foundations were 
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sought in the 'objective,' 152
Now, according to Husserl, both these trajectories of philosophy were valid heirs of Descartes' work, 
and on the former's reading they are developing certain thought-elements already to be found in 
Descartes. Concerning the second trajectory, Husserl makes important observations on Locke. In 
Husserl's reading, "Locke senses nothing of the depth of the Cartesian epoché, he simply takes over the 
ego as 'soul,' which becomes acquainted with its inner states, acts and capacities."
 and where a deep respect is shown to the Tradition.   
One element in Descartes which is 'highly significant', according to Husserl, is the concept of 
'intentionality,' or in other words his 'cogitatio', of having something consciously in mind, etwas 
bewußthaben. In Descartes there is no question of a true presentation and treatment of the subject of 
intentionality. On the other hand, the whole supposed founding of the new universal philosophy of the 
ego must be characterized as a "theory of knowledge", a theory of how the ego in the intentionality of 
its reason, brings about the objective knowledge. 
 From Descartes, Husserl observes,  there are two lines developing in the history of  subsequent 
thinkers: the rationalists and the empiricists. The first is, the "rationalism" of Nicolas Malebranche 
(1638-1715), Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), G. W. Leibniz, Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and Immanuel 
Kant (1724-1804). According to Husserl this first line develops rationalism enthusiastically and, based 
on a mos geometricus, these thinkers were convinced that the absolute knowledge of the world was 
obtainable, accepting it as a realization of the transcendent 'in-itself'.  
 The second is the line of "sceptical empiricism," which had been present before Descartes, in 
Thomas  Hobbes (1588-1679), later in John Locke (1632-1704), and then from Berkeley (1685-1753) 
to Hume (1711-1776).  
Like the Sceptics in the ancient times, the second line of post-Cartesian thinkers developed a scepticism 
against the rationalism of the first line. Husserl had a personal interest as to how this second line later 
developed and affected psychology and the theory of knowledge. 
153
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 This is all 
"happening" in the self-evidence of self-experience. And  " . . only what inner self-experience shows, 
only our own "ideas" (Ideen) are immediately, self-evidently given. Everything in the external world is 
inferred." 154  This, then, according to Husserl, is scepticism. In Locke's system, the soul is an 
"isolated space, a writing tablet", on which psychic data come and go. In Husserl's opinion this kind of 
data-sensationalism has influenced psychology up to his own day. What Locke has missed in his 
perception theory, however, is that although we speak of a perception of things, yet  " . .  in the 
experiences of consciousness themselves, that of which we are conscious is included as such -- that 
perception is in itself a perception of something. . ."155 Husserl judges Locke by saying, "Locke's 
naïvités and inconsistencies lead to a rapid further development of his empiricism, which pushes 
toward a paradoxical idealism and finally end in a consummated absurdity",156
 Berkeley reduces bodily things which appear in the natural experience to complexes of sense-
data. David Hume, according to Husserl, "goes on in this very direction to the end",
 i.e., Locke's empiricism 
limits the possibilities of knowledge, especially in regard to the great traditional themes of metaphysics. 
With him there begins the distrust of cognitive faculty, which is to culminate in Hume's total 
scepticism.  This judgment though, is not as fair as it could be to Locke's intentions in his context. 
Locke sought to write an empirical description of perception phenomena, while Husserl expected him 
to have a comprehensive theory of perception. Yet it is from this Lockean foundation of 
'sensationalism' nonetheless that George Berkeley builds on Locke's own theories.  
157 hence all 
categories of objectivity are fictions. In this way Husserl pictures Hume as saying that, ". . . the world 
in general, nature, the universe of identical bodies, the world of identical persons, and accordingly also 
objective science, which knows these in their objective truth, are transformed into fiction".158
 In Husserl's reading, Descartes provided the parting of the ways. Descartes, with his goal of 
grounding an absolutely new philosophical rationalism, has made possible the immense force of 
discovery in mathematics and natural science. On the other hand the empiricist sceptic brings to light 
what was already present and not worked out, i.e., that all knowledge of the world, prescientific and 
scientific, is an enormous enigma (ungeheures Rätsel ).
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154  Ibid., 86. 
155  Ibid., 85. 
156  Ibid., 86. 
157  Cf. Crisis , 87. 
158  Ibid., 87. 
159  Cf. Crisis , 89. 
 Why? Because the knowledge of the world as 
we live in it, die Lebenswelt,  is greater than the knowledge as only captured or obtained by the 
mathematized and rationalized knowledge of the same world.  
 To know the world 'methodically', according to the standard of a mathematized knowable 
world, is not incompatible with the fact that we still have to investigate the ontology of 'knowing' itself. 
Hence what scientists and mathematicians were doing and what empiricist sceptics were saying, 
occasioned by Descartes' philosophy, is in my reading attributable to Descartes' greater success in his 
methodology when compared to his ontology. Husserl was close to apprehending this.  
 After having investigated the British empiricist-sceptics, Husserl turns to Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804). In Husserl's reading, Kant uproots the dogmatism of his days. Kant's crucial question is 
how the truths of reason (Vernunftwahrheiten) could really guarantee the knowledge of things 
(Dingerkenntnis), since between these two there remains a gulf of incomprehensibility.  In Kant's 
system, this question is to be "solved" in a regressive procedure, in Husserl's words: "... if common 
experience is really to be (an) experience of objects of nature,.[...] then the intuitively appearing world 
must already be a construct of the faculties that express themselves in explicit thinking in mathematics 
and logic".160
           mathematizing[ ...] The other way is that of reason constantly functioning  in concealment, 
reason ceaselessly rationalizing sense-data and always  having them as already rationalized.
  
 Husserl summed up the Kantian 'reason' (Vernunft) as possessing a  twofold way of functioning.  
 
 One way is its systematic self-exposition, self-revelation in free and pure 
161
 the intuited world of bodies - this includes the whole world of natural  science - is a 
subjective construct of our intellect (subjektives Gebilde  unseres Intellekt). Only the material of the 
sense-data arises from a  transcendent affection (transzendenten Affektion) of 'things themselves'
  
 
Husserl elaborates further, that  
 
162
           Kant, [while] reacting against the data-positivism of Hume, -as he  understands  it,-
 
What interests Husserl is that  
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160  Ibid., 94. 
161  Ibid., 94. 
162  Ibid., 95 
163  Husserl is of the opinion, that Hume as understood by Kant, is not the real Hume. See Crisis, 95 . 
 outlines 
a great, systematically constructed, and in a  new way still  scientific philosophy in which the 
Cartesian turn to conscious  
           subjectivity works itself out in the form of a transcendental subjectivism.164
This transcendental subjectivism, amounts to a "scientific philosophy for the first time since 
Descartes."
 
 
165
 It is a philosophy which in opposition to prescientific and scientific  objectivism, goes 
back to knowing subjectivity (erkennende Subjektivität)  as the primal locus (Urstätte) of all 
objective formations of sense   (objektiven Sinnbildungen) and ontic validities (Seinsgeltungen).
  
  
166
 In Galileo, Husserl sees a prototype of a quantitative thinking. The original quantifying method 
   
 
In this way we undertake  to understand the existing world as a structure of sense (Sinngebilde) bearing 
its own validity (Geltungsgebilde).   
 It seems to be, according to Husserl, that it is Kant who best understood Descartes, and 
continued his new way of philosophising. Yet Kant's transcendental subjectivism, in Husserl's opinion, 
has not gone far enough in continuing the Cartesian way. In analysing Kant, Husserl himself hopes to 
clarify the transcendental idealism which has proceeded from Kant's style of philosophising. Husserl is 
convinced that through this style the teleological unity of meaning in the modern philosophy can be 
explicated. In consequence he holds he can then make progress in his self-understanding as recreator of 
this particular part of history of philosophers.  
 His explication on Kant, though, was cut off suddenly; and the two parts of the Krisis text was 
published in 1936 in great haste. The intended part three was delayed, and later poshumously 
published. This part three has  its own history as we shall soon discover. 
  
The implications 
What are the implications of this history-sensitive exercise thus far? Husserl's intention to discover the 
teleology of the history of modern philosophy runs through analyses of thinkers, especially from 
Galileo, through Descartes to Kant, while other thinkers he merely mentions non-descriptively. We can 
see that he is very selective (but not injudicious) in his choice of the "historical figures" on whom to 
build his claims. 
                                                 
164  Crisis , 95 
165  Ibid., 97. 
166  Ibid., 97. 
had become 'the truth' for later scientists. Science then developed accordingly. Thus scientific truth, 
accepted to be the truth becomes 
equated with quantifiableness. Subsequently, it is accepted among most scientists and people in 
general, without questions about the origin of its assumptions. . 
 In Descartes, Husserl sees the pioneer of radicalism in philosophical principle of inquiry, even 
though Descartes himself did not fulfil his own ambition. For Descartes' system, the goal and the 
method were pre-given and were accepted as such, and this inconsistency contradicted his own 
radicality. Husserl pointed out this oversight in Descartes. When Descartes stated the 'doubting-I' as his 
beginning to reason, and that 'doubting' was his method, for Husserl this was a compromise of 
Descartes' own stated principle of 'inquiry-ab-ovo'. 167
 In general, Husserl reads the history of European philosophers as a history of thinkers searching 
for the same telos. But in his time, he was aware that the exaggerated enthusiasm for the mathematized, 
  
 In Kant, Husserl sees the continuation of Descartes' radicalism. But it was not a continuation of 
the vast depth of the Cartesian totality of all science, and in developing his transcendental philosophy 
Kant could not give therefore the ultimate grounding to his own system.  
 In Husserl's Krisis text, admittedly, other philosophers did rate some mention, as already noted, 
but they were given minor roles, more especially around those three main thinkers, Galileo, Descartes 
and Kant. According to Husserl, it is in those three main thinkers that the spirit of Europe is to be 
found: the spirit of radical inquiry towards the subjective thinking in its original form. Apart from their 
success or failure in their expression of the spirit of radical inquiry, they are for Husserl still worthwhile 
to investigate. When this rigorous method of  thinking is abandoned, then Europe is in crisis, and the 
human thinking in general is in crisis. Husserl is convinced that Europe has a telos and , that the 
European philosophy has a telos. He is accusing scientists and the thinking circle of his days of losing 
sight of this telos, hence European humanity has indulged in the mere accumulation of facts and in 
accepting them as 'knowledge', (scientia). Even the British empiricists and sceptics are actually 
searching for this telos though, since they have been reacting against Descartes, and thus they are still 
to be considered heirs of Descartes and so contributing to a greater task. 
                                                 
167  Ab-ovo (Latin), meaning from the very beginning, literally  "from the egg". 
quantifiable world was causing the crisis in philosophy. This was a crisis in the European search for the 
telos, yet if it was as if Europe had lost its telos, it had really only lost its 'reason' (Vernunft). His 
publication of the Krisis text in 1936 was his cry in the wilderness, his unfinished mission and 
expression of this vision.   
 We could ask whether Husserl is not oversimplifying his historical facts about philosophers 
whom he uses for his analyses, or whether his scanning of historical figures is too generalised, or is his 
reading of each of his examples too narrowly biased. And ultimately, has Husserl really shown to 
Europe a dangerous way of thinking which threatens her?  These questions should be kept in mind as 
we proceed, and to be fair in tackling these among a variety of related questions, one needs to 
contextualize the Krisis text.  
 I have already contended that we should take the Krisis text as "a cry in the wilderness." (It was 
in 1933-1936 Germany, when Husserl struggled). Husserl was passionate about his mission and vision, 
to show Europe her 'reasoning capacity. To enlighten the people of Europe about their tradition of 
philosophising, he goes back to the ancient days of philosophy. He reminds his fellow Europeans that 
being a European is to be a bearer of a great tradition, i.e., to philosophise. Philosophising for Husserl 
is knowing while being conscious of the process itself, and thus 'doing phenomenology' on one's own 
process of thinking. 'Reason' should not only take a physicalistic objectivity as the whole truth. There is 
much more. It is not a structured whole, the articulated moments of which can and must be 
investigated. For Husserl 'reason' is viewed as 'essentially becoming', a constant unfolding, and in its 
unfolding it is necessarily coming to itself.168
 His vision is of the possibility of creating a universally accepted philosophy. But in this new 
light, this "philosophy" is not a body of doctrinal statements. Husserl's days are described as full of 
positivistic-scientism on the one side and empiricistic-scepticism on the other
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168   This reminds me of Hegel's thesis in his Phenomenology of Spirit , the only difference is that Hegel 
substantialized 'spirit' when it comes to its own fullness. G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. V. Miller. 
(Oxford University Press, 1977).  
169   For example in E. Ströker. Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology. Trans. L. Hardy. (Stanford University 
Press, 1993), and  
       Mario Ruggenini. "Krisis: The Power of Sense". in Space, Time, and Culture. Eds. D. Carr,  
       C. F. Cheung. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004).   
. Thus in this situation, 
creating a body of philosophical teaching  (systema) is certainly not in Husserl's mind at all. Although a 
feeble attempt at it needs to be recognised too, in his  First Philosophy I and II (1923-24), as for now, it 
is a matter of creating a methodology, a rigorous attitude and its execution, by which one can overcome 
the scientism and scepticism of his day. This creation is at the same time an admission that human 
enlightened knowledge through reasoning is not an absolute certain knowledge, modelled after 
mathematical knowledge. It means that, to reiterate, "doing philosophy" is applying the 
phenomenological method to our thinking processes, hence all 'results' of previous thinkers need not be 
accepted and repeated as 'truth', just like that, but need to be processed again in the mind of subsequent 
thinkers, and appropriated for the value they offer. Thus the thoughts of Galileo, Descartes and Kant 
who struggle to make the world intelligible need to be struggled through by us in the same way again 
and again.  It is not doing philosophy properly, if we but repeat Galileo's, Descartes' and Kant's  
conclusions as if we 'understand' the world, through them. It is rather that through the process of 
philosophising as a compelling force within history, by using a build-up of reasoning, we 'understand' 
the world, since we are convinced that reason as such cannot act irrationally. Reason will decide 
according to its insights, hence decisions as to what to use as appropriate is also at the same time a self-
realization and part of a movement toward telos.  
 To show this deep underlying human struggle Husserl has deliberately selected  Galileo, 
Descartes and Kant and several others, in lesser roles. It seems almost like an argumentum ad 
hominem, but here is the accomplished philosopher sharing the way for others as he applies his own 
effective method for himself, and a method intrinsically historical in its grounding. And then when a 
personal situation affects Husserl170, after he has delivered the Vienna and Prague lectures, lectures 
given with the same mission and passion as the writing of the Krisis-text, the latter work may be taken 
as an elaboration of this vision, written in a great haste and in a feeling of urgency.171
 The implication of the Krisis text then, is that it was not only another new way for Husserl to 
introduce  Phenomenology, but it was also his coming to terms with history in a complete way, so that 
all his previous concepts now gained a new dimension, indeed a new meaning. Phenomenology has 
 
                                                 
170   On Jan. 15, 1936 Husserl's Teaching Licence was withdrawn. Jan. 25, 1936 the Ministry of Education compelled 
Husserl to withdraw from Philosophical Organisation founded by Arthur Liebert in Belgrade. (Karl Scuhmann, Husserl-
Chronik, Dordrecht: Kluwer,1977).  
171  The text sent off to Prague on Jan. 24, 1936. (Husserl-Chronik, 472). 
explicated the core of what thinking/ reasoning is all about. It has not been done in a vacuum, but in  
historical settings. Phenomenology is not a debate about how to formulate thinking-theories. But it has 
observed how thinking processes are emerging in particular historical moments, within particular 
intentional scopes. Hence, Husserl cited Galileo, Descartes and Kant as key examples of those 
historical moments to clarify his own insights about the underlying process. He also tried to describe 
them as examples of human intentions, rather than their thinking results, that have either as failed or 
succeeded in the systems-building of philosophy. Husserl, we must acknowledge more clearly, did not 
come to terms with history easily. We have an entire series of manuscripts K III172 from the archives, in 
which Husserl asks himself why philosophy should need history,173
5   The Other Crisis Texts from the Nachlass
  and they reveal how hard for him 
the question was. But he faced up to what he realized  was a pressing necessity. 
 Judging from the urgency of his mission and vision, his way of scanning for meaning 
throughout the history of philosophical struggles begins to make sense. His scanning was not to give a 
full detailed philosophical panorama, but to spotlight the points of important philosophical struggle. 
Husserl's own struggle had been brought on by his attempt to understand how it was possible for 
science to have fallen into such a critical stage that it offers an imposing and very useful knowledge of 
nature but fails to know humans, i. e., ourselves. Indeed the ancient European 'know thyself' principle 
had been betrayed. 
 
174
-Husserliana VI
 
175
                                                 
172  K III, in Husserl Archives, quoted in the critical apparatus in Hua VI and XXIX . The systematic classification of 
1935 by Landgrebe and Fink, still forms the basis of today's grouping of Husserl's Nachlass at the Husserl's Archives. 
See R. Bernet, I. Kern, E. Marbach. An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology. (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1993), 245-249.  
173   cf. W. Biemel,  "Decisive Phases in the Development of Husserl's Philosophy," in The Phenomenology of 
Husserl. Selected critical reading, Ed.  R. O. Elveton.  (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970).   
174  Not all the texts concerning the issues of crisis have been published in Husserliana VI and XXIX . After  Biemel 
edition, Smid published these other texts while avoiding possible repetitions, selected from the K III and M III 
collections. 
175  Biemel's Krisis texts (1954), Krisis I, and Smid's Krisis texts (1993) Krisis II.  
, edited by Walter Biemel, 1954, part 3 edited in 2 parts 
-Husserliana XXIX, edited by Reinhold N. Smid, 1993, in four sections. 
 
Husserl's intention to publish the whole three parts of the Krisis texts in a sequence of instalments, was 
postponed, and only the first two parts were published, in 1936 as mentioned above. 
With the publication of Husserliana VI. in 1954, however, we now have all the three parts of the Krisis 
texts, as it was intended to be published by Husserl himself. Biemel's inclusion of part III, needs to be 
more comprehensively contextualised after Smid's publication of Krisis II, in Husserliana XXIX, in 
1993. 
Husserliana VI as we now have it though, also contains many supplementary texts: three Abhandlungen 
and 29 Beilagen. Two of the Abhandlungen are Husserl's early attempts to work out ideas to be found 
later in the Krisis. The third one, is the famous Vienna Lecture. The other Beilagen texts that have been 
included in this edition are "Forschungsmanuskripte" (research mss), never intended to be published. 
Husserl's later corrections and revisions therein need to be taken into account to supplement the 
unsatisfying part III of Krisis I of the Biemel edition.  
 Furthermore, after the publication of Krisis II, in Husserliana XXIX, we are now in the position 
to expand our contextual understanding of the crisis issues, as Husserl saw it.  In other words, Husserl's 
Krisis texts from both Husserliana VI and XXIX176 can and need to be read as one opus, and in my 
opinion the published text has more of an authenticity of Husserl's opinion at that particular stage, than 
the research manuscripts in which Husserl had a habit 'to think while writng.' As we see, Husserliana 
XXIX, contains supplementary texts around the European crisis issues, the texts themselves being 
taken mainly from the K III and M III documents of the Husserl Archives.177 Reinhold N. Smid has 
edited these texts and they are understood by him to be specifically written by Husserl with the 
intention to be published in 'Philosophia'  following the Krisis part I and II in 1936178
                                                 
176   I  am following A. Steinbock, to call Hua VI, Krisis I and Hua XXIX, Krisis II. 
177  Krisis II,  556. 
178  ibid.  p xii 
 Smid placing 
them in the right chronological order.  
 As an introduction to a new systematic philosophical method, this collection of  texts remains 
an unfinished work in the sense that it has never satisfied the author himself. Due to the limited focus 
of my thesis, the relevant Krisis texts which have been investigated in depth here are only those that 
could be regarded as a source of a philosophy of history. 
 The  Krisis II, Nachlass texts (1993) 
Smid edited this collection of texts and divided them in four divisions in chronological order.  
 The first division (written between August 1934-November 1935) are the texts pertaining the 
geo-social-historical becoming issues.  According to Steinbock, they would have belonged to the 
intended part 4 and 5 of the incomplete Krisis179 if, as he thinks we ought to  follow Fink's suggestion.180
  The fourth division (written between January 1937-Summer 1937) is Husserl's lengthy 
treatment of the notion of teleology in the history of philosophy.
  
 The second division (written between November 1935-Summer 1936) , with the exception of 
the Prague lecture, (nr.10) is a collection of drafts, appendices, and emendations which were meant to 
prepare the publication of part 3 of Krisis I.  
 The third division (written in Summer 1936) contains writings designated for the reworking of 
part III of Krisis I. These writings are somewhat similar to the second division mentioned above.  
181
For Husserl this crisis issue must be overcome once and for all. This cannot be done by substituting any 
given philosophical system with his system, in fact he has no system as such, in spite of his attempt in 
the 1920s to systematize his thinking. The Erste Philosophie  lectures of 1923-24 were the result of that 
period
 We need to come back to some of 
Husserl's ponderings here when discussing the 'Inner History from Crisis' (Ch. 5. section 5). 
 
The implications 
182
                                                 
179  Cf. also Anthony J. Steinbock . 'The new 'Crisis' contribution: a supplementary edition of E.Husserl's Crisis texts'.  
In The Review of Metaphysics  47 ( March 1994), 557-584. 
180   Krisis I,  514-516. 
181   I have to leave this section aside, until Ch. 5 section 5 
182  E. Husserl. Erste Philosophie I . Hrsg. R. Boehm. Hua VII. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956). 
 E. Husserl. Erste Philosophie II. Hrsg. R. Boehm. Hua VIII. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959). 
. But it did not come to fruition. Although no clearly defined system has been created, and yet a 
style of doing philosophy that Husserl calls transcendental phenomenology, has been a very persistent 
feature of his philosophy. 
 In 1927 Husserl published an article in the Encyclopedia Britannica, in which his idea about a 
philosophical 'system' has become clear. He says, 
 
 Demnach fordert die Phänomenologie vom Phänomenologen, für sich  dem Ideal eines 
philosophischen Systems zu entsagen und doch als  bescheidener Arbeiter in Gemenischaft mit 
anderen für eine philosophia   
 perennis zu leben. 
 (Accordingly, phenomenology demands that the phenomenologist  foreswear the ideal of a 
philosophic system and yet as a humble worker in  community with others, live for a perennial 
philosophy).183
Ströker, commented on Husserl's later work
  
 
184
One dissonant opinion whether or not Husserl had a philosophical system is, that of David Woodruff 
Smith in his publication Husserl
 that,  
 
 . . . the wide range of themes and the many repetitions in Husserl's later  research. It also 
explains Husserl's failure to  order them systematically, a  lapse that seems odd in that Husserl spared 
nothing by way of systematic  rigor in details of analysis. What nevertheless held these highly 
disparate  investigations of manifold themes together and fitted them into an  organised unity, . . 
.was Husserl's  goal of a phenomenlogical grounding of  science. 
 
185
 Specifically in the Krisis I text, the transcendental phenomenology has an 'entry point', which is 
, he stated  
 
 Of the great thinkers in the West, the greatest systematic philosophers  were arguably first 
Aristotle and then Kant. Husserl joins these two. I  submit, on a short list of greatest systematic 
philosophers, those who  produced a truly wide-ranging system of philosophy and worked out 
 exceedingly careful details through the system. There are other systematic  thinkers of great 
stature - Aquinas, Hegel, Whitehead. But my thesis here  is that the greatest systematic philosophers 
are Aristotle, Kant and Husserl  - not least because each system in this sequence can be seen as a 
 successor system that radically changes and improves on its predecessor.  
 
Husserl's works from The Logical Investigations (1901/ 1913) to Ideas I (1913), and further to Formal 
and Transcendental Logic (1929) and we may include the Cartesian Meditations (in its French 
translation 1931), could indeed still be defended as 'systematic' in their content. But since 1934 when 
the revisions to create a German text of the Meditations was dropped, and the writing of the Crisis 
started, it is convincing that we could not speak of any system anymore.  
                                                 
183   E. Husserl. Encyclopedia Britannica Article 1927. Hua IX, p.277-301 ( draft D) # 16.  also in Edmund Husserl. 
Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and Confrontation with Heidegger. Trans. Thomas Sheehan , 
Richard E. Palmer. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997) 159-179. the above quotation p. 179.    
184  Elisabeth Ströker. Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology. Trans. Lee Hardy. (California: Standford University 
Press, 1993), xxvi. ". . . though this late philosophy was initiated relatively early, namely at the beginning of the 1920's."  
185  D. W. Smith. Husserl. (London: Routledge, 2007), 5. 
the history of our own philosophising. Not only mathematics and sciences need to be brought back to 
their origin, but history and our human-historicising-existence  needs to be brought back to its origin 
too. In other words, the essence our consciousness, which is being conscious of our world, in its 
constant temporal changing givenness, needs to to be explicated to ourselves. This is ultimately 
Husserl's phenomenology of his own phenomenologising of the history of western-philosophy.  
 Husserl has a deep appreciation for Galileo, Descartes and Kant in a special way, since 
especially these three thinkers are attempting to radicalise western thinking processes. Or at least these 
three thinkers are excellent examples of how to highlight European enterprise in philosophy in the 
modern time. By the same token Husserl has his sharp criticisms against these three thinkers. For 
Galileo it is that he has not always been aware that his method is but a method and not the whole truth 
about the world. For Descartes it is that he is not aware that he is not radical enough by excluding the 
ego, in the ego cogito, hence did not begin philosophy ab ovo. For Kant it is that, in his pure 
subjectivity, this representation (of the objects perceived) has been dislodged from the objects outside, 
hence it does not give guarantee that through it the world "out there" can be known anymore.  
 But in spite of all this, we European thinkers, are able to radicalise ourselves (going back to our 
radix, root), which quality has tended to disappear in Husserl's imaging of his own days. This European 
ability is inherited as our European human-essence (as long as we do not understand 'essence' as an 
'entity' outside our historical being-in-the-world). In Husserl's time especially around 1933, there were 
radical demands (of students, backed up by their professors) to restructure the universities with even 
those who still believed in the Humbolt -style186
                                                 
186   Alex von Humbolt (1769-1859) and Wilhelm von Humbolt (1767-1835) both very influencial in Berlin 
University at that time. 
 university -whom Sluga called 'conservatives' also 
wanting "to adjust" philosophy to "the need of time,"as expressed in Magdeburg and Leipzig meetings 
of that year. Husserl sees such strange new promises as a sign of the disappearing of universally valid 
philosophy and hence of European humanity falling into crisis. What is worth noting in the Krisis text 
is that History and the reflection (Besinnung) of history needs to be "purified." Husserl certainly heard 
of and read the support of the philosophers to the Nazi regime, since Heidegger's Rektors Rede and 
others' inaugural speeches and let alone the Magdeburg and Leipzig meetings, were widely public; and 
yet without  responding specifically to these events at all, Husserl saw a deeper need to 'correct' the 
historical thinking of his time.187 I am convinced that Husserl's Philosophy of History, not uninfluenced 
by Hegel's model of Philosophy of History, and also Dilthey's works188 (as it will be elaborated in 
Chapter Six) was a purer philosophical response to his situation: hence we can justifiably write of his 
conversion to history and going back to the root his reason of the ancient Greeks, with an unexpectedly 
reorientation of phenomenology189
                                                 
187  see nr. 4 of this Chapter 
188   G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) Philosophy of History. (his lectures of Winter 1830-31) Trans. J. Sibree. Dover 
Publ., 1956. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) (specifically his) Das Verstehen anderer Personen und ihrer  
Lebenäusserungen. (Ges. Schr. Bd. VII) 1927.  
189   Husserl had given up the project of a final version of the Cartesian Meditations altogether, in favour of the Crisis, 
as his final definitive introduction to phenemenology.    
.  
 
 
Chapter Five.   Toward a Philosophy of History  
 Husserl's "conversion" toward history. 
 The meditation on history, is now seen as one way of doing  phenomenology. In this 
chapter the meditations on the Pure  Consciousness and the meditations on the Internal-Time 
Consciousness  can be seen to converge. He speaks further about the two levels of  historicity.
  
1    A short overall view 
2   1956. Erste Philosophie erster Teil  (mss 1923-24). Hua VII 
3   1959. Erste Philosophie zweiter Teil  (mss 1923-24). Hua VIII,  
4   From Intersubjectivity's perspective  
5   Inner history from the 'Crisis'  
 
Praenotanda 1 
Geist,  
Geistesgeschichte, history of cultural knowledge (in Husserl's historical perception) is the struggle 
between objectivism and transcendentalism; the enfleshment of ideas. 
 
Praenotanda 2 
Geschichte,190
'e historia, means a written account of an inquiry.
 history (sometimes also Historie), geschehen, to happen, to occur. 
'Historie' entered into German language via the Latin, historia, ca. thirteenth century. The original 
Greek historein simply means to inquire, to explore, hence  
191
                                                 
190   Cf., M. Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) 118-120. 
191   Liddell-Scott. Greek- English Lexicon. (Student Ed) (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1991.  
 In the eighteenth century the usage was tended to 
be repressed by that of Geschichte, a native German word. 
Geisteswissenschaft, see Praenotanda 3 of Chapter Two.  
 
Praenotanda 3 
The English word 'mind' has no German equivalent. In German we find Gemüt, Seele, and Geist.  
Gemüt, originally means a totality of one's feelings. Also used for Innerlichkeit, inwardness. Later in 
Leibniz it includes the capacity for thought, and also the capacity of understanding and willing.    
Seele, corresponds with psyche, anima, soul. In classical Aristotle soul means just 'principle of life' 
without being turned into a substance. In the classical Scholastics, soul is just a forma-substantialis , 
which needs a materia-prima to be able to exist. The later Scholastics started discussing about the 
possibility of anima-separata (the soul seperated from the body). In the New Testament anthropology 
psyche, pneuma, (or the translations of the Old Testament's nefesh and ruach ) tend to be spoken of as 
if a substance.192
Geist, carries a wide range of meanings, and was developed in Hegel, and after him.
  
Later on, and since Descartes, the soul "has become" a distinct substance.  
193
Husserl did not write an explicit philosophy of history, the way Hegel did.
 While soul-
consciousness-spirit become the same entity with a different perspectives, spirit is then the the spirit-
entity seen in itself.  
----------------------------- 
1.  An overall view.  
194
 Erster Philosophie. Zweiter Teil, Hua VIII (Beilage III) p. 327 where Husserl renounced 
history, and yet in the same book (Beilage XXXII) on p. 506, he came to reconsider history in a 
 Up until the writing of the 
Krisis texts, in 1934-'37, he had not much interest in history, so it seemed. He was even against 
Dilthey's earlier 'historicism'. Although Dilthey had moved on from that position, in his publication of 
Gesammelte Schriften VII, (Leipzig 1927), Husserl was still criticising him for his 'historicism'.  
However, between 1921-28, we find some of Husserl's texts that involved discussing history. These are 
the texts in question, from three main sources: 
 Erste Philosophie. Erster Teil. (Hua VII) p. 141-142 where the concept of 'inner-history' 
emerged. 
                                                 
192   Kittel-Bromiley. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. (abridged in one vol.) 
 Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1985. 
193  Michael Inwood. .A Hegel Dictionary. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992): 274-277 (nine general meanings of 
Geist, and ten specifically Hegel's usage of Geist.). 
194   G. W. F. Hegel. The Philosophy of History. Trans. J. Sibree. New York: Dover, 1956. 
different light.    
 Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Zweiter Teil, Hua XIV (Beilage XVII) p. 217-225 
which contains the only passage where Husserl approached history from the aspect on intersubjectivity.  
The status of the first two books are such that they were 'intended to be published,'195
 Then there came the publication of the Krisis I (part I and II, in 1936)
 except their 
Beilagen, and the latter one is a Forschung Manuskript. 
196
The years 1923-24 amount to a small period in which Husserl attempted to create a system
. In it Husserl meditates 
on history at several places, specifically in §§ 6 and 15, when we limit ourselves to the published text 
of 1936. I venture even to speak about Husserl's 'conversion toward history' when I base my reading of 
his opus on the larger collection of texts of Krisis I, (i.e., not only part I, II, but also included III A and 
B, in Hua VI, 1954, which was eventually published as was intended by Husserl himself), and the 
Forschung Manuskripte in the Biemel edition as Beilage esp. nr. 28, p. 508-513. 
 Furthermore, in his Krisis II (Nachlass, Hua XXIX, 1993) as indicated on p. lxiii, in Nr. 4, 40:1 
- 41:14. Husserl spoke about the 'Two Levels of Historicity, and in Nr. 32, 362-413 (esp., 398-403) he 
wrote about 'Teleology in the History of Philosophy'. (In Chapter 4 Krisis II, Hua XXIX, is only 
mentioned in passing). If we put all these together, then we will have a collection of texts as impressive 
as Hegel's lectures on Philosophy of History. We will come back to this when we deal with the 'inner 
history'. (ad. 5 ut infra).   
 
2.   Erste Philosophie I, subtitled: 'Kritische Ideengechichte'.  
197. His 
winter semester lectures, later prepared to be published as Erste Philosophie, with the subtitle, 
Kritische Ideengeschichte, indicated that Husserl sought to present his philosophy while at the same 
time explicate the implicit history behind it. Later in his second volume, Husserl would deal with his 
own specifics: 'Theorie der phänomenologische Reduktion'.198
                                                 
195   K. Schuhmann, K. Husserl Chronik. (The Hague: Kluwer, 1977) p. 278.  
196   The term Krisis I and Krisis II, see Ch. 2,  ftn. 15   
197  Schuhmann, K. Husserl Chronik. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977) 273. E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie I, Kap. 1 ad 1. 
See also, Iso Kern, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Zweiter Teil. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973) Einleitung.  
Sebastian Luft, Zur Phänomenologischen Reduktion. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002) Einleitung.  
198  Schuhmann, K. Chronik  p. 278. 
 The fact that somehow he did not fully 
succeed to "create and build a system", as well as publish such a book in his lifetime, is beside the point 
and it is not necessarily a bad thing. The name, "first philosophy" reminds us of course of Aristotle and 
Descartes199
 Gerade diese Quelle aber interessiert uns nach dem ganzen Gang und  Sinn unserer 
ideengeschichtlich-kritischen Betrachtungen vor allem  anderen. Denn es handelt sich uns in 
diesen Betrachtungen um nichts  geringeres als darum, die Einheit der durch Jahrtausende 
 hindurchgehenden Motivation bloßzulegen, welche als Entwicklungstrieb in  aller 
Philosophie lebte. . . 
 as indeed Husserl had intended the title to do. When we read these Freiburg lectures, the 
first volume, where Husserl started with Plato, then Aristotle, Descartes, Locke-Berkeley-Hume they 
seem no different than any other courses in history of philosophy, i.e., in studying systems of thought 
one after another. But in fact, his procedure is more than that. In doing this historical reflection Husserl 
discovered, that "history of philosophy [presents] not as a more or less fortuitous succession of 
philosophical systems and theories, but rather as a polymorphic 'unity of motivation'". That was already 
his view in 1923. This is what I have considered mentioned earlier as his  'emerging philosophy of 
history' even though Husserl was not planning such a thing at all (cf., above). In Husserl's own words, 
  
200
This "Einheit der Motivation welche als Entwicklungstrieb in aller Philosophie" has become a 
Husserlian conviction while reading and lecturing history of philosophy and of such sciences as 
geometry. Here we see "Husserl arrived at what is absolutely first and fundamental,"
        
 
 (But straight away these sources interest us because of the whole course  and meaning of our 
meditations for all other people according to the critical  perspective and the perpective of the 
history of ideas.  
 Because in the meditations we are making explicit not less than exactly the  unity of 
motivation through the thousand years. This unity of motivation  have lived as the main spring of the 
development of all philosophies). 
201
                                                 
199   Husserl himself mentioned Aristotle's work which ususally is called "Metaphysics" and Descartes' Meditationes 
de prima philosophia, in his Erste Philosophie I, Kap.1 .  
200     E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie I, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1993) 141-142.  
        See also, E. Ströker, Huserl's Transcendental Philosophy. Trans. L. Hardy. (Stanford U. P.,    
       1993) 230   
201   Ströker, ibid. 
 and approached 
what he also called the hidden 'telos' of all sciences since St. Augustine. (Now we understand where the 
telos in Krisis originated from, even prior to Krisis, in his Prague lectures it already appeared). I will 
call this Husserl's 'philosophy of history', in other words, this is how Husserl's understanding of history 
had been shaped. This new insight became the core-dynamics of his own philosophising from then on. 
Philosophy as  "the systematic result of a theoretical interest that has been freed of all other aims, of the 
interest in the truth solely for the sake of truth,"202
 Nicht erforderlich ist, obschon zur empirischen Durchkämpfung nutzlich,  eine durchgeführte 
Kritik aller historischen Erkentnistheorien mit ihrem  sehr differenzierten Zufälligkeitsgehalt.
 is now given a historical dimension. History, is now 
understood philosophically as an polymorphic expression with a unity of motivation as its 
developmental drive. Thus Husserl's plan through the First Philosophy is to give his philosophy a new 
legitimation, and he now acknowledges in these lectures that History can be a point of entry to 
philosophise, a point he will be expanding in the Krisis. But here in the First Philosophy we encounter 
only his beginning, and after it, we do not find any further elaboration of the discovered Philosophy of 
History until much later. We are left until then only uncovering odd stepping-stones. 
 
3.    Erste Philosophie II. Die Theorie der Phänomenologischen Reduktion.   
In this second book, Husserl continues reflecting on the philosophical underpinning of his First 
Philosophy. Regarding the philosophical reflection on History, there is one text, which says that,  
 
203
Here Husserl seemed to express his doubt, even his renouncing of historical cognition theories, or was 
Husserl in this Forschung-manuskript, just thinking aloud regarding the matter?
     
  
 (It is not necessary, to perform a critique of all historical cognition theories  with all their 
very subtle arbitrary by-chance meanings, although it is  beneficial to struggle through them).   
204
 Die Geschichte is das große Faktum des absoluten Seins; und die letzen  Fragen, die 
 I have alluded here to 
the sensitive issue regarding the status of the documents as 'ready for publication,' or as a research 
document. In the next chapter, I will deal with this issue more at length. Suffice to say as for now, one 
has to be cautioned that it is very hard to distinguish Husserl's certain opinion (at a certain stage) from 
any 'still tentative formulation' of his views.   
 For in the same collection Husserl is found saying,  
 
                                                 
202   E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie I, Hua VII, (Haag: Nijhoff, 1956) Abhandlungen 1, (mss. 1922-23) p. 203, 
Abhanglungen 3, (Mss. 1924) 288ff  
203   E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie II, Hua VIII, (Haag: Nijhoff, 1959) Blg. III, (Mss. 1925) 327.   
204   Since we know that Husserl has a habit of  thinking while writing, it follows that reading his Nachlass  one needs 
to make a distinction (at least  being aware) between manuscripts ready for publication, or even having been published 
and his Forschung mss. as far as the certainty of his opinion is.   
letzmetaphysischen und teleologischen, sind eins mit den  "Fragen" nach dem absoluten Sinn der 
Geschichte. 205
Iso Kern has made 'Intersubjectivity' his theme to collect Husserl's Nachlass. He did that in three 
volumes. For my purpose of tracing Husserl's interest in Philosophy of History, the second volume in 
its Beilage XXVII is importatnt.
  
 (The history is a great fact of the absolute being; and the last question, the  last of metaphysical 
and teleological question are one with (all) the  questions which is in quest to the meaning of 
history). 
  
I regard this statement sounds more affirming than the previous one quoted to history. This quotation, 
however, is from a Forschung Mss., and so the same caution applies.  
At least we can deduce that in the now published Erste Philosophie I and II and  (Hua VII and VIII) 
and their Beilagen,  we are witnessing Husserl own struggle in coming to grips with the place of history 
in his attempt to systematize his First Philosophy.    
 
4.   From other mss., from the perpective of Intersubjectivity 
206 In it Husserl approaches history from the viewpoint of 
intersubjectivity. Although we only have research manuscripts, and no publication, concerning this 
issue, the context of this group of texts, is Husserl's intention to complete his 'Cartesian Meditations', 
which (at the time) had not yet been published for a German audience, and by doing extra writing he 
had hoped to complete his goal to publish a statement on his systematic philosophy based on the 
prewritten manuscripts of the Cartesian Meditations plan, but by 1934 he finally dropped this plan 
altogether.207
In Chapter 4 section 5, this particular matter could not be meditated through properly since the data of 
 After that decision, Husserl came to a break-through in his own thinking as announced the 
Krisis text.   
 
5.    Inner History from the Crisis texts. 
                                                 
205   E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie II, Hua VIII, Blg XXXII, (Mss. more likely 1924) 506. 
206   E. Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster 1905-1920, Zweier 1921-
1928, Dritter Teil 1929-1935 Hrsg. I. Kern. (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1973) 
207   Cf., R. Bruzina. 'Last Philosophy: Ideas for a Transcendental Phenomenological Metaphysics. Eugen Fink with 
Edmund Husserl, 1928-1938.' in Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy. Ed. D. P. Chattopadhyaya e.a., (New Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass, 1992) 271.   
the First Philosophy have not been mentioned and investigated as I have just done. 
 I will now start examining the Krisis texts again, (without repeating my explications in Chapter 
4 concerning the genesis of the text) and then some earlier texts, to put these Krisis text against their 
contextual background. 
Indeed I will now elaborate on Husserl's Philosophy of History, as I see it, through detailed 
interpretations of his explicit statements, contextualizing then the texts to show how he has understood 
such a Philosophy, and how he defined it.   
I will start with what Husserl was saying,  
 
 Geschichte ist von vorherein nichts anderes als die lebendige Bewegung  des Miteinander und 
Ineinander von Ursprünglicher Sinnbildung und  Sinnsedimentierung208
 (History is from the start nothing but the vital movement of being-with- one-another and 
being-in-one-another of the original formation and  sedimentation of meaning).
 
209
The context is, that "to understand geometry or any given cultural fact is to be conscious of its 
historicity, albeit implicitly."
 
210
 This is Husserl's core "definition" of history, his philosophy of history. He has put it succinctly 
for the first time. The implication being that, one 'given cultural fact' is history itself, described by 
Husserl here as 'the vital movement of being-with-one-another and being-in-one-another of the original 
formations of meaning and sedimentations of meaning.' Hence investigating this 'movement' is doing a 
Philosophy of History. Philosophically, to be conscious of our co-existing and our interpenetrating-
existence in our original formation of meaning and sedimentation of meaning, is to be in a historising 
existence, to be historically existing. 'To be conscious' admittedly, is an act of 'being-conscious now' 
while the 'original formation of meaning' and 'original sedimentation of meaning' is a formation and 
sedimentation that have started in the past and will be continuing till now, and after now. Such 
 A kind of a historical attitude is promoted here, which is not the attitude 
of Wesenanschauung (intuition of the essence) of Ideas Book I (back then in 1913) anymore.  
                                                 
208   Krisis I, Hua VI, 380. Crisis, 371. a mss. of 1936, originally published and titled by E. Fink in 1939 as Die Frage 
nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentionalhistorisches Problem, in 'Revue Internationale de Philosophie' 1Jhrg. 
nr 2, 203-225.  
 Carr's translation modified, thereby it has become more literal. This Beilage was meant to be included in § 9 a. 
according to Carr's footnote p. 353 
209  Carr has translated Miteinander and Ineinander as 'co-existence' and 'interweaving', I find those too far from the 
literal German, hence my translation. 
210   Crisis, 370. 
foundation is a 'movement' in time and sequence of be-ing, both being historical and calling for a 
history.  
 Speaking about a telos, a teleology, is speaking from a philosophical position concerning a 
shape and a meaning of the sequence of processes of thinking which we observe as unfolding and 
which we observe phenomenologically.  
 Quoting Husserl again "the whole cultural present (Kulturgegenwart), understood as a totality, 
implies, the whole cultural past (Kulturvergangenheit)."211
So he explains further, "it implies a continuity of pasts which implies one-another each in itself being a 
past cultural present."
 
212 Although Husserl was using geometry and pushing it back to its origins (hence 
E. Fink's title, shortened by D. Carr in his translation: The Origin of Geometry213
 In the previous chapter, I have examined those Krisis texts where Husserl had treated the 
scientific developments and reflected their impacts on the history of Europe. By doing what he did, his 
Philosophy of History has emerged. I used the word "emerge," since for Husserl there had been so far 
no obvious planning to design a Philosophy of History, or nothing comparable to the way he planned to 
write a Philosophy of Arithmetic, Logical Investigations or Ideas I, and his last publication before 1936, 
Formal and Transcendental Logic.
), we can apply this 
style of investigation to any cultural data. In this chapter, I am only explicating 'philosophy' as one 
cultural datum, and 'history' as another one, and so we are able to see how the Husserlian Philosophy of 
History has taken shape.        
214
 The fact that the Krisis text was a new
 In all these publications Husserl has been definitely meditating on 
arithmetic, logic, ideas, formal and transcendental logic all of them as though they were "above history, 
and not influenced by history", as transcendental ideas.      
215 'Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy' 
(indicated by the subtitle), and that it incorporated 'history' as one of its paths to do phenomenology, 
"[may well] strike one as strange indeed."216
                                                 
211   Ibid., 371. 
212   Ibid., 371 
213   Published by Fink for the first time in Revue internationale de philosophie vol I nr. 2 (1939) 
214   published in 1929.  
215   the last publication with a subtitle 'an introduction' was Husserl's  french Méditations cartésiennes , Traduit  par 
G. Peiffer et  E. Levinas. (Paris: A. Colin, 1931).  
216   E. Ströker, Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology. (Stanford U. P. , 1993) 176.  
 The 'strangeness' is because in Husserl's works published 
during his lifetime thus far, there seemed to be very little about history, in fact nothing significant at all. 
Nonetheless, we have shown that considered reading of the later Husserliana Beilagen, reveals some 
signs of a "struggle" in Husserl's thinking to branch out into history in his own way, as evidenced in the 
texts of his research manusripts,  we have examined, and even before his 1936 publication of the Krisis, 
as we have seen above.  
 However, it is always important to make a clear distinction between the (ready to be, and) 
published texts, and all other Husserl's research manuscripts.217
                                                 
217  This is E. Ströker 's publication of Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Schriften (in 8 volumes) (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner, 1992)  "als eigene Schriften Husserls von besonderer Authentizität" (vol 1 p. v). I hereby gratefully 
acknowledge this clear distinction that Prof. Ströker suggested, as very helpful, in distinctione salus,  as we say. 
and in the next chapter, when discussing 
'Philosophy of History beyond Husserl's texts', we will always have to keep that basic distinction in 
mind.  
Chapter Six.   The Phenomenological Philosophy of History 
 The History of European people is a constant human effort to focus on a  telos. And in 
Husserl's interpretation of history, this telos is what he sees  as a constantly bursting out of human 
thinking, on the surface of  chronological time. Thus we have philosophers and even philosophies. 
1   Beyond Husserl's texts 
2   How to read history philosophically 
3   Doing History as doing Phenomenology 
------------------------------------- 
 
1  Beyond Husserl's texts 
This heading could be taken to mean 'beyond Husserl's published texts during his lifetime' or even 
beyond the 'archival texts which have been published continuously since the publication of the first 
Husserliana series in 1950.'  
  Husserl died in 1938,  leaving us with a mass of written yet unpublished pages. As Anthony J. 
Steinbock has put it,  
  
 An overwhelming proportion of Husserl's writings were never intended for  publication; 
many have the tenor of experimental investigations, often  challenging the reader with repetitions, 
sharp transitions, laconic phrasing,  and incomplete sentences. Husserl would take up a theme, 
develop it,  consider it from different angles, relate it to other themes (sometimes 
 irreconcilably), let it ferment for a time and pick it up even years later.218
Elisabeth Ströker, who wanted to present what is "als eigene Schriften Husserls von besonderer 
Authentizität, (as Husserl's own writings with a special authenticity)" published simply those texts 
 
And yet many of his disjecta membra have been published by different scholars at different times. The 
whole project of putting all his work to press started in 1950 with the publication of the Cartesianische 
Meditationen, the first production in the Husserliana series. At the time of writing this thesis, 2003-
2006, the Husserliana series has reached vol. XXXVIII, published in 2004. Many of these volumes 
were Forschung-manuskripte (research manuscripts), never intended to be published .      
                                                 
218   E. Husserl. Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Trans. Anthony J. Steinbock.  (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 2001) Translator Introduction, p.  xxxvi-xxxvii. 
which Husserl himself had published in his lifetime, or those mss. which had been prepared to be 
published, such as the Erste Philosophie (1923-24), Cartesianische Meditationen (1929), and Krisis (3e 
Teil) included (1936/1954).219
 When dealing with Husserl's texts regarding history, then, we not only have the published texts, 
such as the Krisis, but we also possess Erste Philosophie text, prepared to be published, as well as 
reasearch mss. in their Beilagen. I think to be sensitive to these nuances is very necessary in this thesis, 
to contextualize Husserl's opinion regarding history, and to determine as much as possible Husserl's 
own nuanced opinions concerning it, and perhaps Husserl's unfinished struggles to form his definitive 
opinion. However, while considering their degrees of certainty I will present my reading of the texts to 
build a philosophy of history in the spirit of Husserl's texts, published or otherwise. Since the history of 
an individual or a group also contain their struggles and not only their achievements, the historical 
context of Husserl's thinking concerning the issue of historicity must also include his struggles as well 
as his definitive achievements. This is why the research manusripts, the struggles, as well as the 
   
 This clarifying statement is necessary to my position regarding what I call "Husserl's texts." 
Following Ströker, I regard all texts published by Husserl himself and also those prepared to be 
published, as obviously "Husserl's texts". I also regard  these "als eigene Schriften Husserls von 
besonderer Authentizität."     
However, I would go further than Ströker, for I will also include all public lectures, e.g., the famous 
Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis, later in Husserliana XI (1966) and Active Syntheses, later in 
Husserliana XXXI (2000), as simply Husserl's texts as well. And concerning the Forschung 
Manuskripte, usually included as Beilagen, and all the texts not yet published in Husserliana but 
already housed and classified in the Husserl Archives, they are also of course Husserl's texts in the 
physical sense written by him, very useful to understand his thinking, although, as Steinbock put it, 
some have "the tenor of experimental investigations," and thus are not always not a definitive opinion 
of Husserl concerning a certain matter at a certain stage of his thinking. The latter texts I hesitate at 
calling "Husserl's texts", but with some indications of their status of being a research mss. they still 
need to be mentioned, thereby recognizing their "tenor of experimental investigations."  
                                                 
219   I am referring to E. Ströker. Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Schriften. (8 vols) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1992) . 
manuscripts achieving publication, all need to be recognized and explicated, although at different levels 
of certainty of opinion.   
 
2   How to read history philosophically 
One can read history for the purpose of gathering  information. One can also read history as propaganda 
for certain purposes. One can also read it with a particular intention to understand the hidden dynamics 
of human endeavour, the human making of history (for a controversial case, e.g., to analyse how the 
Palestine - Israel problem arose).  
 As for the "how", of 'how to read history' this could mean to ask questions about how to select 
what will be read from the whole chronology of remembered facts/ events, and what the selection 
criteria should be. The "how" could also mean asking questions as to whether a given event is "just 
what happens" observably, quite apart from the "sources", "causes" or even "motivations" of it, or 
otherwise, and whether events mean something "deeper" in a larger context, in a "bigger picture" of 
things. Journalists often claim to present "bare facts," we note, but are there really "bare facts"?  
 Historiography topically puts early events first and  the subsequent ones later, and so on and on. 
Sequence is often interpreted so as to suggest causality. When we read events after events, a less careful 
reader will get the impression that early events are causes, directly or indirectly, of later events. Thus 
for example,  World War I  is supposed "to have caused" the creation of the League of Nations, and the 
League's failure had "caused" World War II which in turn "caused" the creation of the United 
Nations.220
 The Crisis text of 1936 takes up the theme of the 'world' and 'history' and Husserl's approach is 
certainly different in it than his other earlier texts. Yet this book subtitled 'an introduction to 
 In the History of Philosophy, one could imagine simplistically that the collapse of the 
mediaeval Scholastics "caused" confusion in Descartes' perception of Scholastic philosophy, which in 
turn "caused" his attempts to start philosophy anew; his efforts in turn "caused" the two streams in 
philosophical thinking (mentioned in Husserl's Crisis): 'positivistic-rationalism' and the 'sceptical-
empiricism'. As a foil to this kind of reasoning, Roman wisdom used  to have it: post hoc non propter 
hoc, what comes after, is not because of what has gone before, at least not always.  
                                                 
220  Bertrand Russerl seemed to fall into this trap in his Portraits from Memories and other Essays. London 1956.  
phenomenological philosophy', is highly significant in that Husserl introduces phenomenological 
philosophy in this new way. As the last chapter indicates, Husserl had quite some struggle 
incorporating history into his phenomenology. It is only at this late stage of his life that he began to see 
things differently. Hence in the Crisis  there is a particular interest in his allowing the philosophy of 
history to be included in his transcendental phenomenology. And indeed not only is the philosophy of 
history included in the operation of transcendental phenomenology, it has now become even its 
foundation. In this way, Husserl's Crisis text both  promotes a different way of reading history  and thus 
also promotes a different way of doing phenomenology.   
 First, the 'History of European people' according to Husserl, is a constant effort to focus on a 
telos. This telos is not like a blue-print drawn in advance, according to which a building is to be built. It 
is more of a future possibility which calls us out of our lethargy in thinking. It is the experience of 
having an image in one's mind, a causa exemplaris, towards which a sculptor is shaping his sculpture. 
To be able to take a theoretical stance is what makes it possible to understand history as a progression 
toward a telos, which process of progression is ultimately to raise the human community into a 
community motivated by a quest of truth. The theoretical stance requisite for this sense of historicity, 
first appeared, according to Husserl, among the ancient Greeks . 
 In Husserl's interpretation of history, this telos is what he sees as a constantly bursting out of 
human thinking on the surface in chronological time. Thus we have philosophers and even 
philosophies. Even when some thinkers meander, creating seemingly opposing systems of philosphies, 
Husserl still sees this as the selfsame urge towards the telos within the European history. For Husserl, 
keeping this telos in mind, is the only way of reading history, so that we Europeans,221 the bearers of 
history, are able to know 'who we are', i.e., that we are the people with history-making-existence. It 
means that for us, to exist as Europeans is to exist-while-making-history. This position echoes Dilthey's 
assertion that "we are historical beings first before we are observers of history,"222
                                                 
221  Although the writer is not a European by birth and blood-lineage, yet in this study, allow me to address myself as 
"we Europeans", for two reasons: 1/ this thesis is defending a European point of view regarding historising existence. 2/ 
I myself deeply intuit that humans are equipped with  the power to shape history, (this rational intuition, is very 
European) within the ever expanding limits of the human means, esp. given the constant growth of human 
consciousness.  
 
222  W. Dilthey. Das Verstehen anderer Personen und ihrer Lebensäusserungen. Gesammelte Schriften VII. (Leipzig, 
1927) 277-278. The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Expressions of Life. Trans.  Kenneth L. Heiges. (only up 
and Husserl was acquainted with Dilthey recently published Gesammelte 
Schriften volume VII, in 1927, through Ludwig Landgrebe and Georg Misch223
 Concerning his Eurocentrism, it must be recognized that the context of Husserl's Krisis text was 
indeed a European audience.  At the same time and in the same text Husserl also claims that the telos of 
philosophy is universal in that it strives to attain an identical truth which is valid for all who are no 
longer blinded by traditions. If we would accuse Husserl as Eurocentric in a pejorative sense, then we 
can also include all philosophical writers, the Roman, the Greeks, and other non-Europeans, who have 
done the same. The only weak point of Husserl's Eurocentrism is that he did emphasize it (as in the 
case of Hegel and in his Philosophy of History lectures in 1830-1831) in a too explicit and convinced 
way, as if there were absolutely no other possibilities at all, and Husserl nowhere nods in the direction 
of non-Western philosophies. Qui nimis probat nihil probat. Yet Galileo, Descartes and Kant have been 
chosen by Husserl as examples in Crisis, to highlight this view. For Husserl it does not seem important 
to know each and every detail of the history of philosophers and philosophies. But he wants to give us a 
method by which we are 'able to read' the meaning of history, whichever part we want to read. In these 
three examples of Galileo, Descartes and Kant, Husserl depicts clearly history as a possibility of a 
"break-through" of human spirit from the burden of the non-thinking mass.  In spite of their 
shortcomings, these men were pioneer-thinkers of their time, they happen to be Western bacause it was 
in the West where breakthroughs into modernity occurred. Husserl complains that philosophers of 
mathematics and sciences of his time are not there as philosophers anymore, since mathematicians and 
. 
 Before going further I should  make some observations about Husserl's European-centred 
notions and cultural influences behind his teleological orientation. Two points require immediate noting 
about Husserl's understanding of history. His Eurocentric approach, and his deep conviction (or may be 
his profound understanding) of the link between truth and hope, colour his conception of history as 
teleological even identification of it as a telos.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
to pg. 227 of the German text). In R. M. Zaner and K. L. Heiges. (Trans)., Introd. R. A. Makkreel. Descriptive 
Psychology and Historical Understanding. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977. This translated quotation, however, is taken from 
David Carr. Time, Narrative, and History. (Bloomington, Indiana UNiv. Press, 1986) 178 ftn.12.   
223  [3 footnotes]: (a) Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), his last professorial position was at Berlin University. He was the 
one who, in opposition to positivistic and scientistic philosophies of the time, emphasized the difference between 
Naturwissenschaft and .Geisteswissenscaft. In the former we seek causality, in the latter we seek understanding. [Cf., 
Husserl's Ideas II, Hrsg. Marly Biemel. Hua IV, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952) §54-64 concerning 'Motivation.' - pto-.  
scientists have become  more experts technicians and less original thinkers.   
 Concerning the link between truth and hope, which then causes Husserl to uncover the telos in 
history, I would argue that it is motivated, at least implicitly, by Husserl's background in the culture of 
the Judaistic Torah. The text of his Prague lecture mentions, 
 
 Er müßte dabei also einsichtig werden, daß sie in ihrem radikalen  Selbstverständnis den 
Anspruch erheben kann und muß, alle erdenklichen  Seinsprobleme, vor allem die lezten und höchsten 
Sinnesprobleme für  Welt und meschlichen Dasein, in der Systematik ihrer Arbeit zu umfangen; 
 aber auch daß sie dabei schließlich befähigt sein wird, den beiden  Sinnesquellen, aus denen 
das europäische Menschentum im Altertum  entsprungen: die griechische Philosophie und dem 
jüdisch-christlichen  Monotheismus die endgültige Form der teleologischen Auswirkung zu 
 geben, in welcher sie zu einer letzten Ausgleichung kommen.224
The Greek philosophy and Jewish-Christian monotheism, are singled out to be as the origin of meaning 
of teleology, in which the last reconciliation will come. In the Torah, especially in the second Book, 
We'elleh Semot, the Exodus, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is depicted as "walking in front of 
the people" and thereby eventually leading them into the land, as promised. In the Christian tradition it 
is the Letter to the Romans, and the Apocalypse that speak about the last reconciliation most clearly. (It 
is better not to specify, since Husserl himself did not specify which part of the Jewish-Christian 
heritage he actually meant when he wrote this piece). Nevertheless, here we see the truth, and the hope, 
go hand in hand to shape the, for lack of a better word, the destiny, or the telos. It is clear from the 
 
  
 (Thus, It must be understood that they in their radical self-understanding  can and must above 
all raise the demand, that embraces in the systematic  of their work, all the conceivable problems 
of being, the last and the  highest problems of meaning, for the world and for the humane 
 human-being; but also that they will also be extremely capable to raise  both sources of 
meaning, scil., out of their European humanity in its  ancient heritage: the Greek  philosophy and 
the Jewish-Christian  monotheism, which give the conclusive form of the teleological  solution, in 
which they will come toward  their last reconciliation).    
 
                                                 
224 (b) Ludwig Landgrebe (1902-1991), Husserl's professorial assistant  1923-1930. who helped him editing Formale 
und transzendentale Logik (published by Husserl in 1929), and he himself published Erfahrung und Urteil (1939, as an 
example of their colaboration). 
 (c) George Misch, who due to his concentration on logic, had appropriated it to the  phenomenology as a whole. 
(Husser'ls Briefwechsel Vi. Hrsg. Karl Schuhmann. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994) 282-283. Misch had been more a student 
of Dithey, and according to Husserl he misunderstood phenomenology. He published Lebensphilosophie und 
Phänomenologie (1929).  
  Krisis II, Hua xxix, Prager Vorträge, 109 
Vienna and especially the Prague lectures how Husserl's reading of history, has come together.225
As we know already, Galileo, Descartes and Kant, are chosen to highlight the concrete forms of 
European thinking, but at the same time criticized as falling short from the ideal. But there is a smaller 
text of relevance here, also a text from 1936,  included as Beilage iii in the Biemel edition of the Krisis 
I 
 Hence 
it is not a "directionalism" in the sense of a dialectic outcome at the end of an historical process. 
Husserl's teleology is an option chosen by going back to the origin of our European thinking.  
 In his Vienna lectures Husserl depicted a history in the tradition of the Greek thinkers. The 
human spirit burst out into its concrete expressions in history so that history can be "read" and 
interpreted as human spirit taking concrete forms. For Husserl the ideal outburst of the human spirit 
happened with the ancient Greek philosophers. By asking the question 'why are the things the way they 
are?' these thinkers were pioneer as to  how to philosophize. 
In his Prague lectures, while Husserl described history in the tradition of both the Greeks and the Jews, 
he also underscores his praise of the Greeks as pioneers of European thinking, while adding the Jewish-
Christian tradition as another source of the European 'critical thinking attitude.'  
 
In Krisis 1936 
226 known as The Origin of Geometry. First published by E. Fink in 1939,227 we can use it to penetrate 
deeper into Husserl's question into history via his quest into the origin of geometry. According to 
Husserl this quest "surely never occurred in Galileo."228
For Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), we may note en passant, this text has become his starting point of his 
deconstructive critique of Phenomenology. Following Husserl, Derrida explores the philosophical roots 
and the tradition of geometry as a kind of history. In other words, Derrida uses The Origin as 
 Husserl wants to go further back into the origin, 
while according to him Galileo only wanted to use the tradition of geometry to do his work. Though 
small, The Origin still neatly illustrate the formation of Husserl's approach to history. 
                                                 
225  Ch. 4. ad 3 of this thesis:  The Vienna and Prague lectures and Husserl's situation in Freiburg and the newly 
promulgated laws against Jews, these all contribute directly to Husserl's Crisis publication in haste. 
226  Appendix 6 in David Carr's translation.  
227  in Revue internationale de philosophie vol 1 no 2  
228  Crisis , 353 / Krisis  I ,  365 
significant model for Philosophising about History.229
 But let us get back to Husserl's own words concerning history, first in the Krisis I   then in the 
Krisis II 
  
230
                                                 
229  J. Derrida,  Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: an Introduction. Trans. P. Leavy. Lincoln: (Univ of Nebraska 
Press, 1989) (original French 1962) 
230  see this thesis, chapter 4 Fnt. 1 and 3 
 collections of texts, that impinge on history. 
In Krisis I (HUA VI) # 6, we read " Philosophy and Science would accordingly be the historical 
movement through which universal reason "inborn" in humanity as such, is revealed."  
 Husserl is saying that, reason inborn in humanity (dem Menschentum als solchen eingeborenen 
Vernunft) is revealed through historical movement, and this historical movement is not a sequence of 
events that we in common parlance call "history," but specifically Philosophy and Science. How 
Philosophy and Science have been done, practised and theorized, is in itself a historical movement. In 
this movement the inborn reason in humanity is revealed, showing in other words, that inborn reason in 
humanity is indeed there in action.  
 In HUA VI # 15 we find Husserl desiring,  
  
 to make comprehensible the teleology in the historical becoming of  philosophy [. . ] and 
at the same time to achieve clarity about ourselves,[. .]  the bearer of this teleology. . .  
And what is this teleology and clarity about ourselves? Husserl explains: 
  
 It (=history) has spiritual unity through the unity and driving force of the  task which, in the 
historical process,. . .  seeks to move through the  various stages of obscurity toward satisfying 
clarity until it finally works  its way though to perfect insight. 
  
The telos is to be the perfect insight, in the final stage, when humanity (Menschentum), through various 
obscure stages, moves towards a clearer critical understanding, here again, either in philosophy and/ or 
in science.  Husserl calls this  a "critical understanding of the total unity of history."  Husserl accepts  
that this unity of history could be understood critically, simply because of its very basic foundation lies 
in human reason, and in its movement in stages, we must be able to graps it, with the same human 
reason. This is the same as saying, that we humans are reasoning and with the same reason we are 
grasping of our reasoning. That is why, when we understand philosophy and science, we understand 
ourselves as humanly reasoning beings, the bearers of this teleology through philosophy and science. 
 Husserl keeps clarifying that,     
 
  it is to make vital again in its concealed historical meaning, the  sedimented conceptual 
system which, as taken for granted, serves as the  ground of his [ i.e., the knowing subject] private 
and non-historical work 231
 if he is to be one who thinks for himself, an autonomous philosopher with  the will to liberate 
himself from all prejudices, he must have the insight that  all the things he takes for granted are 
prejudices, that all prejudices are  obscurities arising out of a sedimentation of tradition.
   
 
since the sedimented conceptual system indeed conceals the historical meaning. Sedimentation, which 
is a taken-for-granted prejudice (Vorurteil, pre-judgement, the translation, prejudice, is commonly used 
in a pejorative sense), stops the thinker to think for him and herself, or prevent making vital again the 
concealed historical  meaning. 
Therefore Husserl continues: 
 
232
 a historical, backward reflection of the sort under discussion is thus  actually the deepest 
kind of self-reflection aimed at a self-understanding  in terms of what we  are truly seeking as the 
historical beings we are
 
 
Due to the sedimentation of tradition being encountered at all times in our philosophical endeavour, it 
is imperative to go to the deepest kind of self-reflection, to do a backward reflection, Husserl argues, 
then, that     
  
233
 [. . . ]This truth is established only in the self evidence of a critical over-all  view which 
brings to light [. . .] a meaningful, final harmony.
  
 [. . .] 'the point of it' ultimately was, in the hidden unity of intentional  inwardness  which 
 alone constitutes the unity of history. 
234
 Here Husserl is, on the one hand, following the trend of philosophy of history, since Voltaire 
  
 In Husserl's programme of doing philosophy through history or doing science through history, 
we see that history is a kind of a window through which we can see the philosophy-as-a-discipline, 
ultimately a discipline in which humanity is reasoning, or making use of his or her reason, which will 
lay bare, will reveal, what we are, as reasoning beings.  
                                                 
231   Crisis, 71 
232   Ibid. ,72 
233    Ibid., 72 
234  ibid.,  73 
(1694-1778) or perhaps more accurately since Jean Bodin (1530-1595). On the other hand, he is doing 
a philosophy of history in a different sense.   
 Since Bodin's and Voltaire's books,235
 We can conclude this part by quoting Husserl again, from Hua VI, § 59
 philosophy of history replaced the theology of history, as 
Bodin and Voltaire protested against the accepted sediment of tradition (to use Husserl's expression) up 
to that time, even if theology is the foundation of history in the sense that the telos of history is human 
redemption/ salvation as accepted and reflected in theology. In this light there is nothing particularly 
original of Husserl to do a philosophy of history instead of doing a theology of history, for with the rise 
of the Renaissance it was fashionable to protest against anything traditional, e.g., Catholic Church 
teachings, theology and traditional Scholastic philosophy.   
 But this thesis will highlight Husserl's claim, which seems contrary to his own previous stages 
of philosophizing, that phenomenology as a philosophical method that is enhanced by the discovery, 
the uncovering, of history as way into a deeper understanding of  the presence and the different layers 
of the sediments of tradition(s), and thereby in the end to a deeper understanding of who we are as 
bearer of the tradition(s).          
 Husserl, then, can be seen as a philosopher who promotes the investigation of 'who we are' 
through his study of history, but then a history as a driving force of the task which seeks to move 
through the various stages of obscurity toward satisfying clarity until finally it works its way through to 
a perfect insight. This is a map of the struggle (Kampf) of human consciousness (Husserl's use of the 
word 'Kampf' in 1936 was emotionally loaded). In fact, human consciousness has been Husserl's 
interest since his earlier years. It has been a key object of his study  since the Logical Investigations, 
(1900) and maturing in understanding very much in Ideas Book I, (1913), but always in an a-historical. 
way. I can almost call it in a "mathematical laboratory" when Husserl called Philosophy, a rigorous 
Science (1911), he had his earlier mode of investigation in mind. 
In Crisis (1936) however, history comes to take part in defining human consciousness and thereby 
helps better to define philosophy as a conscious human act.  
236
                                                 
235  Jean Bodin. Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem .( Amsterdam: Neudruck der Ausgabe, 1650)  or 
(Darmstadt: Edition Scientia Verlag, 1967) 
 
236 Voltaire. Essai sur le Moeur et l' Esprit des Nation. 1756. (see K. Rahner (Ed). Encyclopedia of Theology. 
  
 I can thematically pursue history, society's memory, so to speak -- but all  such reflection 
remains within transcendental naïvité ; it is the  performance of the world-apperception which is, 
so to speak, ready- made,  while the transcendental correlate -- i.e., the (immediately active or 
 sedimented) functioning intentionality, which is the universal  apperception, constitutive of 
all particular apperceptions, giving them  the ontic sense of 'psychic experience (Erlebnisse)  of this 
and that  human being' -- remains completely hidden. 
 
This is where Husserl suggests that to transcend the historical naïvité of historians, and enter into its 
transcendental correlate, of a philosopher who is philosophizing within history and through history, 
using functioning intentionality, which is the universal apperception, can give the thinker the ontic 
sense of psychic experience. This is a crucial text indeed. This text is not saying that we read history 
and histories and then make a kind of a comparative reflection between a certain period and another 
period, between a certain people's characteristics compared with other people's. Essentially this is what 
Hegel did in his Philosophy of History lectures, but Husserl's approach is different.    
What I have gathered so far are from Husserl's published work. (I am including part 3 of Krisis I, as 
intended to be published.) 
 Now we enter into his Forschung-manuskripte, which is an extraordinary collection of texts. 
But since they are personal notes, and in Husserl's habit , he was wont to think while writing notes, we 
have to keep this fact in mind in using those notes/ texts. There is bound to be some repetitions and 
perhaps even some inconsistencies and ambiguities in these materials.  
 In Beilage xxviii, of Biemel edition237
 Man is capable only arriving, by  starting from his own position, from his  horizons of 
knowledge, and feeling, at certain conjectures and thereby of  forming for himself certain ways of 
believing which, as his world-view,  offer him a personal evidence for conjectures and norms of action 
 or Appendix ix of Carr's translation, we have a note of 
summer 1935, which is titled "Denial of Scientific Philosophy. Necessity of Reflection. The Reflection 
[must be] Historical. How is History required?" a rather curious title and we will see what it holds.  
 This note starts with a sweeping statement of "Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed 
apodictically rigorous, science, the dream is over.  [italics, Carr ]  
In this crucial text we read that  
    
                                                                                                                                                                       
(London: Burns and Oates, 1975) 630-632. 
   Crisis, 209 
237   Summer 1935 
under  guidance of the conjecturally believed absolute.    
 
The starting point is acknowledged as "from his own position" but the learning subject's 'own position' 
is not a blank-start, as if a neutral position. It is "from his own [ultimately subjective] horizon of 
knowledge". This is a definitively a position different then in Husserl's previous position where he 
stressed the 'rigorous scientific' (in his sense of 1911 article) position even in philosophy. If Philosophy 
is to be a "rigorous science' as his position in 1911, then the starting point from "one's own horizon of 
knowledge" cannot be defended. But if Philosophy in this new style of Phenomenology is starting from 
the author's own position and horizon of knowledge, then 'the dream of philosophy as a rigorous 
science' (in the 1911 sense) is indeed over.             
The phrase "from his own position" though, must not be interpreted as if each philosopher is an isolated 
person thinking solely from his own position. Husserl himself recognized the function of a "revitalized 
content of the traditional systems."  
 In the same manuscript  Husserl says about "the evident consciousness of a project,"    
  
 now history is after all not before us like a warehouse`containing its  assembled wares`[ . . 
.] (a philosopher) he reads and naturally he  understands what he reads from a standpoint of his own 
thoughts, [. . .] on  the basis of the 'perception' of his already developed concepts, methods, 
 convictions. Through this apperception he gains something new, further  developing himself 
as a philosoher.   
  
Or in other words, he says that, 
 
 only by engrossing ourselves in the revitalized content of the traditional  systems can we feel 
this evidence (of the consciousness of a project)  and if we penetrate them, interrogate them, the 
sense of the task of  philosophy can  become clear.  
  
Therefore, 
  
 we must engross ourselves in historical considerations and understand  ourselves as 
philosophers and understand what philosophy is to become  through us.   
 
Husserl proclaims now that Philosophy is not a Science in the way people understands science in his 
days. Philosophy is still rigorous in its discipline with a rigor of a thinker who "penetrates and 
interrogates the revitalized content of traditional systems" and nothing is accepted for granted or on 
anyone's authority, and exactly by penetrating and interrogating the content of traditional systems 
philosophy becomes clearer as a human historical project, fulfilling itself and its notion towards telos 
through us, the thinkers, and not as an abstract evidence as if we are but witnesses of The Truth qua 
spectacle. The words "through us" in his phrase "what philosophy is to become through us" turns out to 
be a crucial definition of philosophy as well as a definition of history.  
 Philosophy is a becoming of a thinking process and this process is a historical process since the 
thinker is a historically conscious being and in dialogue with the content of his/ her traditional systems 
of thinking before and contemporary to him / herself. This dialogue with and within the tradition is 
what makes the content of traditional systems become revitalized never to be fossilized.  This 'letting of 
the process of thinking' be a 'letting of the process of history' unfold, we can call a phenomenology of 
history  
 This Phenomenology of History, based on Husserl's texts, can be carried beyond Husserl. With 
this now looming in my own mind, though, I am not in the business of constructing what could have 
been part 4 and part 5 of the Krisis texts, which was attempted by E. Fink238. I have set myself a 
different task and a different hope than Dr. E. Fink's. In this chapter, I am also not  engaged in a debate 
as to whether part 3 of Krisis did really belong to the intended completed published material or not.239
Does Husserl  redefine 'phenomenology' in the Krisis texts? In my reading he does, since what is given, 
 
But I am interested in asking the question, whether from the texts available, a Husserlian philosophical 
phenomenology of history could be brought into its own , and if so, how. 
 If Husserl's phenomenology, before the Krisis text, is very focused on consciousness, and the 
consciousness of individuals, how is a macro-history or general approach to historical materials 
supposed to be done based on this kind of phenomenology? 
 Is it enough to to assume a collectivity of individuals as the subject of history?  
When a phenomenologist reads history, it is implied that s/he will read it phenomenologically. What 
does it mean?  
                                                 
238 Voltaire (François Marie Arouet Le jeune), Candide ou l'optimism. 1759 (a satirical novel, whence the term  
"Philosophy of History' came from).  
  Edmund Husserl. Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und transzendentale Phänomenologie. HUA  VI ( 
Krisis I ) Hrsg. W. Biemel 2 Auflg. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976 ) Blg. XXIX, 514. Crisis. Trans. Carr, 397  
239  Debate between W. Biemel and D. Carr on one side and Ph. Bossert on the other side, presumably based on S. 
Strasser . 'Philosophy and Phenomenological Research' vol 35 (Sept 74) # 1  
is experienced, hence the world as a givenness, is experienced as given to us before even we try to 
grasp it, let alone  thematize it.  Thus there is a certain passivity in our act of perceiving and knowing 
and understanding the world. Phenomenologically, the question of "what happens in the world-
history?" so that we can understand it, could it be translated into "what happens in the world of 
thinking," or "what happens in our reasoning regarding the world?"   
 
 In his earlier writings, Husserl did mention the words 'history' 'historical' and 'historicity' only in 
the context of an awareness of a flow of events. We might say he was still in his 'natural attitude' 
regarding the matter at that stage.  
 In Ideas I. (1913) Husserl made a listing of Wissenschaften (sciences) in which he placed 
History within the group of Geisteswissenschaften.(socio-cultural sciences / Humanistic sciences). Also 
in his early lectures in 1923-1924. Erste Philosophie, ready for print at that time, but only eventually 
published in HUA VII .VIII in 1954 and 1959 respectively, Husserl's notion of history was conceived 
by him to be nothing more than a sequence of events. But then that was in 1923-1924. 
 In Cartesian Meditations (French edition 1931, the first German edition,  1950) and Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, (1929), Husserl mentioned 'History' and explain what he meant by that, without 
making it in any sense a theme of his philosophical phenomenology. In the Cartesian Meditations, 
though he mentioned that "the ego constitues himself and for himself in, so to speak, the unity of 
'history'."240
 In the Krisis documents,
  in the context of the chapter in the meditations on "Time as the universal form of all 
egological genesis". In another chapter, on "Survey of our intentional  explication of experiencing 
someone else" Husserl also mentions that "phenomenological explication does nothing but explicate 
the sense (den Sinn auslegen) this world has for us all, prior to any  philosophizing."At least the first 
statement quoted gives us a clue by which to enter into our investigation i.e, through the issue of 'Time', 
temporality. 
241 and from the later years of his life,242
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 in contrast  Husserl explained 
 Edmund Husserl. Aufsätze und Voträge 1922-1937 Hrsg. Th. Nenon , H.R.Sepp. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989). not 
and thematized his concept of history, it being my reading and thus the very core of my thesis that this 
is an explicit new development in Husserl's way of philosophizing.    
I will present the texts, especially from the Krisis documents, but now together with notes and writings 
from the later years of his life, that point towards  Husserl's concept of history and philosophical 
orientation towards it in a more complete form.  
 There are especially three chapters in the Krisis (HUA VI,1954) which deal with history in a 
philosophical way, chapters 6. 7. and 15.  
Chapter 6 is titled "The history of modern philosophy as a struggle for the meaning of man (Kampf um 
den Sinn des Menschen)"243
This statement is placing philosophies not only in the realm of a sequence of ideas or events, i.e., one 
idea replaced or followed by another idea, or one event followed and thereby replaced by the next 
event, but that of a continuous struggle, that the ideas are competing to claim their validities, and the 
concatanation of events (a natural concept of history) are seen as expressions of human struggles to 
define a meaning of genuine humanity. With this statement Husserl has started a new approach to 
history not found before the Krisis texts were in preparation. This was the time in Husserl's life when 
the Weimar Republic  (1919-1933) came apart and was replaced by the Third Reich (1933-1945), and 
when in 1933 he got a suspension from the new Government from all philosophical activities. It was in 
Aug. 30, 1934 that he made a public statement concerning 'The present task of philosophy' addressed to 
the Prague Congress of Philosophers. I am putting three chapters of Krisis under consideration into 
  An interesting observation is that Husserl is using the word "Kampf" in the 
context of  historical popularity of Hitler's book 'Mein Kampf' (1925) at that time. In this chapter 
Husserl is very clear when he says,  
 
 The true struggles of our time, the only ones which are significant, are  struggles between 
humanity which has already collapsed  (zusammengebrochenen  Menschentum) and humanity 
which still has  roots but is struggling to keep them of find new ones. The genuine  spiritual 
struggles of European humanity (Geisteskämpfe des  europäischen Menschentums) as such take 
the form of struggles between  the philosophies. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
translated. 
243  Carr translation 1970. as above,  14-16  
their historico-critical context, showing that while academically Husserl was on the decline, he reads 
his history in the context of a bigger picture of the struggle of philosophies. 
 Hence we can understand why he says in Krisis chapter 7244
In chapter 15
, 
 
 The faith of the possibility of philosophy as a task, that is, in the possibility  of universal 
knowledge, is something we cannot let go (Den Glauben an  die Möglichkeit der Philosophie als 
Aufgabe, also an die Möglichkeit  einer universalen Erkenntniss, können wir nicht  fahren lassen).  
And why, a little further he affirms  
 
 In our philosophizing, then - how can we avoid it - we are functionaries of  mankind. The quite 
personal responsibility of our own true being as  philosophers, our inner personal vocation, bears 
within itself at the same  time the responsibility for the true being of mankind; the latter is, 
 necessarily, being toward a telos and can only come to realization, if at all,  through 
philosophy - through us, if we are philosophers in all seriousness.     
Nowhere in his writings before the preparation of the Krisis texts has Husserl so passionately stated 
that philosophy is a personal vocation on behalf of the humankind, and with such a strong historical 
mindedness for Husserl significantly adds , 
 
 What is clearly necessary  (what else could be of help here?) is that we  reflect back in a 
thorough historical and critical fashion in order to provide ,  before all decisions, for a radical self-
understanding. . .   
245
In this statement Husserl explains that the 'historical becoming of philosophy' has to be explicated and 
in so doing we as 'bearers of this teleology' will be more conscious of who we are. Hence to 'do 
philosophy ' is intimately linked with the quest 'to be seriously human'. It is for Husserl clear that in the 
'Greek primal establishment lies the teleological beginning, the true birth of the European spirit as 
such', which is the spirit of inquiry leading towards 'a critical understanding of the total unity of history, 
our history', and not only through a critique of some present or handed down system, of some scientific 
or prescientific Weltanschauung. Only in this way "we have a task which is truly our own" he avers in 
 the third of the  Krisis chapters we are examining, Husserl states 
 
that   
 
 Our task is to make comprehensible the teleology in the historical  becoming of  philosophy, 
especially modern philosophy, and at the same  time to achieve clarity about ourselves, who are the 
bearers of this  teleology, who take part in carrying it out through our personal  intentions.    
                                                 
244  Carr ( 1970)  16-17 
245  Carr  (1970)   70-73 
the same chapter. Again Husserl connects doing philosophy with being seriously human, he states, 
   
 If he is to be the one who thinks for himself, an autonomous philosopher   with the  will to 
liberate himself from all prejudices (Vor-Urteil) he must  have the insight  that all the things he takes 
for granted are prejudices,  and that all prejudices are obscurities arising out of a sedimentation of 
 tradition, -- not merely judgments whose truth is as yet undecided --  and  that this is 
true even of the great task and  idea which is called  "philosophy".   
For Husserl as for most philosophers, and not for followers of a certain system of  philosophy, who call 
themselves philosophers, philosophy as a handed-down style or system of thinking needs to be re-
thought-through and re-vitalized. For Husserl 'history' (Geschichte) is seen from this perpective of 
humans doing philosophy in the sense of 'making sense of history' as a 'field of competing efforts at 
self-disclosure'. Since history is a critical understanding of an unfolding of humanity. Here we find 
Husserl is insisting on the necessity of historical reflections in order to discern the very business of 
philosophy itself.      
   
3 Doing History as Doing Phenomenology.                                                        
The Phenomenology of History, presented here is not simply a phenomenology as a method, which is 
then applied to one's writing on history.  In Chapter 4 we have seen how Husserl defined history in his 
later works. We have also seen how in the Crisis  texts, published in 1936 Husserl  introduced 
Phenomenology once again for the last time in historical terms.  
 Why did he do that? Are the Introductions in Ideas I 246, and Cartesian Meditations247
 In my reading of the Krisis texts there now comes a new development in Husserl's 
understanding of knowing and reflecting. Here he introduced 'history' as a point of entry into 
phenomenology, since history is none other than history of human consciousness (which constitues the 
world), in its concrete context. In other words consciousness in this new development, is not analysed 
 not 
enough? No. They were not enough for the later Husserl.  
In Ideas I, as well as Cartesian Meditations, Husserl introduces his phenomenology, or his main 
concern in it, namely, how knowledge of the world or of "transcendental objects" is possible, by giving 
a theory that consciousness "constitutes" the world.   
                                                 
246  first published in 1913, by Husserl himself; first Husserliana series 19 50, then 1976 
247  first German publication in Hua series 1950 ( the French translation had been published in 1931)  
as an object of analysis in vacuo, or in abstracto, but in its concrete time-space operation, in its day-to-
day decision making and choices in life. In Husserl's case this fact is now more outstanding because 
before the Crisis texts he did not pay too much attention to history, even if this is not to say that he had 
been against history, as he had understood it at the time.  
If in his former phenomenology he has looked upon consciousness and temporal experience, as if in 
vacuo, now his later phenomenology takes history very seriously, the investigating of history being 
taken as also simultaneously doing-history-being-history. As he earlier saw in the cases of 
consciousness and temporality, we humans cannot cancel our consciousness, our living consciously, 
and our temporality, our living in  time, unless we do ourselves violence, so now we cannot deny our 
being-in-history, our historicising. By linking our history and our being we know who we are, while we 
do what we are to-be-(come), in other words, we are doing what we are to become, since that is what 
we are. Agere sequitur esse (doing follows being, that is to say what is being done follows the nature of 
the do-er).    
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Seven.   Meditation on History 
 Husserl's Philosophy of History, is best to be approached from a different  or distinct 
perspective: it is not to be categorized as a substantive or  speculative philosophy of history or as a 
critical or analytic philosophy of  history. Two categories usually used in this case.  
 Husserl's approach to History has emerged from his Life-world  meditations, and his 
meditations on Pure Consciousness and  Consciousness of Internal Time.   
 
 
 
Meditation on History 
 
Husserl's approach to History in the Krisis, has emerged against the background horizon of his thematic 
Life-world meditations and the merging into one of his twofold meditations on Pure Consciousness and 
Consciousness of Internal Time, although these twofold meditations were never very clearly separated 
or worked on in a clear sequence. It was not planned at all  preoccupations would eventually 
converge.248 Husserl also did not deliberately plan to write on the Philosophy of History, which is why 
in this thesis I bypass the temptation to categorize Husserl's Philosophy of History as either a 
speculative (or substantive) or an analytical (or critical) Philosophy of History as it has been 
traditionally conceived in the discipline of historical study.249
 Geschichte ist von vorherein nichts anderes als die lebendige Bewegung  des Miteinander und 
Ineinander von Ursprünglicher Sinnbildung und  Sinnsedimentierung
 Concerning the thematic Life-world 
meditations, Husserl has always regarded lifeworld as "the place" from which to launch his 
meditations, but in Krisis he thematized it for the first time very succinctly.  
 I will begin this meditation with Husserl's own statement, and other quotations to provide its 
background. 
 
250
 (History is from the start nothing but the vital movement of being-with- one-another and 
being-in-one-another of the original formation and  sedimentation of meaning).
 
251
                                                 
248  This thesis Ch. 2 and  3. 
249   R. G. Collingwood. The Idea of History. Ed. T. M. Knox. (Oxford University Press, 1946) 
    Maurice Mandelbaum. The Problem of Historical Knowledge. (New York: Liveright, 1938) 
250  Krisis I , Hua VI, 380 
251  Carr has translated Miteinander and Ineinander as co-existence and interweaving, I find those less fortunate, I 
have to modify them.  
 
As to the background horizon, other quotations, 
 
 The historical world is always there, and the individual not only  observes it from the outside 
but is intertwined with it (Carr quoting Dilthey).  It means that we are in history as we in the world. 
It serves as the  horizon and  background for our everyday experience (Carr).252
 The world, then, phenomenologically explicated as the horizon of horizons  for all 
experiential actuality-in-appearing, the one "Something" always  already there for any attribution to 
be possible, is the first "product" of  constitutive origination wherein any meaning can be given on the 
 phenomenological "Absolute" (Bruzina).
  
 
253
.  . . what determines the sui generis 'Singularity' and 'Factuality' of the world  determines 
the meaning  history can have in regard to both the matters  investigated in phenomenology and the 
nature of phenomenology itself  (Bruzina).
     
 
254
A second point is related to this is that the 'miteinander und ineinander lebendige Bewegung' is geared 
toward a 'Sinnbildung und Sinnsedimentierung,' thus the meaning-formation and meaning-
sedimentation happen in that vital being-with-one-another
  
As a phenomenologist looking at history, as a 'given' revealing itself, Husserl describes his activity as 'a 
vital movement being-with one-another and being-in-one-another of original meaning formation and of 
original meaning sedimentations.'  
 This places history immediately in a community-based setting, be it as small as two people. 
History is not an individual, solipsistic monad, doing its own thing by itself. Husserl's efforts to 
overcome the possibility of a solipsistic tendency in philosophy, due to his emphasis of the 
transcendental ego, started already in the 5th Meditation of Cartesian Meditations, where Husserl 
treated 'the transcendental being as monadological intersubjectivity.'  
255
 Husserl's radical phenomenological observation observes only people being with and in-one-
another (as he put it), making meaning happen and hence sedimenting meaning for the next generation 
of people. Tradition is so formed. Intersubjectivity is thus not an abstract entity. There is no 
 and being-in-one-another.   
                                                 
252  David Carr (quoting W. Dilthey ) in Time, Narrative, and History. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 
4 and his ftn. 4.  See W. Dilthey. Gesammelte Schriften VII . 5th Ed. Hrsg. B. Groethuysen. ( 5th ed. Stuttgart: Teubner, 
1968) 277-278. (First published in 1927, when Dilthey's later thinking regarding History has changed. Husserl got to 
know this through Landgrebe and Misch) Cf., Ch. 6 ftn. 5 and 6 (a. b. c).  
253  Ronald Bruzina. Edmund Husserl & Eugen Fink Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2004) 428. 
254  Bruzina 2004,  432 
255  I find Carr's translation of mit-einander  with co-existence, less satisfying. During the "Cold-war" we talk about 
co-existence too, not in the sense of  mit-einander. 
substantialization of "history," history is just a person with another person making a meaningful 
meeting. There is no "holy tradition" either. Tradition is just id quod tradiri (that which is passed on) 
from one generation to the next, and it should be treated as such. This lebendige Bewegung, this vital 
movement, goes on and on. History is created again and again. This core definition will prevent us from 
fossilizing even historic-tradition. This creation, this history, is not happening in one's mind either. It is 
happening between people and between peoples in this (what we call) world. In  this world is the 
possibility of happenings, events, meetings with one-another being-in-one-another. Hence this world is 
a world of people and peoples. A peopled-world. There is no need to postulate anything else to make 
history happening in the world.  
 But as we say people, person, meeting, making meaning happen, it all implies that people are 
reasoing, that people are conscious. That reasoning together makes meaning happen. The being-with-
one-another and being-in-one-another is not only just at a pure physical level (as if this is possible). It is 
a human level, with all human attributes. The sedimentation of meaning too, is at a human level. The 
passing on of meaning sedimented happens from one to other person or generation. The meaning 
making and meaning passing-on does happen, sometimes smoothly, oftentimes violently. Sometimes 
implicitly often explicitly. Thus we make war and peace, to mention just two clearly opposing 
categories of meaning making, and there are countless others in between. And all these then is history 
in the world. So the history makers are also simultaneously the history observers. And what is observed 
is also what is being made at the same time. This is history at the first instance. This first-instance 
history, when all the participants are moving on, or gone, it still can live in the memory of those to 
whom the sedimented meaning has been passed on, whom the tradition has been given to keep. This is 
then the-second instance history.  
 About this second instance history there are many, too many dificulties, as to how to keep the 
sedimented meaning-making "original," "pure."256
                                                 
256  Be it noted, just as I am re-editing this very page, the SBS-TV News is broadcasting the memorial service to 
remember the Final solution, Holocaust, in the Great Synagogue in Berlin.  
 It is almost impossible to avoid sceptical attitudes 
with regard to such 'original' meaning. I am using "almost" as an operative word. Hence in the course of 
our human history we "have invented" some argumentative "tools", e.g., exegesis, hermeneutics and the 
likes, in philosophical circles, while in other areas, e.g., Religion, of Government Policy, usually some 
kind of hierarchy is created which claims to allow the right interpretation (e.g., in a totalitarian 
Government, or Inquisition !).  An example will illustrate the case: the "fact" of Berlin-Wall being 
knocked-down, what is the meaning of it? The victory of the "western" against the "eastern" system of 
government in Germany at that time? or was it Gorbachev bowing to the demand to Ronald Reagan 
hence (the famous broadcasted TV, "Mr. Gorbachev, tear this wall down!")? or perhaps an ultimate 
victory symbol of John-Paul II in knocking down the Communists?  
Our world is full of possibilities of interpretative meanings at the second- (and third and so forth) 
instances of history.     
 As we have seen even in the first-instance history the intersubjective interaction, with-one-
another, and in-one-another, history happens 'in' the world but it also happen 'in' time, in a flowing-
duration. Since we do not experience 'time' and 'space' (world) in vacuo, we experience them 'via' the 
marks, time-events land-marks. Concerning 'time,' consciousness, Husserl famously struggles through 
many manuscripts, and  the manuscripts so far published are only those up to 1918.257
Husserl's main "difficulty" according to Eugen Fink is that "he does not allow the problem of 'being' 
(des Seienden, that-which-is) really come forward at all."  "That-which-is," "that which is in being 
(Seiendes)" is accordingly "the correlate of acts 'that give something as it-self.'"
 But he made his 
own special progress concerning our historical dimension, which this thesis acknowledges.   
 
Phenomenology's limitation   
258
Suffice to say that after Ideen I (1913), when Husserl's analysis of 'seeing [the] essences' is still close to 
This is the junction in 
which Husserl and Heidegger parted in ways of their phenomenology of history. Fink however, has 
made other suggestions again, that would be a topic for another thesis. 
                                                 
257  E. Husserl. Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins 1893-1917. Hua X. Hrsg.  von Rudolf Boehm. 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1969). The Haupttext, Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des Zeitbewußtseins. Hrsg. M. Heidegger 
(Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologisch Forschung, Bd. IX, 1928) 367-498. For my purpose 2e Auflg. 
Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1980.  
 E. Husserl. Die Bernauer Manuskripte über Zeitbewußtseins 1917/1918 . HUA XXXIII. Hrsg. Rudolf Bernet, Dieter 
Lohmar. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001)  
258  Bruzina 2004.  427 
the late Scholastics. (I have in mind the Suarezian).259
 Piecing all these materials together, we can grasp the relationship between  Husserl's insight 
into the philosophy of history and  his own historical time.
  
and when in the Méditations cartesiennes (1929/ 31) intersubjectivity has entered the scene, Husserl 
himself has taken some distance from the late Scholastics. The revision and re-working of the 
Méditations text for the German public has taken Husserl a considerable time eventually given up in 
1934. Suddenly when the writing of Krisis started, he then handled feverishly the Philosophy of 
History, in the midst of his own personal and academic difficulties.  
260
                                                 
259  Francisco Suarez SJ. De Entibus Rationis. (On Beings  Of  Reason) Trans. John Doyle (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 1995) 
260  Ch. 4 this thesis. 
 (Ch. 4 this thesis).  Given the totalitarian 
Government of the Nazi-Germany, which fossilized the German Aryan-superiority myth and the lesser 
thinking of many of his philosophers-colleagues, esp. Heidegger and Freiburg Faculty of Philosophy, 
Husserl last opus, an unfinished work, has voiced again the trust and hope, that a pure consciousness 
perceiving in time the landmarks of history, will sediment this for the generations to come, the vision 
that when humans have left the (Greek, Jewish and German) capacity to think through history, calamity 
will happen.  
    Sic transit gloria mundi. 
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